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Baker Travels to Moscow for Two-Plus-Four Talks

Opens Talks With Shevardnadze

PM1209095590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Talk with U.S. Secretary of State"]

[Text] Talks began 11 September between E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the USSR Presidential Council and USSR foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, who has come to Moscow for the meeting of foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain, the FRG, the GDR, and France on questions of the German settlement and also as cochairman of the U.S. presidential trade and economic mission.

The ministers discussed the schedule for their further contacts in the light of existing understandings on summit contacts. In particular in the context of preparation for the Paris summit of the 35 countries taking part in the CSCE process the two sides attach great importance to the meeting of the participating states' foreign ministers 1-2 October in New York, where they will have to sum up the results of the work already done in the preparatory committee and impart new impetuses to it. The common opinion was voiced that there are good opportunities for reaching major accords at the Paris meeting.

E.A. Shevardnadze and J. Baker dwelled in detail on questions of the settlement of regional crises and examined specific issues of the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms in Europe.

Within the process of the mutual understandings reached by the two presidents in Helsinki, the foreign minister and secretary of state continued the discussion of questions linked to the acute conflict situation in the Persian Gulf and expressed themselves in favor of continuing collaboration with a view to the speediest unblocking of the crisis situation.

The sides agreed that the unanimity in the approach toward the events in the Persian Gulf displayed by virtually the entire world community has enabled the Security Council to lay the political and legal foundation for a settlement. The joint statement adopted by the USSR and U.S. presidents in Helsinki stresses that Iraq must withdraw its troops from Kuwait as a compulsory condition.

E.A. Shevardnadze stressed that the USSR is prepared to use all the opportunities at its disposal and its political weight to help overcome this dangerous crisis.

Questions of security in the Near East and the possibility of setting up practical collaboration with a view to consolidating stability and peace in the region were examined on the broad long-term plane.

The Soviet side noted the importance of activating efforts with a view to launching a peace process and beginning real advance in the direction of convening an international conference on the Near East with the participation of all sides in the conflict, including the PLO, and also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Questions connected with Afghanistan were discussed. The sides, having reaffirmed their desire to promote the speediest unblocking of the conflict in Afghanistan, continued their efforts to bring closer the Soviet and U.S. positions with regard to key principles of an Afghan political settlement.

In this context special attention was paid to questions of the specific content of the mechanisms of the transitional period, in particular the prospects of creating a representative coordinating organ whose main tasks would be the preparation and holding of general democratic elections in Afghanistan with a view to forming a government on a broad basis.

Here the Soviet side noted that the question of the nature and structures of future power in Afghanistan should be decided by the Afghans themselves through their free expression of their will.

USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker expressed satisfaction in connection with the adoption by the permanent members of the UN Security Council of a package of documents defining the framework of an all-embracing political settlement in Cambodia. They welcomed with approval the Cambodian sides' decisions reached during the meeting in Jakarta regarding the formation of a supreme national council.

The Soviet Union and the United States advocate the intensification of the talks process on the Cambodian problem at all levels, leading to practical decisions.

The USSR foreign minister stressed the importance of direct contacts between the interested sides and welcomed the dialogue which has begun between the United States and Hanoi and Phnom Penh.

During the examination of Central American problems great attention was paid to the state and prospects of a political settlement of the conflict in El Salvador. The sides were unanimous that the attainment of peace in El Salvador would be of important significance not only for that country but also for the entire region, promoting the creation of favorable conditions for disarmament and the ensuring of mutual security. They reaffirmed their support for the talks under way with the mediation of the UN secretary general between the government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front leadership on ways out of the conflict situation.

The talks paid attention to questions of Soviet-U.S. collaboration in the settlement of conflict situations in Africa. The readiness of the USSR and the United States was noted to assist the talks process in Angola with a view to achieving national conciliation and agreement on a cease-fire. There was also a discussion of the possibilities of assisting the settlement of the conflict situation and the solution of humanitarian problems in the Horn of Africa region. The ministers plan to continue the discussion during their talk 13 September.

Discusses Gulf Crisis

LD1109123890 Moscow TASS in English 1226 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The Gulf crisis and disarmament top the agenda of the Soviet-American talks in Moscow today between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. Baker arrived here late on Monday evening from Brussels.

The sides will also discuss the "two-plus-four" meeting to be held in Moscow on Wednesday. The meeting will be attended by the foreign ministers of the six countries.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov described issues of Soviet-American economic interaction as an important topic of the present Moscow consultations.

"I believe that the prospects for economic interaction will be discussed in light of what was considered at the Helsinki meeting," he told TASS after the start of the Shevardnadze-Baker talks.

"The two sides singled out specific areas of this interaction," Obukhov continued. "In fact, work began long ago. There are several major projects which need "political backing to implement them completely."

Obukhov stressed that a "new and more constructive atmosphere developed in Helsinki in discussing these issue, and the U.S. side expressed the intention to give political backing to projects which are being implemented".

Noting that Moscow is now being visited by a U.S. trade and economic presidential mission co-chaired by Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher and James Baker, Obukhov said: "we pin great hopes on this delegation."

"The talks it will hold in Moscow will be of practical importance. The mission plans meetings with our businessmen, and I hope that these meetings will yield impressive results.

"A major step was taken in Washington: A trade agreement was signed," he continued. "But other agreements are needed to create appropriate conditions for the development of joint business.

"These are agreements on investments and on avoiding double taxation. Both sides are working on them in the hope to draft the agreements for the next summit."

Asked about the date of a new Soviet-American summit, Obukhov noted that when its preliminary date was contemplated, "Moscow and this December were mentioned".

Speaking about other items at the Shevardnadze-Baker talks, Obukhov said that the meeting would deal with regional issues, including prospects for a Cambodian settlement, which "became better as a result of the latest decisions" and the Afghan issue which remains a "serious and important problem."

"The Asia-Pacific region is a topic which is always on the agenda of talks," Obukhov continued.

"This topic is becoming more interesting in light of Shevardnadze's trip to that region last week and in light of initiatives which were put forth by him in Vladivostok and which amplify the Krasnoyarsk proposals," Obukhov noted.

"I believe that conditions are developing there, maybe even have developed to step up political activities to establish cooperation, to lower the level of military confrontation and to build measures of confidence.

"The region has peculiar conditions as compared with Europe. Nevertheless, approaches should be the same," Obukhov said.

British Secretary's Two-Plus-Four Visit Viewed

LD1109163890 Moscow TASS in English 1600 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow September 11—People in the Soviet Union regard British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd's visit to Moscow, which began today, as a very timely opportunity to continue the Soviet-British political dialogue, a direct and immediate comparison of the two countries' views upon the major problems of the world and European politics and bilateral relations.

"This is a working, unofficial visit by Douglas Hurd," deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Second European Directorate Valeriy Krrasnov told TASS, "but the range of problems to be covered and its duration put it on a par with any full-scale and significant visit."

"During his stay in Moscow, the British foreign secretary is due to meet President Mikhail Gorbachev and have an intense round of talks with Eduard Shevardnadze and a group of experts, advisers and specialists. Hurd can be expected to be briefed on the recent Helsinki summit and discuss the Persian Gulf situation," Krasnov said.

According to Krasnov, the Soviet-British talks in Moscow will focus on European problems. Another major issue is the economic interaction of the two countries both on a bilateral basis and within international financial and economic organisations.

"The Soviet interest in this subject is considerable," Krasnov stressed. He recalled that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, speaking at the Aspen institute in the United States on August 5, proposed assistance to the Soviet Union in transferring one of the Soviet industries to a modern technological basis.

The state of Soviet-British relations is now better than at any time since the Second World War. The two countries have reached a good, steady, effective level of cooperation in solving problems of mutual interest. Even fewer confrontational elements remain in these relations and the desire is noticeable on both sides to settle disputes in a quiet atmosphere.

The new level of Soviet-British relations is reflected in the organisation and the character of Hurd's visit. The British foreign secretary will be given a chance to familiarise himself with Soviet people's way of life and the functioning of various institutions, including the Russian Parliament and the Moscow City Council.

A former interior minister and the author of detective novels, he expressed the desire to familiarise himself with the activity of the Soviet militia and even take a ride in a police patrol car. Hurd plans to visit the Moscow metro, a shop and a village outside Moscow and meet believers in a church community.

"Nothing is being specially prepared," Krasnov noted, "all places to be visited by Hurd have been chosen by the English side."

On September 12, the British minister will take part in the two-plus-four meeting of foreign ministers to discuss foreign policy aspects of German unification.

FRG's Genscher Arrives for Two-Plus-Four Talks

LD1109120290 Moscow TASS in English 1155 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher arrived here today. He will attend the "two plus four" meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and the German Democratic Republic, opening here on Wednesday.

The meeting is meant to settle questions of German unification.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze will meet Genscher here today, TASS has learnt.

French Foreign Minister Dumas Arrives 12 Sep

LD1209025790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2359 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 Sep (TASS)—Roland Dumas, France's minister of foreign affairs, arrived in Moscow today. He is to take part in the meeting, due to start in the morning, of the heads of the foreign political departments of the USSR, United States, England, France, FRG, and GDR within the framework of the two-plus-four mechanism on the problem of the unification of the two German states.

It is expected that as a result of the meeting in Moscow the ministers will sign a treaty on the final settlement of the issue regarding Germany.

As was reported to a TASS correspondent at the French Embassy in Moscow, Roland Dumas will have bilateral conversations here with Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR minister of foreign affairs, and with his West German colleague, Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

Moscow Two-Plus-Four Talks Result in Treaty

Accord 'Expected' To Be Signed

LD1209072490 Moscow TASS in English 0703 GMT 12 Sep 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—The decisive stage of the "two plus four" conference, intended to settle external aspects of the process of German unification, started here today. The Foreign ministers of the six countries are expected to sign an agreement finally settling the German problem.

As noted in Soviet diplomatic circles, the "six" have not only sought and finally found mutually acceptable external parameters for settling the German problem, but have also gleaned valuable political experience that may be useful in the future.

Various elements of the problem—internal, international, military, political and economic—were thoroughly discussed in NATO, in the Common Market and in Warsaw Treaty countries. Many statesmen both in the West and in Eastern Europe note that the reunification of Germany may become and should become a catalyst for creating new European security structures.

Representatives of both German states played a constructive role in the work of the "six". By opting for a single German state, West and East Germans have clearly displayed their readiness to establish it only in concord with their neighbours, with all Europeans, without upsetting the stability, security and traquility of the continent. All this is made legally-binding in the draft treaty on a German settlement.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told journalists on the eve of his talks with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that there were several issues on the agenda of the "two plus four" meeting which warrant the attention of the six ministers. "We must first of all specify the formulas," he added.

Genscher, Shevardnadze Confer

LD1109182190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1716 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 Sep (TASS)—A working meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who has arrived in Moscow to take part in the "Two-Plus-Four" meeting at minister level, was held today.

Questions connected with the coming meeting of the foreign ministers of the six states were discussed, as was the need to complete work on a draft treaty on a final Germany settlement.

The ministers focused considerable attention on questions of implementing the accords on developing bilateral relations which were achieved at the July meeting of the Soviet and FRG leaders.

Accord Reached on FRG Aid

LD1109151990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Excerpts] A number of important events are taking place these days in Berlin and in many other GDR towns, events which provide evidence of how quickly the political background is changing as German unity approaches. A report from our correspondent (Anatoliy Styupkin in Berlin):

[Styupkin] [passage omitted] The next round of talks between the foreign ministers of six states to definitely settle the German question—the so-called "two-plus-four" formula—begins tomorrow 12 September in Moscow. Here in Berlin that meeting is being seen as the concluding stage which will dot the 'i's on the German question.

It is also being said that a half-hour telephone conversation has taken place between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Helmut Kohl. According to reports on West German radio and television an accord has been reached for the German side to provide financial aid amounting to many billions in the process of withdrawing Soviet troops from Germany. In addition it is reported that an agreement has been reached for large-scale supplies of foodstuffs to our country from the GDR. This refers to an agreement to the tune of many thousands of millions, based on world prices, under which we are to receive around 255,000 tonnes of meat, 60,000 tonnes of butter, together with wheat flour, potatoes, fish, tobacco, and cigaretes.

TASS on 'Unresolved Matters'

LD1209090190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0726 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Report by TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Sep (TASS)—The "two-plus-four" meeting started here today with a sitting of the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States, Great Britain, France, the FRG, and GDR in a small group. The ministers have to agree on the position of the sides on a number of aspects related to settling the problems of the unification of Germany. This sitting is to be followed by a plenary meeting which is expected to result in the signing of a treaty on the final settlement of the Germany issue.

Unconfirmed reports circulating among circles close to the meeting say that this morning there remain two unresolved matters: Can dual-purpose systems [artillery systems capable of firing conventional and nuclear shells] be deployed on the territory of the present GDR and can foreign troops stationed on German territory cross the border of the present GDR.

At the July meeting between USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and FRG Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl an understanding was reached that nuclear weapons would not be sited on GDR territory. The question of dual-purpose systems remaind open. At that time it was agreed that foreign troops would not be sited on GDR territory. However, the Western allies would like to interpret this understanding to mean that foreign troops had the right to stay temporarily on this territory, for example, in the event of incidents or maneuvers.

It is precisely these formulas, it is thought among journalists that are the main topics for debate at the current meeting among the ministers.

Pact Signed; Gorbachev Attends

LD1209091890 Moscow TASS in English 0911 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—"The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany" was signed in a ceremony here today, winding up the "Two Plus Four" meeting of Soviet, U.S., British, French, West German and East German foreign ministers. The ceremony was attended by President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Gorbachev To Meet With U.S., Italian Officials

LD1109191790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] There is no dissapation of interest in details of the Helsinki meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and George Bush. Many questions on this subject were brought up by journalists today during a briefing by Ignatenko, the USSR president's aide. He noted, among other things, that the positions of the two sides were reflected in the joint statement on the results of the summit meeting. A process of rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States is under way.

The president's aide informed journalists about Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's working program for the coming week. In particular, meetings are planned with

Baker, the U.S. secretary of state; de Michelis, the Italian minister of foreign affairs; and Reagan, former U.S. president.

Envoy Andropov Interviewed on CSCE Talks

PM0709120790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with special envoy I.Yu. Andropov by correspondent V. Pershin; date not given: "After the Consultations in Rome"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] Rome—In accordance with the decision of the Vienna CSCE meeting a conference on the Mediterranean Sea will open in the Spanish city of Palma de Mallorca 24 September. Apart from CSCE countries, non-European Mediterranean states and representatives of international organizations will take part in its work. Consultations are currently being held among the participants. The other day talks were held in Rome between the Soviet and Italian Foreign Ministries. The Soviet side was represented by special envoy I.Yu. Andropov, with whom your IZVESTIYA correspondent talked.

[Pershin] Igor Yuryevich, such meetings within the CSCE framework on the problems of the Mediterranean have also been held before. What is different about the present meeting?

[Andropov] Many events which have radically altered the look of Europe and created conditions for establishing fruitful multilateral cooperation among the countries of the continent, particularly on questions of collective security, have taken place since the meetings you mention. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of the Mediterranean, where the persisting tension and the fact that a number of serious problems remain unsettled are increasingly clearly at odds with the positive processes in European and world affairs. As Italian Foreign Minister G. de Michaelis has repeatedly noted, the southern Mediterranean countries are increasingly persistent in voicing concern that they may find themselves by the wayside of the process of strengthening mutual understanding and consensus which can now be clearly observed in Europe. Therefore one of the main tasks of the conference in Palma de Mallorca must be to utilize the positive experience accumulated in Europe in order to solve the Mediterranean's problems while taking into account the degree of interdependence between the security of this region and of the European Continent.

[Pershin] What questions is it planned to examine in Palma de Mallorca?

[Andropov] The mandate of the conference on the Mediterranean given by the Vienna meeting is well balanced. It makes it possible to discuss general political questions and to make a profound study of problems of cooperation among the region's states in the sphere of the economy, protection of the environment, culture, and the fight against terrorism and the drug trade.

[Pershin] Will the question of naval activity in the Mediterranean be touched on in any form?

[Andropov] This is a special question, and the Vienna mandate does not directly indicate that it should be discussed. But it can be supposed that the problem of naval activity in the region will not be overlooked. It may be raised both by CSCE member states and by non-European Mediterranean countries.

It cannot be ruled out that certain Arab states will try to raise questions of a Near East settlement and the crisis in the Persian Gulf. This is natural, since each state has the right to speak out on what is for it the most painful topic. But, I repeat, the Vienna mandate does not presuppose profound debate on the aforementioned questions. And the situation now prevailing in the Mediterranean does not make it possible to discuss them in a specific context. So it is better to focus efforts on profound study of the questions envisaged by the mandate.

[Pershin] Was the question of the situation in the Persian Gulf raised during your consultations in Rome?

[Andropov] Yes, of course, and it should be stressed that what emerged was great similarity between the positions of the USSR and Italy regarding assessments of its influence on the development of the international situation and possible ways of settling it.

The Italians, like ourselves, assign a leading role in resolving the crisis to the United Nations and the international community.

[Pershin] So far as I am aware, during your stay in Rome you met with Vatican representatives. What was the discussion about?

[Andropov] The conversation with J.-L. Tauran, deputy head of the Vatican's foreign policy department, was extremely interesting and useful. I must note that our former emphasis on the ideologization of international relations placed us in a position in which we could not fully utilize the potential of our diplomacy. This applied to a great extent to the Vatican, which plays a considerable role in world politics. Our contacts, especially since the establishment of official relations, have been becoming increasingly regular. They are important both for resolving bilateral Soviet-Vatican problems and for organizing broad political cooperation. I was impressed by the competence and logic of the Vatican representatives during the discussion of questions of the CSCE, the conference in Palma de Mallorca, and the crisis in the Persian Gulf. Particularly their analysis and philosophical and conceptual approach to these problems. Quite naturally, the Vatican pays heightened attention to the religious factor, rightly believing that it often forms the basis for the emergence of tension both inside individual states, and in entire regions. As for the Persian Gulf problem, the Vatican's position is unequivocal—any actions violating the UN Charter and the norms of international law and international ethics, no matter who perpetrates them, are to be condemned.

CSCE Envoy Advocates Pact 'Declaration'

PM0709135590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent S. Tosunyan: "Preparing for the Paris Summit"]

[Text] Vienna—The second session of the preparatory committee drawing up the agenda for the Paris summit opened in Vienna's Hofburg Palace 4 September. Delegations from 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada had traveled to their capitals for brief consultations following the end of the first session. Now they will have to clearly formulate the outline agreements that have been reached and incorporate them into a joint document.

Here is what Ambassador Yu.S. Deryabin, head of the Soviet delegation, told IZVESTIYA's correspondent about the work that has been done and the forthcoming tasks for the preparatory committee:

"Our delegation reported on the results of the first session of the preparatory committee to the foreign minister, the government, and the president. We have received a clear mandate to continue to act on the basis of what has already been agreed at the Hofburg.

"On many issues editing can start right away, without delay, and this work can be entrusted to the corresponding groups. It transpired that a number of problems will require discussions to be continued at the conceptual level. We are prepared for this too. Perhaps, as before, the potential of official and unofficial plenary sessions and talks at the level of delegation heads could be exploited.

"Having attentively studied during the deliberations the proposals from the FRG and Canada regarding a conflict prevention and settlement center, the Soviet delegation believes that these proposals could form a good basis for mutually acceptable solutions. They largely coincide with our proposal on the functions of such a center.

"Nor should we lose sight of issues connected with the peaceful settlement of disputes or the elaboration of corresponding mechanisms and procedures. In particular, we must determine whether such mechanisms will become part of the conflict settlement center or whether they will act separately but in conjunction with it. We are devoting no less attention to the idea of the gradual creation of procedures in the sphere of environmental protection.

"I would particularly like to touch on an issue on which there is no unanimous opinion as yet. I am talking about a declaration by the Warsaw Pact and NATO states. The Soviet delegation is convinced that such a document, reflecting the new quality of relations between the member states of two alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—which had until recently been in confrontation, would be an organic part of the results of the Paris summit and fall within the framework of pan-European thinking."

Zagladin on European Security Structures

LD0809131290 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 8 Sep 90

[Text] Next is an interview given to Radio Moscow by Mr. Gorbachev's adviser Vadim Zagladin on the prospects of new security structures being formed in Europe.

Vadim Zagladin said the concepts of European security had been the subject of discussions for quite some time, giving rise to exciting considerations and proposals as well as to national and international programs. But now is the time, he said, to put all of this into practice. Vadim Zagladin spoke of another round of talks that began in Vienna to set the ground for a 35-nation European conference in Paris in November. Discussions in Vienna center on the kind of European security structures that must be set up to implement the worked out concepts into life [as heard]. German unity is close at hand, and the treaty the two Germanys will sign on 3 October will turn them into a single nation, thereby putting an end to the present European divide. The general mood at the Vienna talks on conventional weapons reductions in Europe is to resolve the existing issues and prepare a draft treaty for signing by the Paris conference. Vadim Zagladin also said that regular contacts between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries were part of a new security structure. He called for finding a solution that would lead to an overcoming of alliance structures and the elimination of alliances as a long term priority. However, he said, no country's interests must be affected.

Vadim Zagladin went on to say that Europe must be concerned about developments in Asia and just the other way round. [as heard]

A new security structure is being set up in Europe he said; the process is underway, albeit at a slower pace, in Asia as well. Vadim Zagladin spoke of the need to bring the two processes into step which would give rise to the concept of a single Euro-Asian security and stability. He said Europe had begun the process of ending global confrontation and was making headway; he believes that would stimulate similar trends in Asia and elsewhere.

Discussion of Baltic Pollution 'Long Overdue'

PM0709140790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Article by correspondent M. Zubko: "Baltic Forum"]

[Text] Stockholm—The heads of a number of governments and experts from the Baltic states—Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Finland, the GDR, the FRG, the USSR, and also Norway and Czechoslovakia—have met in the southern Swedish coastal city of Ronneby for a two-day International Conference on Problems of the Ecology of the Baltic Sea.

The importance of the conference is emphasized not only by the participation of prime ministers, but also by the fact that representatives of the "Common Market," World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and a number of other organizations are coming to Ronneby.

Discussion at this level is long overdue.

At a symposium held the other day in Sweden, 70 scientists presented a report. The results of investigation of water samples taken from various regions of the sea in 1984-1988 showed that in terms of a number of indicators the Baltic marine environment is slightly better than in the seventies. For instance, the DDT content has decreased and is now at a stable and low level. The increasingly wide use of unleaded gasoline in a number of countries is also improving the Baltic marine environment.

But in other respects the situation has not improved; indeed, it has deteriorated in terms of a number of indicators. For instance, the content of heavy metals—cadmium, zinc, and copper—in the waters of the northern part of the Gulf of Bothnia is increasing, while in the eastern part, so-called Gotland, quantities of hydrogen sulfide that have never been seen before have been recorded in recent days. Scientists have discovered that 70,000 square km of the Baltic seabed, including a number of areas of the Gulf of Finland, are now lifeless.

World Peace Council Appeals to Gorbachev, Bush

LD0909124990 Moscow TASS in English 1140 GMT 9 Sep 90

[Text] Helsinki September 9 TASS—Soviet Presidential Council member Yevgeniy Primakov today met World Peace Council (WPC) President Evangelos Maheras who conveyed a WPC appeal to the Soviet and American leaders.

The document says that the World Peace Council strongly condemns Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, an independent, sovereign state and a member of the United Nations.

The WPC demands the immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the restoration of its territorial integrity.

The Iraqi authorities must, without delay, release all foreign citizens who are being forcibly detained in Iraq and Kuwait. The WPC supports corresponding decisions taken by the U.N. Security Council.

The appeal stresses that the movements express extreme anxiety at the unprecedented deployment of U.S. and other military forces in the Gulf and any plan for these forces to remain. They are against any military solution of the crisis.

The crisis in the Gulf should not be used as a pretext to expand the sphere of NATO activities outside the limits determined by its own treaty, to halt the process of disarmament and to increase military budgets.

The Gulf crisis, however, leads once more to the conclusion that the disarmament process and reduction of military spending must be accelerated, involving all countries, including those of the Third World, the appeal says.

The disarmament process must include a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the full destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons, the reduction of military budgets and the replacement of the politics of force by fair relations.

The Iraq-Kuwait conflict is just one of a whole series of long-standing problems in the Middle East which urgently need a just solution, the document says.

The WPC regards all Security Council resolutions as being of equal value and asks for the implementation of these resolutions by all member-states.

It is high time to seek a comprehensive solution for peace and security in the Middle East through common efforts by the world community, either at a special international conference or at a special session of the U.N. General Assembly.

The WPC president appealed to the leaders of the two great powers not to cease their efforts in the search for a peaceful solution.

Shevardnadze's Vladivostok Speech Assessed

OW0909132590 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Text] Before his visit to Japan, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze attended the opening ceremony of the Conference on the Asian-Pacific Region: Dialogue, Peace, and Cooperation held in Vladivostok, a Far Eastern city of the Soviet Union. In this connection, our reporter Kalinin reports as follows:

As early as a few years ago, it was frequently said that the Soviet Union gave its priority to European issues and neglected Asian issues. To be frank, there was such a trend. However, it is different now. The Soviet foreign policy has become somewhat balanced, thanks to perestroyka and a new political thinking grown out of it.

As advocated by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in his Vladivostok address, the Soviet foreign policy stresses that Europe and Asia should be turned into a stable and secure region. Will this task be carried out? I believe that although it is not easy to carry out the task, it is possible to do so. We should admit that measures taken to strengthen security in Europe were taken ahead of those taken to strengthen security in Asia. However, there has been a certain progress in strengthening security in the Asian and Pacific region. Soviet-Chinese relations, which had been a cause of international conflicts for a long time, have been normalized. The Soviet Union and China will soon again hold regular talks in Moscow on reducing military strength along their border and on strengthening their relations of trust. In addition, China is deepening its good-neighborly relations with Indonesia. Relations between the United States and Mongolia have improved. There is a bright prospect for ending the Cambodian conflict, and leaders of North and South Korea held talks for the first time on 4 September.

To my regret, however, negative trends are seen in this international development and one of the trends is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Such an invasion is putting the international situation in a very difficult state. It is hard to predict how the Persian Gulf situation will develop in the future. However, there is one thing I can definitely say, and it is that every possible effort should be made to settle the crisis through political means. I do not mean that this should be applied only to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. The security issue is a question which can be resolved by political means during negotiations and should be resolved at all costs. Therefore, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in his Vladivostok address, called for the creation of a mechanism to hold negotiations attended by many nations. In particular, he proposed to examine the possibility of holding talks among the Soviet Union, China, the United States, Canada, and Japan to discuss the question of ensuring strategic security in the Asian and Pacific region, of organizing Asian foreign ministerial conference, and of holding summit talks attended by the leaders of all Asian nations.

This proposal made by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was a further development of an initiative taken by Soviet leader Gorbachev in his Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk addresses to strengthen the security of the Asian and Pacific region. With Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's planned talks in Japan and President Gorbachev's expected visit to Tokyo next spring, we can greatly expect the start of further initiatives. The Soviet side is ready to study all such initiatives taken by any other nation.

If we do not work immediately for the solution of various difficult issues facing the Asian and Pacific region, we may miss chances to use the limitless influence of this vast region for the sake of the entire world's common development and peace, and this is an important thing that we must keep in mind.

United States & Canada

Helsinki Summit Continues To Generate Reportage

Bush on Superpower Relations

PM1209102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 1

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Blinov: "Diplomacy of the New Era"]

[Text] Washington—After returning from Helsinki, U.S. President Bush has informed the leaders of a number of states about the results of his meeting with USSR President Gorbachev. As White House Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater told journalists, Bush has spoken by telephone with the leaders of Canada, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

The President stressed the "historic character" of the joint statement approved in Helsinki, the White House spokesman's report says. All the leaders with whom Bush has talked "expressed support for and in many instances complete satisfaction with the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States were able to undertake such joint efforts."

According to press information he stressed his deep satisfaction at the results of the meeting with USSR President Gorbachev. In the U.S. President's opinion, the meeting demonstrated the solidarity between the Soviet Union and the United States in a period of acute international crisis and thereby aided the efforts to resolve it.

"We are most satisfied at the results of the meeting," G. Bush told journalists on board the presidential plane returning to the U.S. capital. The main content of the meeting was an appeal to observe the sanctions against Iraq, he said, stressing that the common USSR and U.S. stand on this question "gives a clear signal to Saddam Husayn." "I believe that this is also a signal to the whole world, and I am completely satisfied with that," the President stated.

Assessing the joint statement adopted on the results of the meeting, G. Bush called it "superb." "The next step now will be to ensure the application of the sanctions," he remarked.

Answering the question of whether he had disagreements with President Gorbachev, G. Bush stated: "No one has said that the United States and the USSR reached agreement on every nuance of every question. However, as for this one (the demand that Iraq leave Kuwait), everything is precise and clear."

G. Bush announced the possibility of a new meeting with the Soviet leader later this year or early next year.

On Tuesday evening, G. Bush will deliver a speech at a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This speech, previously intended to be on budget questions, will be dedicated almost exclusively, the White House has now decided, to an assessment of the results of the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Helsinki and the U.S. course of actions in connection with the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

U.S. newspapers and television are stressing that the Soviet-U.S. cooperation that is being established has been tested by the first international crisis since the cold war. This test has not set it back but on the contrary has demonstrated the durability of the new relations established between the two countries and their great positive potential for the general international atmosphere.

The Helsinki meeting was a "vivid example of Soviet-U.S. mutual understanding," an ABC TV commentator said, assessing its results. In the opinion of an observer from CNN, another leading TV company, the USSR and U.S. leaders gave an "unparalleled lesson of superpower cooperation."

"The first Soviet-U.S. attempt at the joint resolution of a crisis since the end of the cold war," in THE WASHINGTON POST's opinion, "ushers in a new era in superpower cooperation." The U.S. capital's leading press organ stresses that the results of the meeting should help to step up the pressure on Iraq to fulfill the five UN Security Council resolutions which are aimed at resolving the crisis. In the newspaper's opinion, there have been no examples in the past of such superpower unanimity in condemning those to blame for international conflicts.

Kuwaiti Premier on Summit

LD1109085990 Moscow TASS in English 0851 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondet Aleksandr Krivykh]

[Text] Paris September 11 TASS—The Kuwaiti prime minister and crown prince, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah, is satisfied with the results of the Helsinki meeting between President Gorbachev and Bush.

After his talks with President Francois Mitterrand of France and Prime Minister Michel Rocard here on Monday [10 September], he held a news conference in which he said that the entire world closely followed the Soviet-American summit.

The international community praised its decisions which spell out measures necessary to achieve U.N. goals, the prime minister said.

He expressed hope that the international community would find a way to implement the Helsinki decisions.

If the trade and economic embargo provided for by U.N. resolutions against Iraq is not effective, the leaders of the two superpowers should examine other, stiffer measures which would lead to implementing the resolutions.

The prime minister noted that the european community countries, including France, also clearly expressed their support for Kuwait. France officially condemend Baghdad's invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

The United Nations should put pressure on Iraq and make it leave Kuwait, he said.

Belonogov Briefs Pact Envoy

LD1109164490 Moscow TASS in English 1529 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov today met the ambassadors of Warsaw Pact countries to inform them about the September 9 superpower summit in Helsinki.

He said the summit focused on ways to find a political settlement to the Gulf crisis through the full implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.

"The productive dialogue between the Soviet and U.S. presidents will help work out measures to settle the acute crisis," Belonogov said.

He called for active efforts by the entire international community to this end.

News Conference in PRAVDA

PM1209091190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[TASS report: "Press Conference by the Presidents of the USSR and the United States" in Helsinki's Finlandia Hall on 9 September]

[Text] 10 Sep—It was already reported that M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush gave a joint news conference in Helsinki 9 September. The presidents of the USSR and the United States answered questions from numerous journalists who had arrived in the Finnish capital from all over the world.

Bush: I was told that I should be the first to answer the questions.

Question (Helen Thomas, UPI): I would like to ask both presidents whether there will be a war in the Persian Gulf, and I will follow this up with an additional question.

Bush: With your permission, Mr. President, allow me to say that I hope that we will succeed in achieving a peaceful solution, and the way to do this is to make Iraq observe the UN resolutions. I think this was expressed extremely clearly in two brief sentences of our joint statement: "Nothing but full compliance with the UN Security Council resolutions is acceptable." As soon as Saddam Husayn realizes this, a peaceful solution will certainly follow.

Question: And what can President Gorbachev say in this context?

Gorbachev: In reply to your question I would like to say that our entire seven-hour meeting today was devoted to seeking a political solution to this most acute conflict. I thus think we are on the right path.

Question: Mr. President, allow me to ask you. Are you saying that military actions may begin if there is no peaceful solution?

Bush: The United States is fully resolved to strive for the fulfillment of adopted resolutions. I would like to see them fulfilled and to see this lead to a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Question for President Bush: Mr. President, do you believe that the conflict in the Persian Gulf would make it possible to solve the Palestinian problem within the framework of a peace conference on the Near East? And second: Was this question discussed with Mr. Gorbachev?

Bush: Let me say this. I perceive the fulfillment of the UN resolution independently of and separately from the need to solve this other question. This question has been examined by many countries for many years on end. It is very important that it be solved. The secretary of state said a few days ago—and I firmly support this—that, given certain circumstances, the examination of the possibility of convening a conference would be acceptable. Indeed, our policy did envisage this from time to time. But I am firmly convinced that the two questions are not interlinked. Any attempt to interlink them is an attempt to water down the UN resolution (on the Persian Gulf).

Question (Soviet Television and Radio): A question for President Bush. How long will the U.S. forces remain in the Persian Gulf region?

Bush: They will stay in this region until such time as we are convinced that this region's security needs have been met and the resolutions have been fulfilled. I believe that the sooner they are withdrawn from there, the better. I stated this perfectly clearly to President Gorbachev, and I assume that he will affirm that we do not have the slightest intention of leaving them there a day longer than necessary. I would like to limit myself to this.

Gorbachev: Yes, I wish to add and to confirm that which the U.S. President stated during our conversation, namely: That the United States does not intend to leave its troops in that zone and that, given a change in the situation, its normalization, the U.S. Administration and the President personally will do everything to withdraw the troops from there. That is a very important statement.

Question (AP, Tom Romm): A question for both Presidents: The unanimity of opinions which you are expressing today does not cancel out the fact that certain sources of irritation still remain in relations between the two countries. President Bush, have you now a more sympathetic attitude toward proposals for Western economic aid to the Soviet Union? President Gorbachev, what do you think, is it now necessary to withdraw the Soviet military advisers from Iraq?

Bush: For my part, I am highly interested in rendering aid to ensure perestroyka's success. A group of high-level businessmen is on its way to the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, they are now in Helsinki. This is just one point proving that we are trying to encourage economic cooperation by all possible means. And we had a good lengthy discussion at our enlarged meeting today, taking into account the joint position taken by the Soviet Union and the United States at the United Nations. I believe that we must meet each other halfway, as far as possible, on the economic plane, and I intend to do so.

As you said, there are certain restraining factors, certain finer differences. There are also certain disagreements, genuine disagreements. But at the same time, I have said this earlier and I repeat it here before the assembled journalists from all countries in the world: Of course we want perestroyka to be crowned with success. This is an internal matter for the Soviet Union, but I believe that the convincing cooperation demonstrated by the Soviet Union at the United Nations makes me inclined to recommend the closest cooperation in the economic sphere, as far as this is possible. And I shall state this in Congress when I get back. We still have problems. After all, we also have certain serious problems in our economy. Now, when we are operating in conditions of huge deficits, we have no chance of writing checks for large sums. Apart from this, however, there are many methods we could use to try and assist the emerging economy in the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev: I did not answer the question that was addressed to me. But I would like to say something on a question which appeared not to be addressed to me—about Western aid to the Soviet Union—and to continue the conversation on this matter begun by President Bush. The more so since, as I can see, there is an attempt to link it with disagreements or the absence thereof. This is what I have to say. The President and I began our conversation today from the premise that in actual fact we are currently in a situation whereby the whole world community and our two vast states are undergoing a test of the robustness of the new approaches to resolving the problems of the world situation. And our entry into a new period of peace and our exit from the "cold war" are showing that immense, rather than fewer, efforts are required of us to find along this path methods which are commensurate with the new approaches toward the resolution of problems. I think that if there had been no Malta, it would have been very difficult for us to act in the most complex situation which developed in East Europe, and in the situation connected with the unification of Germany.

I think that if this had not been followed by Washington, Camp David, and other meetings at such level with other partners in international relations, we would have found ourselves in a complex position as regards the crisis situation in the Persian Gulf. And the fact that today we are united in our approaches when solving such acute problems which can have tragic consequences for the entire world community and not just for a given region, indicates that we are, after all, moving in the right direction, and are capable of solving the most major and most acute problems, of giving a commensurate response to the challenges of the time. A large part of my conversation with President Bush today was devoted to this, and I think that this is the main point to be perceived. There can be disagreements, nuances, and arguments. All this is natural. But today we have placed on record the main achievement of the recent period.

I would not like to have President Bush's reply give the impression that the Soviet Union will be rewarded by a certain sum for a certain behavior. This is what I think: We are acting in an acute situation, finding a solution that will be satisfactory and, mainly, will protect us all from an explosion. In this situation cooperation becomes a normal element, new cooperation, in new forms. In trade, in the economy, in technology, and in human exchanges. All these are elements of the new period, the peaceful period which we have only just entered and with which we are still trying to come to terms. It would be very superficial and simplistic to opine that the Soviet Union can be bought for dollars. Although I have to say that we are now counting on cooperation at this very serious stage of steep and profound changes, of the reform of our economy. This is normal. Let us recall the reforms in a number of states. They always presupposed, together with the main efforts of the peoples which were embarking upon the road of reform, the world community's participation in one form or another. This is the way to look at it. If anyone foists another view, then I think that this is unacceptable both for the United States and for the Soviet Union, or for any other state.

The second part of the question—about our specialists in Iraq. We are talking, in fact, not about advisers but about specialists who are serving on contracts. Their number is diminishing. Whereas at the start of the conflict there were, I believe, 196 of them, there are now around 150. As a matter of fact, the Iraqi leadership's view of this question is that if they have completed their jobs—this is normal contract work, even though we are talking about weapons—then they leave Iraq. And this process is proceeding. So, I do not think there is any problem here.

Question (S. Kondrashov, IZVESTIYA): I have a question for both presidents. Was there any discussion of possible military options for curbing Iraqi aggression? Beyond which limits and in what conditions will you consider that political methods have been exhausted and that military measures are needed to ensure compliance with the Security Council's resolutions concerning withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait?

Bush: I can say "No" in reply to your question. We did not discuss any military options. I find your question too hypothetical, and I would like this problem to be solved by peaceful means.

Gorbachev: I wish to confirm what President Bush has said. I affirm once again that the entire time allocated to discussion of the conflict was used to seek a political peaceful solution to it. I think that we can be ultimately optimistic about the efforts being undertaken by the world community, collaborating and pooling its efforts within the framework of the UN Security Council.

Question: Mikhail Sergeyevich, you said just now that if Iraq does not withdraw its troops peacefully, it will be necessary to undertake military steps. What will be the Soviet contribution to these military measures? And what will happen then to Soviet citizens currently in Iraq? And what will be the Arab factor?

Gorbachev: I did not say that we would switch to military methods if, as a result of peaceful methods, Iraq does not obey the will of the peoples and withdraw its troops. I did not claim this and I am not claiming this now. Furthermore I believe that this would draw us into events with unpredictable consequences. I believe that our two states and the United Nations Organization have at their disposal an enormous arsenal of approaches to reach a political solution of this problem. For this reason, I can limit myself to this. Hence the second part of your question is irrelevant.

Question for President Gorbachev: Iraq was your ally. What specifically have you undertaken in contacts with Saddam Husayn in order to change the situation?

Question for President Bush: What specifically did you ask President Gorbachev to undertake, did you ask him to establish direct contact with Saddam Husayn?

Gorbachev: I must say that since the beginning of the crisis we have been actively conducting a dialogue and exchanging opinions not just within the UN Security Council framework and not just with the U.S. Administration. We highly value these contacts and dialogue. We are maintaining an active dialogue with the leaders of China, India, all European states, and primarily the permanent members of the UN Security Council. I think that this is what helped us to arrive at the decisions the UN Security Council has adopted.

In exactly the same way I can say that we are actively conducting a dialogue and cooperating with the Arab world, with the Arab states. Our dialogue here is no less intensive, including that with President Husayn. I can say this: Whatever we say publicly—our ideas and our arguments—is what we bring to President Husayn's notice. The essence of all this comes down to the fact that the president and the entire Iraqi leadership should display prudence, should stop, and—even more so—should draw conclusions from the common position and the demands stemming from the UN Security Council's decisions on this question. We are conducting such a conversation with Iraq, we are trying to get our arguments across to its leadership, we are discussing various options for ways out of this situation with it, and, as I have just told you, we are trying to get across to Saddam Husayn the idea that if Iraq were to provoke military actions, that would be a tragedy primarily for the Iraqi people and for the entire region, but it would also cost the whole world dearly.

You know, for all the sharpness of this dialogue, we nevertheless believe that it is useful to continue it. We do not rule out the possibility of new contacts and meetings at different levels. The nature of our ties with that state during the preceding period allows us to hope that we can utilize these ties to the benefit of all of us in the quest for a peaceful solution with mandatory restoration of the situation as it was before the aggression that was undertaken against Kuwait.

Bush: President Gorbachev answered the question about contacts with Saddam Husayn. It is obvious that your question to me was: Did I ask him to get in touch with Saddam Husayn? No, I did not. But the Soviet Union maintains contacts with him. The president himself received Foreign Minister 'Aziz. But I would simply sum this up by stating that the best answer to Saddam Husayn or the best contact was the one at the United Nations, when the aggression was universally condemned.

I also assume that this statement, testifying that the Soviet Union and the United States are basically in agreement here—this is yet another wonderful statement for Saddam Husayn. I would like to hope that he would convince himself that he will be unable to split us, to split the other countries, and that he would do that which he should have done some time ago—heed the demands by the United Nations. But I did not ask Mr. Gorbachev to do this since they (the USSR) are far ahead of us in this regard. They are maintaining contacts and trying to help.

Question (T. Kolesnichenko, PRAVDA) for Mr. Bush: Mr. President, what is your stance on the question of signing a treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms; and when do you think this treaty will be finally signed?

Bush: We remain committed to the conclusion of a treaty on strategic arms. We promised that we would encourage our representatives at the talks to move on faster both with the treaty on strategic arms and with the agreement on conventional armed forces. I still hope that such an agreement will be reached by year's end.

Gorbachev: I want to confirm what President Bush said: We did indeed agree to make fresh efforts and give instructions once again since we see that there is a possibility to successfully complete the talks processes at these two forums and to achieve a positive result already this year.

Question (Doris Akatarian from the Palestine News Agency WAFA) My question is addressed to President Bush. I should also like to hear President Gorbachev's opinion. President Bush says that there is no connection between the Palestine question and the current situation. I want to understand how it is that it is so important to fulfill the UN resolution on this question when other resolutions have not been fulfilled for so long. I want to know why the current aggression is different from other aggressions? I want to say that the Palestinian question is a question demanding more attention from the superpowers than ever before.

Bush: I agree that this demands such attention, and we are highly interested in implementing UN Security Council Resolution 242. We have persistently striven for many years, like many other powers, to achieve this. The fact that this resolution has not been fulfilled, seeing that it calls for withdrawal within secure and recognized borders—and it must be fulfilled, we would like to hope so, we could encourage this. But this does not mean that it is possible to remain inactive in the face of the blatant aggression against Kuwait. The United Nations adopted measures, and UN resolutions must be fulfilled as such, without any attempts to associate them with any other unresolved conflict. But I fully agree with you that it is important, very important to finally solve this question. And I would like to hope that this will happen sooner rather than later.

Gorbachev: I think that everything happening in the Near East worries us equally. I would go further and say that what is happening in the Persian Gulf is yet another reminder that we must act more energetically so as to untie this Near East knot, and to arrive at solutions, at a system, at guarantees that would ensure the interests of all peoples and of the entire world community, since this affects all of us. It seems to me that there is a connection here. For the general lack of settlement in the Near East does make itself felt, and it is manifesting itself here too, giving this conflict an extra edge.

Question for both presidents: In your statement you state your readiness to act independently and jointly to ensure full compliance with UN sanctions with respect to Iraq. What specific steps have you agreed to take to put this into effect?

Bush: We did not agree on any specific steps. I think that President Gorbachev, in the course of contacts with Saddam Husayn... I mean the Iraqis... if these contacts are maintained... this would be a step in this direction. It is obvious that the statement in itself will be a step in this direction. At our meeting, however, we did not attempt to set any specific tasks to one another and did not make any joint pledges to take any steps on their implementation.

Gorbachev: I would like to add to this that the emphasis here is being placed upon the significance of the political affirmation which we considered necessary to reflect in this statement and which is evidence of our political will to act—either jointly, or in parallel, and independently—in the quest for new steps to a peaceful solution of this problem. I think that the meeting and the documents we are adopting on the results of this meeting are of greater significance that if we had enumerated just one or two steps. It is a matter of a political affirmation which establishes a basis for a quest and for energetic actions.

Question (V. Chukseyev, TASS): I too have a question for the two countries' presidents. Mr. President, Mikhail Sergeyevich. Following your recent meetings, as far as we are able to judge, good mutual understanding has been established between you. Have you been able to deepen this mutual understanding during this meeting, and how does this factor generally affect the results of your talks?

Bush: It seems to me that mutual understanding has been established over the past few years. I would like to believe, and I think that President Gorbachev would agree with this, that our meeting in Malta helped the development of this mutual understanding to a certain extent. I am convinced that our meeting in the United States, and especially the conversations in Camp David, deepened this mutual understanding. In my view, the whole world is clearly aware that if something similar (to the Persian crisis) had occurred 20 years ago, there would have been no such sense of collaboration at the United Nations. In my view, this is very important.

I do not know how to measure mutual understanding, but it seems to me that we are on the right path. Neither of us, whenever we are talking, tries to conceal our differences. Neither of us tries to pretend that we have absolutely identical views on all problems. But the very fact that we can talk to each other with such a degree of frankness, without animosity, strengthens mutual understanding in my view. Afterwards, when we realize that on questions like this we are standing shoulder to shoulder with many other countries at the United Nations, I think that this is a graphic manifestation of this developing mutual understanding. This is a very broad philosophical question, differences still remain. But the spheres where we have common ground, at least in my view, are much broader than these differences, and President Gorbachev and I will continue to cooperate.

Gorbachev: I do not know if I can reveal a secret. I did not consult with the President, but I have a very strong desire to do this... maybe even running a certain risk. This is too important in replying to this question. And the President's last sentence enables me to hope that everything will work out OK. Mr. President said in today's conversation: You know, for a long time we proceeded from the premise that the Soviet Union actually has nothing to do in the Near East. Its role here is very limited. At our meeting today—and this path had to be covered—it was said that cooperation is very important here, just as in other areas of world politics. Here you have a specific reply to this question. This is very important.

Something happens at every meeting. Every meeting enriches. And I have to say the main thing: A greater degree of trust is engendered. If a greater degree of trust is formed between the leaders of two such states, then—I hope that you will agree with me—this is our common asset. Whether we like it or not, history had ordained that a great deal depends on how we collaborate. This is not ambition, this is indeed what history has ordained. And we do not rule out [this collaboration], on the contrary, we collaborate with others more and more, in any steps, we cooperate, we conduct a dialogue. This is correct. We are committed to this. Nonetheless, we are aware of our role.

And now one last remark, but one that carries a powerful charge. It seems to me that the way our world is, and the way it is changing is such that not a single country today, no matter how mighty it may be, could secure the leadership that individual countries have claimed—including, perhaps, countries whose representatives are sitting here. Today we must collaborate. And we must solve problems together. This is what is emerging. This is perhaps the most important thing that is happening.

Question (French Television): Could I ask Mr. Gorbachev, is the Soviet Union still Iraq's friend, as Tariq 'Aziz stated in Moscow last week? Are you still Saddam Husayn's friend?

And another question for Mr. Gorbachev: President Saddam Husayn stated yesterday that the Soviet Union would prove that it is still a great power if it resists pressure from George Bush and supports the Baghdad regime. Could you say what your reply to Saddam Husayn will be?

Gorbachev: I shall reply. In order for me to reply to you and to President Saddam Husayn, I shall have to repeat what we said in the statement, and what I said in my replies to previous questions. My position does not change. We are aware of our role, and we are aware of our responsibility. It is within the framework of this role and this responsibility that we will act, in collaboration with the members of the Security Council. I can say once again, since we two presidents are sitting next to one another, that we will collaborate with the President of the United States. I would very much like to express the hope that President Saddam Husayn will show sobriety, that he will assess everything and will respond to the calls and demands of the world community, and that he will take such steps which might be fittingly evaluated in the world including, I hope, in the Arab world. Nobody intends to exclude Iraq from the world community, but the current Iraqi leadership's actions are driving it into a dead end. Let President Saddam Husayn heed these appeals to him.

Question: I would like to ask Mr. Gorbachev: Do you rule out the possibility of Soviet military participation in these efforts in any sense, either within the framework of a naval blockade or as part of some future peacekeeping force in the region? And let me go on to ask Mr. Bush: To what extent would you be disappointed if Mr. Gorbachev were to take such a stance?

Gorbachev: I see no point in this at the moment. We will continue to act, cooperating within the framework of the Security Council and strictly guided by its decisions.

Bush: This reply does not disappoint me in any way. (laughter)

Question: You said that you are fully resolved to achieve an end to this aggression and are considering certain steps in this context. What does this mean? What will happen next?

Bush: This is a rather hypothetical question. We want Saddam Husayn to accurately and clearly understand the meaning of our statement. We want him to do what the United Nations is calling him to do. This statement could be interpreted any way you like to interpret it, but it has been made and I have simply no intention of going into any hypothetical questions which would make me go beyond the framework of this statement's contents.

Gorbachev: Mr. President, it seems to me that a view that someone is lacking in determination, that we are retreating in the face of those who are treacherously flouting international law, is appearing both in the press and public opinion of certain countries. I cannot agree with this. The desire is to use this to place in a difficult position the leaders of states involved in this situation through the Security Council. It seems to me that what has been done so far in response to the Iraqi aggression is highly significant. Not only have concerted actions been secured within the framework of the UN Security Council, but there is also a greater degree of unity in the world community. This solidarity is unprecedented. The development of this aggression has been prevented. The structures of economic ties have been preserved and are functioning, and this affects many countries. I must say that the decision that has been adopted on the embargo is a very tough measure in response to the aggression. I thus believe that the strategic task has been resolved at the initial stage. This is very important. We are confident that at the next stage we will also succeed in politically overcoming this acute international crisis and shifting it into the channel of political settlement. This is really determination, this is really strength of will, this is really responsibility. I think that politicians' commitment to these methods of settling this most acute crisis testifies to their responsibility both to their own peoples and to the world community. And we are not going to be caught out by those who are already beginning to make a fuss and raise the question of "prestige."

Question (Finnish Television): On the question of humanitarian aid. Does your joint statement mean in practice that you consider it possible to permit food to be sent to Iraq?

Gorbachev: The President and I considered it necessary to reflect in our statement the fact that we share the position of the Security Council on this score, and this position permits the delivery of medicines and foods for humanitarian purposes to those in need, and first and foremost for children. And this is stated forthrightly in our statement. So we are clear-cut on this question. But we were also clear-cut on the question that this should be implemented within the framework of actions by certain organizations, under their control at all stages. I think that this is also a correct formulation of the question.

Bush: I agree with President Gorbachev on this question. These formulations appear quite apt since their really reflect the concern shared by both countries as regards the fact that children might suffer through food shortages. I hope that nobody in the world would interpret this as meaning that we supposedly think that wholesale food deliveries to Iraq should now begin. Since I can speak only on the United States' behalf here, I would like to draw attention to the fact that we need some sort of international institutions which would deal with the humanitarian aspect of this problem. This is the essence of exclusions from the UN embargo. It is, of course, necessary to ensure that food supplies reach people for whom they are meant.

Therefore, from the U.S. point of view, this should not be interpreted as a major embargo exclusion. This was not part of our intentions, and I think that the formulations in this regard are absolutely clear.

Question: Could you clear up a few points? It would seem that you are not in agreement with respect to military options. When you, President Bush, talk about further steps for implementing UN sanctions, one gets the impression that the military option is still being considered. President Gorbachev appears not to be in agreement. Do you really disagree on this question? Did you ask President Gorbachev to recall his experts from Iraq? And did you ask for Soviet troops to be sent to the Persian Gulf region?

Bush: I did not ask him to send troops. If the Soviet Union decided to do so at Saudi Arabia's request, this would suit us fine, but I did not ask him for it. I assume that, with 23 countries participating in enforcing the embargo on land and at sea, Saudi Arabia's security has been virtually assured. What were the other two questions you asked?

Question: Did you ask him to recall the experts from Iraq and are there disagreements between you on the question of using military force? You appear to be saying that this option still exists, he appears to be saying that such an option will never be considered.

Bush: There may be disagreements between us here. As I have repeatedly said in my own country, I do not intend to discuss what I will or will not do. And President Gorbachev made an eloquent statement, with which I agree, that a peaceful solution is the best option. I therefore left this open. He might comment—this is a different matter. But excuse me, what was the second question?

Question: About the experts. About the recall of experts.

Bush: It seems to me that this would facilitate matters. On the other hand, however, President Gorbachev gave his answer. He said that that their number is declining. It seems to me, however, that I tried to make it clearly understood that this question is being widely raised in the United States and that if they were to be recalled on the basis of general mutual understanding, this would facilitate matters. But I listened to his reply, I listened very, very carefully. And I must say that I am leaving everything as it is. If we were talking simply of whether I would like them all to be withdrawn from there, then I would say: Yes, certainly. But I will let him add his own answer.

Gorbachev: I have already answered all the questions which you have listed, and I have nothing to add.

Question (Egypt's AL-AHRAM): A question for the two presidents. You have spoken about measures in the field of security. Does the Soviet Union intend to participate in any actions to ensure security and what will be the role of countries in the Near East in this?

Gorbachev: About the first question. I think that we will cooperate closely and actively within the framework of the UN Security Council. And we will act correspondingly, on the basis of adopted decisions. That is the first point. Second. Regarding the role of the countries of this region. Yes, I think, and I will even emphasize, that the Arab factor has so far not been properly brought into play in settling this crisis situation. I do not want at the moment to offer you my analysis of why this is happening. Nonetheless, I am certain that a growing dynamism is, all the same, evident in the Arab states' positions aimed at seeking an answer to the acute situation in which we have found ourselves. We are cooperating with the Arab countries, and I must say that this has been of some use. The outlines of possible steps are emerging, but it it still too early to speak about them. We will continue this cooperation. Moreover, at some stage, when the situation changes and eases, they could replace the U.S. troops and, under the flag of the United Nations, undertake responsibility. But, in our turn, we, including the permanent members of the UN Security Council, could be guarantors of security, but this would be already at the next stage of the process, provided we succeed in concluding it, primarily regarding the political settlement of this crisis.

Bush: Let me make just one remark. I am very pleased that the Arab countries, within the Arab League framework and by other means, have expressed their condemnation of Saddam Husayn. He is trying to turn this into a duel between the Arab world and the United States. It is nothing of the sort in reality, if you recall that the United Nations condemned him by an overwhelming majority of votes.

Therefore, the Arab states can play an important role in this. By way of a response, many Arab states have come to the defense of Saudi Arabia—Syria, Morocco, and Egypt, let alone the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Therefore, the situation is not at all as if Saddam Husayn and the Arab world were acting against the United States. Saddam Husayn is acting against the United Nations and the majority of Arab League states. This is a very important aspect which I will continue to emphasize, since the Arab League itself has opposed him, called on him to observe the UN decisions, and condemned his aggression.

Therefore, in this case I see that the Arab states could play a highly important role in the solution of this question and they have not given in to attempts to turn this into a conflict between the Arab world and the United States, when nothing of the sort is happening.

Commentary, Reactions to U.S.-Soviet Summit

U.S. Involvement Backed

LD1009170590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Commentary by Viktor Levin: "Latest News"]

[Text] The significance of what took place at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Helsinki extends far beyond the Persian Gulf zone, although Gorbachev and Bush spoke about that as well. A number of very important and principled provisions are formulated in the joint statement. Well, I shall be bold enough to single this one out: We should show in the most convincing way that aggression cannot and will not bring benefits, the presidents of the USSR and the United States stated.

We shall not close our eyes to the fact that here in the Soviet Union, too, far from everyone shared the government's point of view and its aspiration to act jointly with the Americans on this occasion. Stereotypes die hard, and some of our fellow citizens are prepared to rebel against cooperating with, as they say, American imperialism. These people say: There was Grenada, there was Panama, and now the Americans are sending troops to the Persian Gulf, and we are assisting them. Yes, Grenada and Panama are black spots in the U.S. sanctions. If you wish, you can find spots which are just as black in others, including ourselves, alas. Moreover, the Persian Gulf is quite another matter. The Americans arrived there at the invitation of a seriously frightened Saudi Arabia, with whom it has an assistance treaty, and it is now there in the name of fulfilling the resolutions of the UN Security Council and in the name of restoring Kuwait's sovereignty. Also, as Bush assured us in Helsinki, they will leave as soon as the position which existed before Iraq's attack upon Kuwait is restored. Gorbachev and Bush stated: We prefer a peaceful settlement to the crisis, and we shall occupy a common position against Iraq's aggression. At the same time, we are fully resolved to achieve a cessation of the aggression, and if the steps now being undertaken do not lead to this, we are prepared to consider the possibility of additional steps in accordance with the UN Charter.

The Iraqi leader, Saddam Husayn, still has a chance to emerge from the crisis sensibly and with dignity. I doubt that the United States unequivocally wants to drive him into a corner and thrash him, and as for the Soviet Union, I am 100 percent sure of this. I have just had occasion to be a direct observer at Shevardnadze's talks in Harbin, Pyongyang, and Tokyo. The Soviet foreign minister stressed everywhere the need to seek a peaceful, political solution to the problem, something with which all of his interlocutors agreed, I would note.

Having proclaimed the principle that aggression cannot and will not bring benefits, in my view this principle should be applied throughout the whole Near East. Yes, the most burning issue at present is Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. It should be resolved first and foremost, and without delay. Let this also create a precedent for the Israeli aggressor to leave the Palestinian lands which he occupies. Aggression cannot and will not bring benefits. This principle should become universal.

Perestroyka Passes 'Test'

PM1109150190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5

[Article by special correspondents T. Kolesnichenko and Yu. Kuznetsov: "Lessons of Helsinki"]

[Text] Helsinki—The one-day Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Helsinki fitted in so much that was new and unusual that it can no longer be called (as many observers were doing literally a few days ago) a "passing" or "mini" meeting. It not only fully joined the ranks of the meetings between USSR and U.S. presidents dating back to Geneva but also opened a new page both in bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and in the building of a peaceful world order.

It is known that the Persian Gulf situation was discussed and a joint statement adopted. The approximate date for signing the treaty limiting strategic offensive arms was specifically examined and, most importantly, confirmed, as both presidents said in reply to a question from PRAVDA's correspondent. The state of Soviet-U.S. economic relations was assessed.... And this is far from everything. But we would like to draw attention not even to the very impressive number of topics discussed at the meeting but to its qualitatively new content.

If the joint statement had simply been adopted in the Finnish capital 9 September this year, that would have been enough for Helsinki to be allocated a place of honor in history after Malta and Washington. The cold war was buried in Malta, and in Washington (particularly at Camp David) the two leaders theoretically defined, so to speak, how to build their relations after the end of the cold war.

But theory is one thing, and practice is another. Fate deemed it necessary to check out right away how feasible those decisions were, how deeply the new thinking had put down roots, and whether morality and ethics in the present international relations really are stronger than the egotistic, narrowly mercenary interests of the great powers.

In other words, the crisis that has broken out in the Persian Gulf could well have been the banana skin on which both the noble principles of the new international order and the mutual trust which is only just emerging and which both Moscow and Washington have secured with such difficulty might have slipped. To the credit of the Soviet and U.S. presidents, that did not happen.

The joint statement frankly states: "We are united in the conviction that Iraq's aggression cannot be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states are able to swallow up their smaller neighbors." It would seem to be simple and clear—as well as the idea that "aggression cannot and will not bring advantages." But it has taken 45 years since World War II and Soviet-U.S. summit meetings in order to record these words here, in Helsinki.

Both Moscow and Washington have arrived at this in different ways, but in some respects together. We needed perestroyka, the de-ideologization of interstate relations, and, finally, recognition of the priority of panhuman values in international politics. Not so long ago our propaganda might have extolled "progressive Iraq" for carrying out a "just action" against the pro-U.S. "hireling" Kuwait. But times are different today. Aggression cannot be tolerated. So that on 9 September 1990 Moscow and, thus, all of us and our perestroyka passed an important test.

Washington in turn managed—contrary to its former principles and its traditional policy in the Near and Middle East—not to try to ignore the Soviet Union, not to put it "out of play," but to rely on its support. Washington decided—this too for the first time—not to act alone but to create a world public opinion including all countries, with different social and state systems. This was a bold decision, and it was vindicated. It was bold, for example, because in the past, when President Carter was on the point of trying to involve the USSR in resolving the Near East crisis, that at once began to threaten his presidency, and literally a few days later he abandoned his scheme.

This path away from confrontation to cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Near and Middle East has now been traveled.

And again (let us state frankly that it is particularly pleasant to write about this): These days the assertion, which had become almost a cliche, that the Soviet Union has lost its status as a great power and moved into the position of a "secondary" country has been blown from the pages of Western newspapers, as if by the wind. The general tone of commentaries now is as follows: The USSR is an equal partner of the United States, its weight in the international arena is strengthening, and its prestige among other peoples is growing. And we would like this to be heard by those who, pining for the recent past, are trying to put our common ship off course and make it unsteerable.

The question of the economic aspect of the peaceful order is also very important to us. Great attention was devoted to it in Helsinki. At the risk of repeating ourselves, let us point out here that it is not a question of any compensation for the Soviet Union or of a "prize for good behavior." Everything is both more profound and more serious. The new political level demands a new character of economic relations in the modern world.

After the news conference we approached U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker with a group of U.S. journalists.

"What is new in this sphere?" we asked him.

"Everything is new," he replied. "In particular, the United States already specifically intends to give the USSR very important assistance now in opening up oil and other minerals. Big steps in the sphere of joint aircraft building, etc. In short, here, too, we are moving away from confrontation toward cooperation...."

In speaking of the significance of the Helsinki meeting it is appropriate, in our view, to note another aspect of it which is of considerable importance. Namely the influence which it is having and will yet have on Europe as a whole and on its northern region in particular. We mean, above all, the development of the positive process within the CSCE framework and the dying out of "bloc" philosophy. For long years (and even now) the invisible line between NATO's Denmark, Norway, and Iceland and the neutral Sweden and Finland has passed through here.

Let us state frankly that Washington used to look condescendingly on the experience of small neutral countries. But now that the weight of a state in the world arena is increasingly determined not by the number of mass destruction weapons it has but by its intellectual potential and unique national experience, their voice is being heard increasingly loudly.

And maybe it was not quite by chance that from the very first minutes of his stay in the land of Suomi President G. Bush showed interest in the Finnish experience. Speaking highly of Finland's foreign policy in the car on the way from the airport to the residence, the U.S. President asked President M. Koivisto to say how Finland's relations with the Soviet Union are being built.

That exchange of opinions was all the more curious because one of its participants is opposed in principle to blocs, while the other is a leader of one of them. But why, one wonders, is the North Atlantic bloc still needed? Whom are its members preparing to fight in Europe? The GDR, which is itself on NATO's threshold? Or Poland, which our troops are leaving? Or, finally, the Soviet Union? But on many points Moscow and Washington today act together, jointly seeking to ensure peaceful living conditions and security for all peoples.

Helsinki also holds lessons in terms of the opportunities now being opened up for small states—and not just neutral states—to make a greater impact on the course of international affairs, and these are becoming increasingly obvious. For there are far more small countries on the planet than large ones, still less great ones.

And here is another consideration in connection with the USSR and U.S. leaders' Helsinki talks. They also discussed economic questions—this has already been said. Mention was made of the possible joint use of natural resources, in which the United States has good experience which helps to resolve the ecological problems which are so important now. There has long been an urgent need, for example, for joint international efforts to restore the ecology of the Kola Peninsula and to modernize its enterprises. Here the Finns, the Swedes, and the Norwegians are all ready to help us—both with technology and even finance. What is holding things up? Is our inertia alone to blame here?

...We are writing this dispatch right after the event, as it were, confident that the lessons of Helsinki will be studied both by political experts and by historians and, still better, by those who make history. Difficult and sometimes even tragic history, to which fate has made us witnesses.

Comparison of Gorbachev's Talks With Koivisto

PM1109120590

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian on 11 September 1990 in its Second Edition on page 1 carries a TASS report on Soviet President Gorbachev's 8 September Helsinki talks with Finnish President Koivisto. The PRAVDA item, entitled "Meeting of USSR and Finnish Presidents," has been compared with the Moscow TASS English version published in the United States & Canada section of the 10 September Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pages 7 and 8, revealing the following variations:

Page 7, column two, paragraph five, sentence one of the PRAVDA item begins: [Text] Helsinki, 10 Sep—USSR President M.S. Gorbachev had a conversation here with Finnish President M. Koivisto. For several hours in a friendly and sincere atmosphere there was a thorough discussion of the work done on the results of last year's official visit to Finland.

This concerned, above.... (rewording)

Same column, paragraph seven, only sentence of the PRAVDA item reads: ...who is deeply and constantly interested in the.... (adding "and constantly")

Page 8, column one, paragraph one, only sentence in the PRAVDA version begins: On a political and intellectual plane this was a.... (adding passage)

Same sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...trust each other deeply and are ready.... (adding "deeply")

Same sentence, PRAVDA reads: ...assert and develop a new quality of international relations. (substituting "a new quality of" for "new")

U.S. Position on Armenia Status Unchanged

PM1109140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "U.S. State Department Spokesman on Armenia"]

[Text] At a briefing in Washington State Department spokesman Mark Dillen gave the following reply to a question about Armenia:

Question: I would like to ask a question on another topic—the policy we are pursuing in relation to Armenia now that it has declared independence.

Answer: When the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1933 we recognized its borders as they then existed. Armenia was within those borders. We have recognized Armenia's status as part of the USSR ever since. The question of Armenia's future status is a matter for the peoples and governments of the Armenian Republic and the USSR to decide. We are neither for nor against any specific outcome."

U.S. Naval Squadron's Vladivostok Visit Continues

LD1209104190 Moscow TASS in English 0944 GMT 12 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Palagutin]

[Text] Vladivostok September 12 TASS—The second day of the courtesy visit of a U.S. naval squadron to Vladivostok began with a ceremony at the "Pacific Fleet Military Glory" memorial, built in honor of navymen killed in action during the Second World War.

Sailors of the two Pacific navies, comrades-in-arms during the war, were lined up before the memorial, under the fluttering banners of the United States and the Soviet Union. To the strains of a military band Admiral Charles R. Larson, commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet, an Admiral Gennadiy Khvatov, commander of the Soviet Pacific fleet, laid a wreath at the eternal fire.

Then the U.S. guests visited the Frunze heavy missile cruiser, one of the largest vessels of the Soviet Pacific fleet. The Americans were touched by the openness with which Captain Nikolay Ovchinnikov, the ship's commander, told them about the cruiser's armaments and combat power. One of the admirals said in this connection that the salute gun was "perhaps the most peaceful weapon on board. may it be fired more frequently." On behalf of the Frunze crew, Ramzan Magomedov, a young sailor from Checheno-Ingushetiya, said: "We are glad to host Americans. The fear of war has diminished throughout the world."

More than a hundred sailors from the cruiser Princeton and the frigate Reuben James paid a visit to Soviet marines. It was greatly enjoyed by both sides, judging by how they swapped photographs and addresses, by the merry chatter during the joint mess. Its participants said they would remember the visit all their lives, just as their fathers and grandfathers remember the meeting on the Elbe River.

The programme of call is very crammed. It includes sports competitions, excursions, a visit to the "Okean" super-market and an aquatic sports holiday.

The Americans have already hosted thousands of Soviet people on board their ships, where concerts of the U.S. Pacific Navy Orchestra and of the Princeton cruiser's "big band" were given.

The visit continues.

Northeast Asia

Shevardnadze's Remarks on ROK Ties Examined

PM1209131590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA diplomatic correspondent M. Yusin: "Are Seoul and Moscow Ready to Establish Diplomatic Relations?"]

[Text] Reports about the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea have appeared in the foreign press in recent weeks. In confidential conversations representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry are letting it be known that that these predictions are not far from the truth and that there will be a significant event in Soviet-South Korean relations in the very near future. However, there has not been a mention of these plans yet in official statements by Soviet diplomats.

Answering a question about the possible establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul, put by journalists accompanying him on his Far East tour, Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze said: "We will develop relations with South Korea, acting primarily on the basis of Soviet interests." In the opinion of diplomats I have talked with, the normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul would help reduce tension in the Asian-Pacific region and, ultimately, contribute to the solution of the Korean peninsula's problems, that is, it meets the interests not only of the USSR and South Korea, but also of the DPRK people.

On the very eve of Shevardnadze's trip, Foreign Ministry aides, talking about the upcoming visit to the North Korean capital, let it be understood that the central topic at the talks would be relations between Seoul and Moscow, the strengthening of which worries Pyongyang.

If the Soviet Union really intends to exchange embassies with South Korea in the very near future, then it is perfectly logical to suppose that Shevardnadze flew to Pyongyang specifically to inform the North Korean side of this decision. "Many people believe that you will be faced with difficult talks in the DPRK capital. Is that what you think?" journalists asked the minister in the aircraft flying fromn the Chinese city of Harbin to Pyongyang. "We have a very difficult problem to discuss," Shevardnadze replied.

The visit to the DPRK lasted little more than 24 hours. Around midday on 2 September the minister's Il-62 landed at Pyongyang airport, and at approximately 1400 on the next day (that is, nearly three hours earlier than expected) it took off for Vladivostok.

As has been reported, Shevardnadze had lengthy talks with his North Korean colleage Kim Yong-nam. First around 90 minutes one on one, and then with a small number of Soviet and Korean diplomats participating.

The official communique on the results of the talks did not mention differences or any awkward points. But the minister himself, in conversation with correspondents an hour before departure, admitted that the talks had been very difficult. According to diplomats who participated in the conversation with Kim Yong-nam, the talks were possibly the most difficult in all Shevardnadze's years as a minister and demanded colossal effort.

It is hard to imagine Pyongyang's reacting calmly to Soviet intentions with regard to South Korea. Let us recall some recent examples. The decision by East European states to exchange embassies with Seoul caused a storm of criticism in the North of the peninsula and Pyongyang lowered the level of diplomatic relations with these countries. Admittedly, this action made no one change his mind. Will relations between the USSR and DPRK follow a similar pattern? It is hard to say at the moment. One thing is clear—North Korea would be the biggest loser if events developed in that way: The USSR is one of few countries with which Pyongyang has retained normal relations.

Foreign Ministry aides, who asked not to be quoted, formulated Moscow's position on this question as follows: The USSR is a sovereign state, it decides its own foreign policy independently, and decides with whom to establish diplomatic relations. If Moscow chooses to open an embassy in Seoul we will not ask North Korea's permission to do so. Informing interested parties, including Pyongyang, of one's plans is another matter. In all probability, this is what Shevardnadze did during his visit.

According to Soviet diplomats, the USSR is interested in normal relations with the DPRK and will seek to preserve existing links, but there is no point in using the language of ultimatums when talking to us.

What were the consequences of the Pyongyang talk? To all appearances, the Soviet side will take the DPRK's position (a well-known position, in fact) into account, but is hardly likely to adjust its plans vis-a-vis South Korea. In my view, the DPRK leadership's reaction can be judged by the fact that during the Soviet delegation's stay in Pyongyang there was no meeting between the USSR foreign minister and Kim Il-song or his son, Kim

Chong-il. This is unprecedented in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and North Korea.

When will the establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul be officially announced? It is most likely to take place at the meeting between the two countries' foreign ministers that is due to take place on 26 September in New York, when Shevardnadze and Choe Ho-chung attend the UN General Assembly. This is the date informed sources are hinting at.

As for Seoul diplomats, they, it appears, have already organized a "news leak" for their own journalists. The first to announce the upcoming establishment of diplomatic relations was the South Korean news agency. The other day, the state radio company KBS gave the date. It claims that at their New York meeting the Soviet and South Korean ministers will agree to establish diplomatic relations in November. Moreover, the radio announced that a Soviet Government delegation will go to Seoul in October to discuss with the South Korean side all the details relating to the upcoming exchanges of embassies and also the possibility of expanding economic cooperation.

How true this information is we will find out, in all probability, on 26 September.

North-South Korean Ministers' Meeting Reviewed

'Unprecedented Cordiality' Seen

PM1109130190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4

[Report by Sergey Tikhomirov under the "Viewpoint"rubric: "Premiers' Premiere"]

[Text] Pyongyang—It is obviously too early to judge whether this premiere has succeeded (and if so how far). The main thing is that the meeting between the premiers of the DPRK and South Korea, the first at such a high level since the country's split in 1945, took place at all. And, which is of some importance, as the statement by the Northern side's delegation said, that it took place "in an atmosphere of unprecedented cordiality."

That last comment is notable, because it gives hope that inter-Korean talks will be continued in a constructive spirit. And the range of problems for the sides' discussion is very wide. Moreover, Pyongyang and Seoul are only just embarking on the main questions on the agenda. The three days which the North Korean delegation spent in the South Korean capital confirm that.

The elimination of the military-political confrontation on the peninsula, the principles for the divided nation's unification, the question of UN membership—that is a far from full list of the main points on which the two sides set forth their positions. Unfortunately, the North and South delegations did not reach real accords. Except perhaps for one point. It concerns entry into the United Nations. Even there they agreed only on continuing consultations until each other's positions had been more precisely ascertained.

As is well known, Pyongyang is categorically opposed to separate entry into the United Nations: It insists that it be a joint entry and that the two Koreas share one seat in the United Nations. Otherwise, the North asserts, the perpetuation of "two Koreas" is inevitable.

Well, in my opinion we can only welcome the flexibility displayed by the South Koreans, who agreed to continue consultations on this issue. But at the same time they suggested accelerating discussion on the exchange of people and the problem of bilateral economic relations. In Seoul's opinion these are all components of confidence-building. I think that there is a rational kernel in this position. Ultimately the UN seat will not run off anywhere. They have after all managed without it for 45 years. For its part Pyongyang is pushing to the fore questions connected with reducing military-political confrontation and in that context is demanding if not the total prohibition of the annual U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit" exercises then at least a two-year or three-year moratorium on them. So far the South denies that this is possible, stating that the exercises are of a defensive nature.

I shall note that it was "Team Spirit" and the fate of three South Koreans (the student Yim Su-kyong and two priests who visited Pyongyang without Seoul's permission and are now in prison) which overshadowed the talks throughout the three days. Of course it is possible to understand the humane position of the North, which demands the release of prisoners. But it is harder to explain why this question should be put foremost when truly global tasks, including the tasks of the country's speediest unification, are being resolved. After all it was primarily for the sake of this unification that many lances were broken on the path toward this historic meeting in Seoul.

Frankly, even before the departure of the North Korean delegation I was very skeptical about the possibility of reaching any constructive results at the forthcoming talks. I think the participants in the Seoul meeting had no illusions on this score either. Nonetheless there is a real result. It is that the two premiers agreed that they are in the same boat. Consequently rocking it is dangerous for everyone. It would seem to be a case of one small thing lacking—learning to seek and find mutually acceptable compromises and to listen and be heard. Ultimately there are examples for emulation. Moscow and Washington have been able to find a common language. And here there is one nation with a common history and traditions....

I shall hardly be wrong if I say that it was the present level of Soviet-U.S. relations which enabled the North and South Korea to take a step toward each other. Hence, incidentally, the favorable reaction of the great powers to the start of inter-Korean dialogue at such a high level. Moscow, Washington, and Beijing have welcomed the talks in Seoul. In particular an official White House spokesman stated that the North an South should be the main participants in dialogue.

But is it possible to fail to consider the latter's mutual fears with regard, on the one hand, to U.S. military presence in the south of the peninsula and on the other the constant military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang? Hardly. It is promising, however, that recently the USSR and the United States have held a number of consultations on the situation on the Korean peninsula.

And so the Seoul premiere of premiers is in the past. The concern of the main protagonists is to act the play "closer to life" next time. It is for the critics to "assess" the premiere as they deem necessary. In my opinion we should bear in mind the main thing. The "headline" under which the first meeting took place—it was attentively followed by millions of Koreans in the South and North—was by no means the result of the idle interest of some faceless public. It was primarily evidence of ordinary Koreans' sincere desire for the nation's reunification.

PRAVDA Article Reviewed

SK1209022090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] The Moscow paper PRAVDA came out with an article filed by its correspondent in Pyongyang, Sergey Tikhomirov, on the subject of the talks between the North and South of Korea.

The article reads: Removal of military and political confrontation on the Peninsula, hammering out a principle of reuniting the divided nation, and settling the question of entry into the United Nations are some of the major issues between the two sides who have begun to lay out their positions in the talks.

Regrettably, however, the delegations from the North and South have failed to reach any practical agreement on anything. They have agreed on only one thing—on the issue of entry into the United Nations. They have agreed to keep discussing it in order to clarify their positions on the issue.

As is known, Pyongyang is against unilateral admission of any one side into the United Nations. Pyongyang insists that the two sides are jointly admitted with a single UN seat. Otherwise, the North side asserts, the two Koreas will be made permanent.

The flexible position of the South Korean side which has expressed its willingness to continue discussing this issue must be welcomed. At the same time, the South side has called for humanitarian exchanges to be actively promoted and for bilateral economic ties to be developed. In Seoul's opinion, this will serve as a condition for deepening confidence-building. I think there is something reasonable in such a call.

Frankly speaking, even before the departure of the North side's delegation, I already was wondering if the talks would produce any constructive results.

I do not think that the participants in the talks from the Seoul (?government) had hung any great hope on this, either. Nevertheless, the outcome was (?substantial). It is that the two prime ministers admitted that their people are in the same boat.

This being the case, the boat should never be rocked. So, if the two sides work out a mutually acceptable compromise, I think all issues between the two sides could be completely settled.

Sergey Tikhomirov continues: There are also nations to emulate. If Moscow and Washington can find a common language, shouldn't people that have common history and traditions be able to guarantee such a thing?

It is quite natural that the current level of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States can make Seoul and Pyongyang step forward toward each other. This may be why the two superpowers welcome the high-level talks between the two sides of Korea.

However, is it practical not to take into consideration the facts that U.S. troops continue to be stationed in the southern half of the peninsula and Moscow and Pyongyang continue military cooperation?

Such things unfailingly must be taken into consideration. But, one thing is promising: The United States and the Soviet Union recently have held a series of talks, discussing the situation on the Korean peninsula.

One thing, in fact, the most important thing, should not be forgotten. The first meeting, watched by the millions of Korean people in the North and South, was the fruition of the ardent desire of the common Korean people for reunification.

Moscow Celebrates DPRK Founding Anniversary

SK1209085990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 7 Sep 90

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded; statements by Biryukov are recorded in Russian, fading into Korean translation]

[Text] Dear listeners: A gathering of representatives from social circles in the capital of the Soviet Union was held on 6 September at Friendship Hall in Moscow to celebrate the 42d anniversary of the DPRK founding. You will now hear a station reporter's report on the gathering.

Present at the Friendship Hall to celebrate the festive day of the fraternal Korean people were leaders and activists of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, writers, scholars, and college students. Present at the rostrum, which was decorated with flags of the Soviet Union and the DPRK, were L.V Sharin, chairman of the Committee of National Defense and Security Affairs of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; (Aleksandr Leionogo), deputy minister of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and other officials. Also present at the rostrum were functionaries from the DPRK Embassy in the Soviet Union, including Kim Hui-su, charge d'affaires ad interim.

(Shekorana Shuyezuva), vice chairman of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, presided over the gathering.

At the gathering, Aleksandr Biryukov, vice chairman of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society Central Committee and chairman of the Light Industry Committee of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, made a report.

"The birth of the first worker-peasant state in the land of Korea on 9 September 1948 was an important event in the struggle for national and social liberation and for building a socialist society. The working people of the DPRK, by surmounting all barriers and devoting their labor efforts in the past decades, have completely changed the land of old Korea and have built there a socialist state with high productivity agriculture and with developed science and culture."

Referring to Soviet-Korean friendship, Aleksandr Biryukov said that the people of the two countries of the Soviet Union and the DPRK have advanced shoulder to shoulder along the road of socialist construction for more than 40 years, and have assisted each other in every difficult period.

For the past decades, an outstanding united body has been organized for working cooperation between our two countries in the field of relations with various countries and in the international arena. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance has consolidated our relations of alliance.

Referring to the recent visit to the DPRK by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, the reporter said that the visit has made remarkable contributions to further strengthening relations with the DPRK. We regard the visit as an important part of the joint efforts to guarantee security in Asia and the Pacific.

In conclusion, Aleksandr Biryukov said:

"Greeting the felicitous 42d anniversary of the founding of the DPRK, we sincerely wish the Korean people happiness and prosperity and, at the same time, sincerely wish the Workers' Party of Korea new success in the implementation of its vast creative plan and in its struggle for national reunification. The cooperation and friendship between the people of the Soviet Union and the DPRK will develop in the future, too."

At the gathering, Kim Hui-su, DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim to the Soviet Union, spoke:

"First of all, I express profound thanks to the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, the Moscow City Party Committee, and representatives from the social circles who are present here for having organized this celebration gathering today on the occasion of the 42d anniversary of the DPRK founding and for having invited us to the gathering. At the same time, I extend profound thanks to Comrade Aleksandr Biryukov for his expression of warm feelings of friendship to our people greeting the 42d anniversary of the founding of the Republic."

The DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim spoke on the success attained by the working people of his country. He expressed deep thanks to the Soviet people for their liberation of Korea from the Japanese rule and for their assistance and cooperation extended to the postwar construction of his country.

In conclusion, Kim Hui-su said:

"The Soviet party, Government, and people have expressed support and solidarity with the just cause of our people for national reunification. This is a great and valuable encouragement for the Korean people's difficult struggle. Our people, who treasure the friendship with the fraternal Soviet people will, in the future, too, continue to strengthen and develop the relations of traditional friendship and cooperation between Korea and the Soviet Union. We wish the fraternal Soviet people great success in their struggle to achieve social stability and grandeur and development of the country.

Finally, I wish all Soviet comrades success in their work and health and happiness."

Message Sent to DPRK Friendship Association

SK1209120790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 10 Sept 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] The Presidium of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries sent a congratulatory message to Yi Chong-yul, chairman of the Central Committee of the Korea-Soviet Friendship Association, on the 42d anniversary of the founding of the DPRK.

In particular, the congratulatory message pointed out: The Soviet people rejoice over the success effected by the DPRK working people in social and economic development, and are convinced that the friendship and cooperation between the people of the two countries will grow in strength and develop.

Message Sent to DPRK Trade Groups 10 Sep

SK1209114990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 10 Sept 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] In connection with the DPRK national day, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [AUCCTU] sent a congratulatory message to the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea [GFTUK]. In the message, AUCCTU warmly congratulated GFTUK and the DPRK working people on the national day. AUCCTU wishes the DPRK working people success in the social and economic construction and in the cause of Korean reunification based on peaceful democracy.

Young Soviet Chernobyl Victims Rest in DPRK

SK1209105790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 10 Sept 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] Soviet children who suffered from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station arrived in the DPRK on 7 September. Approximately 100 children from the Ukranian capital of Kiev and from [word indistinct] can rest and receive medical treatment in a sanitarium.

This humane step has been taken after a DPRK Government proposal. The DPRK Public Health Ministry has taken consideration of Soviet children. After undergoing physical examinations in Pyongyang, the children will have a rest at Mt. Kumgang and Mt. Myohyang for three weeks.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Gorbachev, Indonesian Leader Exchange Telegrams

BK0809090890 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1500 GMT 7 Sep 90

[Text] The contents of the telegrams sent by the USSR and Indonesian presidents in conjunction with the 45th anniversary of Indonesian independence day [17 August] have been published in Moscow. In his telegram, Mikhail Gorbachev expressed his hope that friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries will develop in a useful direction and [word indistinct] the agreement reached during President Suharto's visit to the Soviet Union.

In his reply telegram, President Suharto thanked Mikhail Gorbachev for the message congratulating him on Indonesian national day.

Reports, Commentary on Cambodian Settlement

U.S.-Cambodian Officials Meet

PM1109114590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent P. Tsvetov: "There Is Contact!"]

[Text] Vientiane-Phnom Penh—It is not hard to imagine the surprised face of the janitor at the Cambodian Embassy in Vientiane when he opened the doors last Thursday to an incoming automobile with the American flag. Formerly no such guests were seen here.

The visit by C. Salmon, U.S. charge d'affaires in Laos, to the State of Cambodia Embassy was also a surprise for that country's ambassador, Long Kem. Evidently the U.S. Government statement which his guest set out was also a surprise. The United States has decided to begin direct talks with the State of Cambodia. Vientiane has been named as the venue, as the only capital of the three Indochinese states where there is a U.S. embassy. The Americans have suggested that the State of Cambodia government at the talks be represented by the Cambodian ambassador to Laos.

In his statement a spokesman for the State of Cambodia Foreign Ministry has welcomed the new initiative from G. Bush's administration. "The State of Cambodia Government is prepared to begin talks with the U.S. Government on all questions at any level," the document stresses.

The first contact has been entirely successful. The start of direct political talks between the United States and the State of Cambodia is an important event in the process of unblocking the regional conflict. I think they will enable the two states to understand each other better and to achieve greater balance of interests between the sides involved in the conflict. Phnom Penh views the U.S. Government's decision as an expression of the U.S. desire to prevent the restoration of the genocide regime in Cambodia.

It is also worth discussing the more remote future. Many observers believe not without justification that the start of direct political contacts between the United States and the State of Cambodia may be the first step toward Washington's official recognition of Hun Sen's government.

And so President Bush's team has made a new move in the Cambodian game. Perhaps the next will be in Helsinki? At any rate in Phnom Penh too today politicians' eyes are turned toward the Finnish capital.

'Spirit of Reconciliation' Seen

LD1109122190 Moscow TASS in English 1133 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS news analyst Sergey Afonin]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The Cambodian knot can be untied. This seems obvious after the decision to form the Supreme National Council, made by the Cambodian parties at the Jakarta meeting. The move signals a breakthrough in the political settlement in the spirit of national reconciliation.

This important decision fully attunes with the recommendations elaborated by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. They regard the Supreme National Council as an embodiment of the independence, sovereignty and unity of Cambodia.

The council is meant to represent the entire country abroad and occupy Cambodia's seat at the United Nations. It is envisaged that, during the transition period, Cambodia will be governed by the council in cooperation with the U.N. interim administration in Cambodia, which will be made up of the military and civilian components.

The decision to form the council on the basis of the equal representation of the two sides—the Phnom Penh government and the opposition—was made at the Tokyo meeting of Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and opposition leader Norodom Sihanouk last June.

As for the Khmer Rouge, it first balked at supporting Sihanouk's proposal. According to available information, these objections have now been lifted, but hardly anyone can forecast how the Khmer Rouge will behave in future. They are continuing their combat operations and efforts to terrorise the civilian population.

A statement made by Sihanouk in Beijing on Monday introduced a new element of uncertainty into the situation. Sihanouk, who was to head the council, said that he was compelled, on health grounds, to abandon political and diplomatic activity for six months.

It is important today to complete the formation of the council and to make sure that the inter-Khmer dialogue is kept going, observers point out.

Such practical issues as a ceasefire are on the agenda today. As a first step, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council called upon all parties involved in the conflict to display maximum restraint.

The Soviet Union's proposal to announce a moratorium on military aid to all Cambodian parties as a component of a comprehensive settlement is assuming particular importance.

The organisation and holding of free and fair elections under U.N. auspices in Cambodia and the implementation of measures that would rule out a return to the policy and practice of the past, when Pol Pot and his clique perpetrated horrible crimes in the country, will require enormous efforts.

Lastly, international guarantees need to be adopted to ensure the independent and neutral status for Cambodia. To this end, it is planned to hold the final stage of the international Paris conference on Cambodia.

UN Effectiveness Examined

BK1209063690 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1230 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Commentary by Oleg Shchedrov]

[Text] The negotiation in Jakarta between the Cambodian government and the three Cambodian resistance groups with an aim to putting an end to the 11-year conflict in this country has ended. The United Nations is to play an active role in this matter. Our commentator, Oleg Shchedrov, has the following comments:

The tragic event in the Persian Gulf shows that the United Nations may become an effective apparatus to deal with regional aggression. By deciding to be actively involved in seeking peace for Cambodia, it seems that this organization wants to show that it might be useful in dealing with even (?very complicated) situations—that is, anywhere in which there has been no clear differentiation between the aggressive party and its victim.

Following several rounds of discussion, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council were able to map out a comprehensive plan for promoting the process to restore peace in Cambodia. In line with this plan, the United Nations is ready to take up the task to supervise the process of the cease-fire and free elections in the country.

During the transitional period, UN representatives will be in charge of the task of administering Cambodia. It is expected that this UN plan, including the dispatch of UN civilian and military personnel totaling 20,000 to Cambodia, will require an expense of $5 billion. Obviously, this kind of a plan can be fulfilled only when it has no conditions attached and is accepted by all parties involved in the conflict. This includes the fact that these parties agree to cooperate with each other in the cause of national reconciliation. The first problem has been settled—that is, since the onset of the Jakarta negotiations, the UN plan has been accepted by the four Cambodian parties as the groundwork. They have agreed on the formation of the Supreme National Council [SNC] as a symbol of their national reconciliation. They even agreed on the appointment of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk—a political person accepted by all parties—as the chairman of the SNC. However, at the last minute, due to his poor health, the Samdech refused to accept this proposal.

'Optimistic Views' Expressed

BK1209071190 Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia 1100 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Commentary by station commentator (Vladimir Gangshin)]

[Text] The talks, which lasted for two days in Jakarta, between Hun Sen, the comrade head of the State of Cambodia Government, and leaders of the three Cambodian groups of the opposition side, were concluded in an optimistic atmosphere. On this issue, our commentator, Comrade (Vladimir Gangshin) writes:

Since the first day, Sunday, the meeting provided clues that the participants to the meeting were determined to make concessions. And the situation evolved as expected. The four Cambodian parties voiced their support for a number of documents worked out by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The documents outlined the main principles for solving the conflict. Presumably, the prestige and influence of the superpowers still play a significant role despite some expressed concerns for it can already be seen how difficult it was to organize this meeting in Jakarta.

To be frank, even at the meeting in the Indonesian capital, differences of views were clearly observed. It involved the issue of representatives in the Supreme National Council [SNC] from confronting parties. The knot was untied following Comrade Hun Sen's agreement to be part of the SNC: six representatives from the Phnom Penh government and six from the opposing Cambodian side. In other words, there are two representatives from each group of the tripartite side, including the Khmer Rouge group. Thus, the formula, six-plus-six, agreed upon earlier in Tokyo between Comrade Hun Sen and Samdech Sihanouk, was slightly altered. Now it takes this form: six-plus-two, two, and two. In other words, Comrade Hun Sen took some gamble by agreeing to the inclusion of Khmer Rouge representatives into the SNC in order to save the talks from being deadlocked as it happened umpteen times before due to the intransigence of various parties. It ought to be said that the attitude appropriate to the circumstances taken by the head of the State of Cambodia Government is worthy of the highest praise because it was certainly due to Comrade Hun Sen's constructive stance that the Jakarta meeting proceeded despite Samdech Sihanouk's refusal to attend.

Talking about the Samdech, he has carried out new maneuvers. In response to the proposal that he hold the position of chairman of the SNC, he instead said he is withdrawing himself from political activities for six months. However, those who really know Sihanouk expect that he will revise his decision. Whatever the case, the establishment of the SNC at the Jakarta meeting will certainly open real possibilities for implementing the UN peace plan for Cambodia. The SNC, as the symbol of the nation's sovereignty, will be charged by the United Nations with an extensive task in the transitional period until the general elections in Cambodia. The SNC will represent Cambodia in the United Nations.

It is still difficult to say how firm and to what extent the agreement reached in Jakarta will be because the task ahead is to solve complex problems, such as the disarming of the warring parties. On this point, the Khmer Rouge might again show their negative attitude. For now, the majority of observers have expressed optimistic views about the results of the four-Cambodian party talks in the Indonesian capital, concludes our commentator, Comrade (Vladimir Gangshin).

Moves Toward Settlement Seen

PM1209102790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Sep 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by Viktor Pritula "Viewpoint": "Will the Guns Fall Silent in Cambodia?"]

[Text] The informal meeting on Cambodia taking place in Jakarta is an event which arouses intense worldwide interest. The outcome of the years-long tragic conflict in that country, where war has gone on unabated for virtually 20 years, could depend on the decisions it takes.

The creation of a Cambodian Supreme National Council (SNC)—to which power in the country will be transferred until the formation of a new government following free elections—is to be one of the key issues of the Jakarta meeting, since it is precisely the question of power which has stalled the process of a peaceful political settlement in Cambodia.

As people will know, at the previous informal meeting in Tokyo the Khmer Rouge grouping, headed by its leader, Khieu Samphan, effectively torpedoed the compromise solutions which had been drawn up with great effort. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of the coalition of three opposition groupings—not without pressure from the Khmer Rouge—went back on his word on this issue after the dialogue in the Japanese capital. He began demanding from Phnom Penh increased opposition representation in the SNC, although the "six-six" formula whereby there would be six representatives in the SNC from the Phnom Penh government and six from the coalition had originally been agreed in Tokyo.

The Phnom Penh government, which controls virtually the whole country, righly rejected this demand, stating that such a concession to the Khmer Rouge could lead to a restoration of the genocidal regime.

I recently visited Cambodia and was able to see for myself the solid position occupied by the Phnom Penh government, which enjoys the support of the country's population. What, then, is forcing Phnom Penh to embark on compromise with the opposition coalition? Above all, a desire to serve the interests of the people and end the fratricidal war.

The Hun Sen government's authority is now receiving increasing recognition by many governments and international organizations. The latest evidence of such recognition is the U.S. decision to enter into direct contacts with Phnom Penh to help bring about a settlement of the situation surrounding Cambodia.

Phnom Penh has welcomed this decision. It has also welcomed the statement by the Soviet and Chinese foreign ministers on their countries' abandoning the supply of military aid to the warring sides in Cambodia. The following gratifying fact of our time must be noted: In the settlement of regional conflicts—whether it be the war in Cambodia or the crisis in the Persian Gulf—the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are showing unanimity.

In the light of the unceasing efforts of the five powers who drafted the plan for an all-embracing settlement in Cambodia the Jakarta meeting should show who is striving for peace and who is hindering it. On the very eve of the meeting, which had several times been threatened with disruption, Prince Sihanouk, leader of the tripartite opposition alliance, gave his assent to the creation of the Cambodian SNC according to the "six-six" principle. Here the six places received by the opposition will be shared out equally among the three coalition groupings.

Incidentally, Sihanouk himself has not gone to Jakarta, citing a sharp deterioration in his health. In order to prevent the meeting foundering Hun Sen has changed his original conditions whereby he would hold talks only with Sihanouk. Phnom Penh has enough common sense to forgo unnecesary ambition at this time. Will the Khmer Rouge have enough common sense to forgo their ambitions? After all, if the meeting does founder they could find themselves in complete political isolation.

Will a step toward peace in Cambodia be taken in Jakarta or will its so war-weary people be dealt yet another disappointment? I want to hope that this time common sense will prevail.

Lukyanov Receives Papua New Guinea Delegation

PM1209080190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Important Matters Discussed"]

[Text] On 7 September USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A.I. Lukyanov received a Papua New Guinea parliamentary delegation headed by parliamentary speaker D. Young, which is on an official visit to the Soviet Union.

There was a friendly conversation during which Lukyanov told the guests about the main areas of Soviet domestic and foreign policy and talked about the USSR Supreme Soviet's role in solving the tasks of perestroyka. Young described the structure and activities of the Papua New Guinea parliament and indicated the country's main foreign policy priorities.

Bilateral relations and a number of topical international issues, particularly in relation to the situation in the Asian-Pacific region, were discussed.

Near East & South Asia

Reportage on Persian Gulf Crisis Continues

$800 Million Loss Expected

AU1109174590 Paris AFP in English 1719 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, Sept 11 (AFP)—The Gulf crisis will mean an $800 million loss in foreign currency receipts for the Soviet Union this year, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the Soviet Parliament on Tuesday.

He said the losses would be incurred by halting the provision of goods to Iraq and Kuwait.

The foreign minister also said that there were still difficulties in evacuating Soviet nationals from Iraq, but added, "there is no basis for saying that they have been turned into hostages."

Belonogov Meets PRC Envoy

LD1109145190 Moscow TASS International Service in German 1405 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 11 Sep (TASS) —Aleksandr Belonogov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, today received Zehn Zhang, charge d'affaires ad interim of the People's Republic of China.

They exchanged information on the efforts being made by the USSR and China on settling the crisis situation in the Persian Gulf and on the contacts which have recently made on this topic.

Iranian Officials Favor Ties

LD1209033490 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Tehran September 11 TASS—Head of the Iranian parliament Mehdi Karrubi favours the development of relations between Iran and the Soviet Union.

Meeting new Iranian ambassador to the Soviet Union Nematollah Izadi, he said Iran aims to develop ties with its northern neighbour.

Speaking about the situation in the region, Karrubi noted that the great powers should bring back the atmosphere of peace and calm to the region, instead of trying to fish in troubled waters of the gulf.

The United States are focusing focused [as received] on the protection of economic interests of the West, but never and nowhere had their military presence ensured peace and stability, he said.

U.S. Activities Reported

LD1109163490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Report from Saudi Arabia—from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Correspondent I. Rostovtsev] An unprecedented business: Lately it has not been easy to find a room in Saudi hotels, especially along the shore of the Persian Gulf. Everywhere there are American officers and men and American armor.

It is as though the Americans have not only mastered the small things in the local hotels, but the climate in Saudi Arabia, too. It is tough for them, but service is service—be patient, soldier, since you have been sent here! But for how long? By all accounts, there is no answer to that question.

We took these pictures at one of the U.S. Air Force bases in the Persian Gulf region. Helicopter crews are serving here. Of course, this is not the desert, but the heat is the same everywhere. It is the equipment which suffers most. While you are getting your helicopter ready for a flight, the sweat pours off you.

We noticed that the Americans were not inclined to show us their military equipment. We did well to take pictures of the helicopters. By the way, they have a somewhat different attitude to journalists from western countries. Perhaps they still have a hard mistrust of Russians. But what we did manage to see was clear testimony that the American military machine in the region has been started up. It will not be easy to put it into reverse. What is needed is goodwill, and not only from the Americans.

[Video shows Rostovtsev addressing Prince 'Abdallah Bin-Faysal Bin-Turki Al Sa'ud] You are probably aware that some Arab capitals see the intensifying U.S. presence in the region as a direct threat to the interests of their people. They believe that the Americans are pursuing, first and foremost, selfish interests. What do you think about this?

[Prince Al Sa'ud] As a citizen of Saudi Arabia, I am convinced that the Americans, on the contrary, are defending our interests and defending the people of this region from possible aggression. Therefore everything they are doing here deserves gratitude and respect. We ourselves are vitally interested in this. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, one had no illusions regarding the aggressive nature of the present Iraqi regime. Where is the guarantee that another Arab state will not be subjected to such an invasion? So, I repeat: We are convinced that the Americans are pursuing a noble objective.

Gulf Diplomats Hold Talks

LD1209104390 Moscow TASS in English 1001 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—A meeting with the representatives of diplomatic missions of several Gulf countries has taken place at the Soviet National Olympic Committee headquarters.

The diplomats, accredited in Moscow, told the Soviet committee about their desire to use international organizations to press Iraq for the peaceful solution of the Middle East problem.

For its part, the USSR National Olympic Committee assured the representatives of Arab countries that it will promote their efforts in every way possible.

Recall of Specialists Urged

LD1209075490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0727 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 Sep (TASS)—The Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet has called upon the USSR Supreme Soviet to urgently consider the issue of suspending the treaty on friendship and cooperation with Iraq.

A statement from the committee promulgated here today on Iraq's aggression against Kuwait stresses that the Russian members of parliament support the desire to find a peaceful solution that will eradicate the consequence of the aggression expressed both in UN resolutions and during the meeting between the presidents of the USSR and United States in Helsinki on 9 September this year, the document notes.

In the conditions that have developed, the Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet deems it unacceptable and amoral to maintain any kind of contact with the aggressor in the military domain. It is essential to recall immediately all Soviet military specialists currently in Iraq, the statement says.

Commentary Questions Military Ties With Iraq

PM1009164090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 36, 4-10 Sep 90 p 7

[Article by Petr Gladkov: "I Do Not Believe You!"]

[Text] When great Stanislavsky was dissatisfied with the performance of his actors, he cried out: "I do not believe you!" One feels like repeating these words when watching the performance of some actors in the drama entitled "Glasnost and the Military" which is being played before our eyes. It seems that the tragedy in the Gulf can only strengthen the scepticism of independent experts who are watching the Soviet top brass' attempt not to lose face when the game turns bad.

Where did Iraq obtain its arms? Mostly from this country. From 1982 to 1986 (later statistics is unavailable) Iraq bought from the Soviet Union a 14,300 million worth of weapons, thus becoming the world's largest importer of Soviet hardware.

Whence this statistics? From Western sources, of course. We do not have Soviet sources of such information. Not because of our secretiveness mania, as a high-ranking officer of the Soviet General Staff has explained to IZVESTIYA in a recent interview, but simply because it is our little commercial secret with Iraq.

I would have been satisfied with such an answer yesterday, all the more so as no one would have bothered to explain anything to me. Today, I refuse to accept such explanations. Can there be any common commercial secrets with an aggresor openly trampling international law and shared human morals? Let us be frank: we have nursed, brought up and armed this aggressor in our blind geopolitical fencing with the United States, dividing up spheres of influence. The United States, by the way, is also a captive to the same blind policy. While the two giants were busy crushing each other, independent, powerful and ambitious regional superpowes appeared which have expertly exploited imperial aspirations of their patrons for their own ends, eventually growing mature enough to have their own geopolitical objectives.

Thanks to perestroyka, the Soviet Union is out of the Gulf's dangerous game. Today it is the U.S.' superpower status that is being tested. It looks like withstanding this test proceeding from outdated standards will be a tricky business. In any case, Third World countries will from now on be more active, even aggressive in their attempts to boost their international standing and dictate their will in the world arena. After so many years of sowing wind, the superpowers are reaping the storm.

Let us return to our military and the question of whether their statements can be trusted. Today, personally I believe in the foreign political sincerity of the president and his foreign minister. Their words about this country's foreign policies are fully in accord with the facts which I am professionally aware of and which can be verified. However, I still have no trust in our military. Can I really trust the General Staff officer's allegations that the Soviet Union has sold no missiles to Iraq since the early 1970s? Other sources tell me that in 1985, the Soviet Union supplied Iraq with 300 SCUD missiles with a range of 290 kilometres. This fact became known only after these missiles were used in the war against Iran in 1987-88. I learned this from independent Western sources and I trust them, because I remember how often official Soviet representatives had to acknowledge that the information supplied by these sources was correct after initial resolute denials.

When you have lied once, no one will believe you the next time. I do not believe in the assurances that there have never been and are not any Soviet military advisors in Iraq. Today they may be keeping their advice to themselves, but what did they do before? How numerous were they? What functions did they perform? Soviet military advisors are posted in many countries: in the early 1980s the Soviet Union dispatched some 20,000 military advisors to various Third World countries. It is clear why we needed to send our military experts there in the past. Why we continue to keep them there is a different question, especially in light of our current official policy of preventing and settling of regional conflicts. In order to be able to believe official statements in this very delicate field, I must know who supervises the matters connected with our military presence and arms supplies to the Third World. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR? It would have been logical, but knowing the composition of the Parliamentary Defence and State Security Committee, I do not think it could exercise really rigid, if any, control. The President? Other bodies of power? Control must be there, in any case.

In conclusion, whatever people may say, this country has made a great progress: it is frightening to think today whose side we could have taken in a similar conflict a mere six years ago.

Iran's Role in Easing Gulf Tensions Assessed

NC1109211090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Station commentary]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Union and Iran are among the other UN members that actively participate in the imposition of international sanctions against Iraq's aggression. The two neighboring countries are in a position to hold direct talks with the Iraqi leadership on ways to solve the Persian Gulf crisis. Our commentator writes on this:

The two sides held such talks (?recently) during the visits paid by Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz to Moscow and Tehran. With his visits to both countries, the Iraqi foreign minister was able to realize that the Soviet Union and Iran support an elevated role by the United Nations in solving the new crisis in the Persian Gulf. They decisively support the UN Security Council's decision on implementing extensive economic sanctions against Iraq but they oppose unilateral decisions by governments to resort to military force.

During the talks with the Iraqi leadership, the Soviet Union propounded the need to seriously observe the legal rights of all the foreign citizens—without any exceptions—who are in Kuwait and in Iraq, and first and foremost the right to freely leave the country, without any prejudices, on the basis of universally recognized international laws. I think that the permission granted by the Iraqi leadership to all the foreign women and children living in Iraq was gained through Soviet influence. But Baghdad continues to be impersistent and indecisive on this too by either adopting new decisions or abrogating old ones. As for foreign men, they are being kept in strategic points in Iraq as a human shield vis-a-vis punishments for occupying Kuwait. [passage omitted]

In its contacts with Baghdad, the Soviet Union will use its potential to neutralize these criminal acts. It would be logical if the Iranian side, too, would place Iraq under pressures. Meanwhile, we would like to point out that the Iranian leadership's decision to open up 1,200 km of its borders for the refugees from Iraq and Kuwait was very satisfactorily welcomed by the Soviet public. This decision conforms with the Soviet Union's efforts and paves the grounds toward the easing of the crisis in the Persian Gulf.

One can only praise such negotiations by Tehran and Moscow on ways to solve the crisis. The meeting between Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and Iranian ambassador Mr. Nowbari was devoted to this goal. During this meeting, the Soviet Union expressed hopes that the peace between Iran and Iraq will continue during the establishment of Kuwait's national sovereignty.

Iranian Delegation Visits Soviet Azerbaijan

LD1109113290 Tehran IRNA in English 0933 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Rasht, Gilan Prov., Sept. 11, IRNA—A three-man delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister for Educational and Research Affairs Abbas Maleki arrived in the Soviet Azerbaijan through the Astara border town Monday evening.

The Iranian delegation was greeted at the Astara border by the Soviet Azerbaijan Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Higher Education officials as well as a group of local authorities. Expansion of bilateral relations as well as educational issues will be among topics to be discussed between the two sides.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Lithuanian Soccer Tour to South Africa Stopped

Anti-Apartheid Groups Lobbied

AU1109172290 Paris AFP in English 1632 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] Johannesburg, Sept 10 (AFP) — Pressure from anti-apartheid lobbyists has forced the top Lithuanian football team to call off its planned tour, due to begin Monday, to the nominally independent Bophuthatswana tribal homeland, state-run television said Monday [10 September].

Reports from Moscow said the Lithuanian Football Union [LFU] had ordered that the team, Zhalgaris Vilnius, not tour South Africa.

A spokesman for the LFU said the decision to ban the trip was made by the union, the Lithuanian National Olympic Committee and the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry, the report added.

This follows wide-spread condemnation of the tour by anti-apartheid groups and the black nationalist African National Congress (ANC) as it would have broken the moratorium on sporting tours to and from South Africa.

The Anti-Bophuthatswana Co-ordinating Committee earlier condemned the tour saying it would lend recognition to the homeland as an independent state.

Anti-apartheid lobbyists dismiss the homelands system because, they say, it is propped up by the South African government and based on apartheid.

Demonstrations Were Planned

LD1109180190 Moscow in English to Africa 1700 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Recent reports say the Lithuanian Football Association has canceled the trip by the Zalgirys team to Bophuthatswana that was due to begin on Monday [10 September]. Here is a review of the circumsances that preceeded the association's final decision.

Active opponents of apartheid in Bophuthatswana started preparations for the arrival of the guests from Vilnius: mass demonstrations of protest were planned for Monday. The ANC [African National Congress] and other South African democratic organizatons also voiced their attitude to the Lithuanian football players.

The intentions of the Lithuanian team neither bypassed the attention of the Soviet public quarters. An article in the Moscow based-newspaper, MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA, read: The International Olympic Committee has denied the South African racists any participation in the Olympics. Virtually all international sports federations do not admit South African teams to their contests, among them such an authoritative agency like FIFA. The teams holding games with South African teams are fined or disqualified. However, Zalgirys think tanks have decided that international regulations can be ignored. In an article for the newspaper, SOVIET SPORTS, the chief coach of the team tried to justify the trip to South Africa, saying it pursued the aims related to pure sports and not politics.

There can be no argument about the qualitative changes now sweeping South Africa that, however, have come about through the struggle of South Africans for their legitimate rights and the principled and persistent efforts of international organizations, through the economic sanctions against South Africa, limited as they are through. Frederik de Klerk is not a philanthropist, he is a realistically minded politician who seeks the way to lead his country out of isolation in politics, culture, sports, or economics. But so far a number of limitations from international agencies on contacts with South Africa remaining in effect and they cannot be ignored.

Mr. Koloskov, who heads the Soviet Football Federation, received telegrams from the African Football Confederation's president and the FIFA secretary general. Then followed an appeal to the Lithuanian prime minister, Prunskiene, and eventually the Zalgirys [team] turned down the trip to South Africa. Ambitions of the Lithuanian footballers have been bridled, and the incident can be regarded as exhausted.

Pullout of Cuban Troops From Angola Noted

MB1109153290 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa 1930 GMT 4 Sep 90

[Commentary by Yelena Olgina—read by announcer]

[Text] As announced by the office of the Cuban minister of defense, by [words indistinct] more than 37,000 Cuban troops and military experts will have returned home from Angola, meaning that the New York agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola is on schedule. Yelena Olgina has this to say:

The remaining Cuban troops in Angola, numbering 12,000, will be withdrawn by the middle of next year. This has been confirmed by the UN Committee overseeing the pullout. All this is indicative of the good faith of the Cuban Government, and its desire to see the problems of the peoples of southern Africa solved.

As is known, Cuban troops were first deployed in Angola in 1975 at the request of the Angolan Government, and were of tremendous assistance to the newly independent state in the fight against destabilizing South African forces, and in the strengthening of the new government.

Cuban military experts trained Angola's fledgling army then, and the work done by Cuban troops in the country is greatly appreciated by Angola's leadership. Besides, at the time of arrival of these troops, the southern African region was in a state of flux and the Cuban troops effectively dealt with the South African menace in Angola.

Another offshoot of this was the successful struggle of the Namibian people for independence, and the decision of the superpowers to end their policy of confrontation between East and West added impetus to the idea of solving regional and other conflicts by peaceful means. The superpowers took on a mediatory role in the resolution of the region's problems, culminating in the signing of the historic New York agreements in 1988 between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. These countries continue even today to fulfil these agreements, as indicated by the announcement of the Cuban defense minister, and the UN committee's confirmation of the up to date withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.

East Europe

Joint Firms Seen as Key to Hungarian Trade

PM1209084190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by PRAVDA correspondent V. Gerasimov under the rubric "Hungary Today": "Not Losing But Finding"]

[Text] Budapest—**The Bribery "Curse"** Hungarian businessmen are increasingly complaining:

"It is simply dangerous to have contacts with certain new representatives of Soviet enterprises and firms which have obtained the right to autonomous foreign trade activity: They demand bribes. And unceremoniously and brazenly too."

It is extremely distressing to hear this. They told me straight that such a self-seeking ideology scares away and hinders normal trade contacts, which have never been more necessary. On the whole there would be considerably more deals and joint enterprises, firms, and concrete and mutually advantageous ties at plant and factory level if our new foreign traders displayed elementary common sense and strove to earn as much as possible through honest endeavor, by broadening entrepreneurship and showing initiative, and not through savage, intimidatory, shameful methods. All the more so because the "new boys," who have overstepped the mark and are moreover still amateurish, still do not understand that nothing can be kept in the dark: All such affairs are quickly seen through and come to light.

Efficiency in foreign economic ties is still low. One of the most experienced foreign traders, V. Usanov, deputy Soviet trade representative in Hungary, thinks that perestroyka in his "sphere" began at the wrong point.

"Since the greater part of the Soviet Union's trade turnover is with East European countries, it was necessary to give Soviet suppliers an economic incentive to sell goods by changing the system of accounting and price-formation, switching to freely convertible currency at current world prices," he told me. "But without creating an export incentive they broke up the foreign trade organizational structure—which should have been done in the second stage. By my estimates, the number of managers in our sphere has increased at least threefold. But there has been no increase in goods! In many cases the export of machine building output has begun to fall overall: The Law "On the Enterprise" gives plants the opportunity to sidestep the state commitments fixed in the annual trade turnover protocols. The commodity market has also been messed up: Different producers have started to emerge from the same product list with varying degrees of competence, and often they are totally incompetent in foreign trade questions. Many of our Hungarian partners have found themselves in complete confusion: It has become impossible to ascertain who is who."

But as the saying goes: It's no good waving your fists after the fight. The die is cast. And since from next year we will finally switch entirely to accounting in freely convertible currency and to price formation based on current world prices, contacts and ties between enterprises are acquiring a decisive role. The final whistle is being blown on planned trade, fixed in "quotas." Although it must be admitted that for the time being the transition to market relations and the explosion of foreign trade activity by the Soviet Union's republics introduces elements of unpredictability, fluctuation, and disjunction.

But the future belongs to direct ties between enterprises. And those new managers and administrators who have become so numerous in the foreign trade sphere must justify their existence by honest endeavor and raise cooperation to a new level. But monitoring, assistance, and coordination by trade delegations must also grow. Right up to the creation of an interdepartmental ethics commission.

Will We Buy Shares?

Very timidly, without understanding the new situation, we are taking the first steps in purchasing Hungarian enterprises' shares. There is a lot to buy in Hungary today. Enterprises, many of which had traditional ties with the Soviet Union, are transforming into mixed joint-stock companies. We continue to need these enterprises' goods. Having become their part-owners (with 15-20 percent of the share capital), we should become stronger in the Hungarian market, gradually restoring the currently decreasing trade turnover.

The Hungarian economic leadership would like to create a "more autonomous energy system for the country"—to extricate itself from the influence of and to "disentangle" itself from Soviet oil and gas pipelines and power transmission lines. This also coincides with our "circumstances": We are cutting oil deliveries by 30 percent already in the second half of the year. And in the future, obviously, we will not be able to maintain our "energy influence" on the old scale. But it would be a huge and unforgivable mistake if, by cutting deliveries of raw materials and power and switching to freely convertible currency in accounting, we start to lose the Hungarian market. So far ties between enterprises are proving slow to grow. Privatization of the Hungarian economy will also alter all the balances in relations. That is why the purchase of shares in these conditions would be a great help, as would the sale of Soviet enterprises' shares on the Hungarian exchange and markets.

Several dozen Hungarian-Soviet and Soviet-Hungarian joint enterprises have been registered and have come into economic being. There is another promising route here, albeit not an easy one. Hungarian difficulties and our own are reflected in joint enterprises. But those joint enterprises that have found a third or even a fourth partner (a Western firm) are attracting share capital, progressing more surely by this route, and increasing production of competitive articles more quickly.

Gyorgy Hargita, representative of the Munich firm "Waltham Elektrik" in Budapest, who knows both the Soviet market (he studied in Moscow) and the European market (he worked in the FRG) well, is convinced of the advantages of such "multilocation" joint enterprises. This is what takes Gyorgy Hargita out in search of ever newer Soviet, Hungarian, and Western partners. Already five joint firms and companies have been formed, and new ones are in the pipeline. Close contacts with U.S. firms—a "fourth side"—are being established. And the activities of these joint enterprises, associations, and joint-stock companies are in the leading areas of scientific and technical progress. Electronics, sophisticated equipment, management programs, licenses, training systems, servicing—the whole works.

The joint enterprises "Interprokom" or "Elmako" (their active participants on the Soviet side are the "Soyuzgazavtomatika" and "Radioprom" All-Union Scientific Production Associations and the Kama Truck Plant) are studying key automation problems. Purchase and sale, installation, contract servicing—production problems really are being solved en bloc. It is also good that the joint enterprises and mixed companies organized by the indefatigable G. Hargita have compulsory clauses obliging them to involve themselves in consumer goods as well.

"We want to create a powerful trading house in which production, consumer, and intermediary firms of various countries are associated," Hargita told me. Conversion in the Soviet military industry must also be exploited. Finished Soviet goods and not raw materials must come to the fore. We plan to open 20-30 branches in the Soviet Union to ensure better collaboration with Soviet producers and consumers.

East-West

Here I would like to note the Kama Truck Plant's energetic breakthrough into the Hungarian market, although it is not being achieved without disruptions, struggle, and difficulties. Hungarian enterprises' shares are being bought and Kama Plant shares are being offered for sale. Exploiting the new situation Minsk Tractor, breaking the monopoly of certain foreign trade firms in Hungary, chose a new partner to sell its vehicles for freely convertible currency, and its market position is now developing better and more profitably. Likewise as early as last year and this year "Avtoeksport" has switched to selling a certain proportion of its "Ladas" and "Moskviches" for dollars.

In Budapest there is a joint-stock trading company called "East-West." Its capital is 99 percent from Britain, Austria, Cyprus, and certain Arab countries. Talking about areas of activity, Bela Nemeni, chairman of the board of directors, mentioned the Chelyabinsk firm "Forum," formed by 52 East Siberian enterprises and banks. The contacts established with "Forum" are bringing in contracts. In the main they are directed at buying equipment for waste-free timber production, food products, and consumer goods. By way of example, representatives of 25 major Urals and Tyumen enterprises were invited by the "East-West" firm to Budapest for lecture courses. "On such courses we wanted not only to familiarize business executives with various aspects of market strategy and leadership, but mainly to get personally acquainted," Bela Nemeni told me. "It is very important for us to know who we are doing business with."

The "East-West" company has invested its capital in two Hungarian-Soviet joint enterprises. It has created 15 enterprises centered on food and agricultural technology and concepts, and has eight outlets in various countries. And all of this was gotten off the ground and worked out literally in 18 months.

"We could take on supplying Chelyabinsk and the region's cities and villages. We are also finding goods that we could obtain in return."

From everything that Bela Nemeni said it would be possible to draw the conclusion that Hungary must remain a very important link for us, connecting East and West. In the next few years this link will be even stronger. Hungary's reorientation toward cooperation with the West will also be of benefit to us: That country, irrespective of such a reorientation, has the traditions, the cadres, and the desire to cooperate with the Soviet Union. And in the future the growth of direct ties between enterprises, an increase in the number of "tri- and multipartite" joint enterprises, and a mixture of Soviet, Hungarian, and international capital are inevitable.

Yugoslav Militia Arrests Kosovo Citizens

AU1109180990 Moscow International Service in Albanian 1500 GMT 11 Sep

[Text] The Yugoslav militia has carried out a search in a village in the vicinity of the town of Podujevo in the autonomous province of Kosovo. Alleged attacks by the village's inhabitants on the patrol served as the pretext for this search. As a result of the search, firearms were found and 23 people were arrested. A total of more than 50 people have been killed in Kosovo since March last year. The province's Albanian population is dissatisfied about the violation of their autonomy by the authorities of Serbia, which dissolved the parliament and government of Kosovo in July after the Albanian deputies proclaimed Kosovo's independence.

Latin America & Caribbean

Chilean Trade Group Holds News Conference

PY1209035090 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 5 Sep 90

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] Radio Moscow correspondent (Igor Yesteyev) has prepared a report on a news conference held yesterday in Moscow by Chile's Foreign Relations Under Secretary Edmundo Vargas.

Good evening, friendly listeners, a news conference has been given by Under Secretary Edmundo Vargas; Augusto Aninat, the Foreign Ministry's international economic relations director; Emilio Ruiz-Tagle, acting charge d'affairs of Chile; and Mr. Edwards, a Chilean businessman. As is known, this is the first official visit to the Soviet Union by a Chilean Government delegation in nearly 17 years. The members of this delegation held meetings with high-ranking Soviet officials, among them, Presidential Council member Yevgeniy Primakov and Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Viktor Komplektov. Mr. Vargas summed up the results of those meetings:

"These contacts have been very fruitful and useful in allowing us to note that there are important points of coincidence with the Soviet Union; that we are both guided by common principles in our foreign policies, principles that are the same as those in the UN Charter; and that we have similar aims regarding strengthening of the United Nations. We also agreed on the evaluation of common problems such as the environment, the fight against drug trafficking, and the need for coordinated policies since the Soviet Union is part of the Pacific Basin and we have interests in Antarctica. We also agreed that there is a need for strengthening our bilateral relations in the area of cultural and economic-commercial exchange."

It was noted at the news conference that commercial and cultural relations between the USSR and Chile are practically nil, restricted in recent years to the Chilean purchase of some Soviet goods on the international market for no more than $12 million. Precisely, one of the objectives of this visit by the Chilean delegation was to establish commercial ties, particularly in light of the changes currently taking place in the Soviet Union, Mr. Edwards said:

"The economy in this country is being oriented toward a market economy and this can help in establishing important bilateral trade. We have come to see this and get information for ourselves. We have had the opportunity to talk with various officials from autonomous economic enterprises. We can now expect to have broad commercial relations, both import and export."

I seized the opportunity to ask the following question: Mr. Edwards, I would like to know what the Chilean Government's foreign policy priorities are.

"In general terms, the Chilean Government's priority is to reintegrate Chile in the international community. Chile has been isolated from this community during 16 years of dictatorship. We now want to reintegrate ourselves in this community, exercising all our rights and obligations. In other words, we want to participate without seeking leadership and to responsibly reinsert ourselves in our natural community, which is Latin America. We are interested in strengthening the Latin American institutions to which we belong.

"We are particularly interested in relations with our neighboring countries. A few days ago, the Argentine President Carlos Menem visited Chile. Shortly before that, our president, Patricio Aylwin, visited the president [words indistinct]. We have signed important documents with Argentina. Earlier, Mexican President Salinas Gortari was in Chile. President [words indistinct] attended the inauguration of President-elect Alberto Fujimori in Peru. We want to intensify these relations with Latin America. However, we do not intend to neglect our relations with the United States, which are important. We have had obstacles with the United States, obstacles we are confident will be removed. We hope so. Yet, the United States has adopted some protectionist measures that are affecting our exports, and we are doing all we can to have those measures removed.

"Relations with the European Economic Community are very important because we transact 40 percent of our trade with it. We want to open new economic markets as we are trying to do now with East European countries by normalizing our relations. We want to participate in the international community as a responsible member on the basis of traditional principles of Chilean foreign policy, such as, nonintervention, self-determination, juridical equality, nonuse of force to solve international conflicts, and, as a principle inherent to the Aylwin government, promotion of democracy."

The question posed by a Brazilian newspaper on Chile's position on the Persian Gulf crisis was very logical in view of that crisis. Mr. Vargas said:

"Regarding the crisis that has been caused by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, Chile was one of the first countries to resolutely and vigorously support the Security Council's resolution condemning this act of aggression, and to implement the measures approved by the Security Council.

"Thus, Chile wishes to contribute to a more secure world, a world where the breaking of peace must not go unpunished. It is evident that we are very concerned about the situation that has been caused by this crisis. Chile, just as Brazil, is not a country that produces enough petroleum for its own supply and it is already suffering the consequences of this crisis in its economy.

"We hope that the upcoming meeting between the two superpowers in Helsinki, the UN actions, and all efforts that can be made will lead to reestablishing the peace and international security that have been broken by this crisis."

Of course, other questions were formulated during the news conference, but in my view these were the most important.

Supreme Soviet

Lukyanov Holds News Conference Prior to Session

PM1209081290 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Captain Second Class V. Urban: "The National Parliament: Priorities Determined"]

[Excerpts] There have been quite a few commentaries and forecasts in the press regarding the fourth session of the Union parliament which opens 10 September. But three problems have been determined as the main priorities: the transition to the market, the Union Treaty, and the 1991 plan and budget. This was confirmed at a press conference Saturday by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

It goes without saying that journalists put quite a few questions to the head of parliament. For example, it was said that many Union laws are not working, so is there a mechanism apart from hearings which could "set the ball rolling"? A.I. Lukyanov replied: First we need laws of such quality that they contain this mechanism within themselves, the same kind of mechanism must also exist in analogous republic legislative acts. As an example he cited the fundamentals of the law of the USSR and the Union republics on land. At the moment no republic apart from Russia has prepared its own draft laws, with the result that the entire legal mechanism is being slowed down.

Your KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent also asked a question:

"Recently, the country's president has talked several times about the need for the earliest possible examination of the concept of the military reform. Will similar questions be raised at the fourth session? There is still one specific problem in this respect. The Supreme Soviet Committee for Defense and State Security Questions has adopted a decision on the need to eliminate the military construction detachments belonging to civilian ministries. The government, as far as is known, takes a negative view of this. Will the session resolve this problem?"

"As regards military construction detachments," A.I. Lukyanov replied, "we will support the committee persistently. Especially since the republics also express the same view on this question. The draft concept of the military reform has already been sent by the Presidentaial Council to parliament and it is now being examined by the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions. We are planning to adopt the draft at its first reading."

Ryzhkov Responds to Questions From Deputies

LD1109192290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Question-and-answer session with N.I. Ryzhkov, USSR Supreme Council chairman, and USSR deputies Sobchak, Pamfilova, Pribylova, and Stadnik at the USSR Supreme Soviet morning session in the Kremlin on 11 September; Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov mediates—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Following the end of the [Ryzhkov] report, deputies came up one after another to the microphone and expressed their attitude to its content. Listen to the brief remarks by deputies Sobchak, Pamfilova, Pribylova, and Stadnik.

[Sobchak] It was reported to us yesterday that the government would report on a joint program which is the result of some coordination of programs elaborated under the leadership of Academician Shatalin and the program presented by the government. But today, unfortunately, we have come up against something quite different. I was listening and could not understand. What are they reporting to us? What is this—the government's program or criticism of the program which we have not yet heard? Criticism of some alternative programs which we still know nothing about, or just read about...[changes thought] the point is the report which was presented by Shatalin's group. I would like finally to understand why are we incorrectly informed and placed in such a position where we are compelled to listen to what we are not promised?

[Ryzhkov] The government carried out, rigorously carried out the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet which was adopted in June of this year, and which directed the USSR Council of Ministers to present a program by 1 September for a transition to market relations. On 30-31 [August], in this hall and with the participation of the chairmen of the republican councils of ministers, and also with the involvement of academics and workers, the question was discussed of what are we to do with the two programs.

And the decision was made that the possibility had nevertheless to be found of uniting these two programs, uniting them and bringing a united program to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of the Union republics. This decision was implemented.

How did events develop from them? I signed the government's program on the first, but did not send it to the Supreme Soviet because we had an accord. At that time Comrade Shatalin's program, as it is called, was published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA, and from the third it began to be discussed at the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Following this I was compelled to send the program to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and as far as I know it was distributed to the chairmen of the committees and commissions. This is the situation.

Today there is no united program, it is currently being worked on and it will be available in a few days' time. In my report I said on what issues our positions coincide; there are very many sections there on which there is no difference of opinion. But there are certain fundamental differences of opinion which I have to report to you today. I was obliged to do this for you. What has to be done now? In my view, we have to await a united program. If there is unity there, then that is very good. If on certain matters mutual understanding still cannot be found that means the different points of view will be formulated. They have to be examined in the supreme soviets of the Union republics and in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Lukyanov] Second microphone, please.

[Pamfilova] Esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich. Personally, your report had generally simply depressed me. The point is that you are just suggesting to divide what little is still left without offering anything productive. You understand we all have to die a slow death together along with these wretched social programs. I do not understand why we have gathered here today. Please explain why. We have nothing and we know nothing; we cannot compare. There is Shatalin's program. It is fundamentally different from what you have just said.

[Ryzhkov] I have explained, and whatever impression my report creates, depressing or not, I think that we have no reason for a happy, very optimistic report. We have to take a realistic view of the situation that has arisen in the country.

[Lukyanov] First microphone, please, deputy Pribylova.

[Pribylova] Esteemed Nikolay Ivanovich, please set out the main criteria for the moderate radical economic reform which the government is proposing, and in what way does it differ from the draft program which we have not approved, which was not approved by the Supreme Soviet the first time round?

[Ryzhkov] Is it worth dwelling in detail once again on all of the principles of moderation in our proposals? Hardly. I have spoken of certain provisions in my report.

[Lukyanov] Second microphone, please.

[Stadnik] I am addressing you, Anatoliy Ivanovich. We have already heard at least two proposals, and people are addressing deputies, their own colleagues. Nikolay Ivanovich has replied as he was able, and to discuss now is simply useless. An assessment can be given of his address, but we have to end our questions. There was a proposal we are not prepared, you should not turn us into some kind of cogs in a machine; we are not prepared to discuss this program at all.

So let us take a sober look at things. There is the Shatalin program; it is a reality, and the Union republics know about this reality. If the government's program has been seen by the republics, then thank God. And so we have to discuss these two programs which are realities, including of course in the Supreme Soviet. We simply have nothing to adopt and decide at present. We have no basis for reflection. So Anatoliy Ivanovich, I am ashamed for the chairman of the Council of Ministers whom I also confirmed.

Do you understand? That is all. I have a third proposal, to end the questions and discuss the programs only after we have discussed them for a minimum of three days in the committees.

[Lukyanov] Alright.

Market Plan Debate Postponed Amid Acrimony

LD1109123290 Moscow TASS in English 1213 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Lev Aksenov, Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—Loud voices and angry exchanges marked the Soviet parliament's discussion of a programme of transition to a market economy today.

The report by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who admitted that there was still "no coordinated programme of this transition" did not satisfy the majority of deputies. Ryzhkov, who appeared to be under "cross-examination", at times reminded of a schoolboy guilty of not having done his homework.

Soviet Parliament chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov also came under fire—speakers decided that the question was not prepared for the session and all attempts by Lukyanov to forge a compromise were received with mistrust.

No wonder that in a situation as tense as this, Nikolay Ivanov, who is known for is ultra-radical views, demanded "the resignation of Gorbachev and Lukyanov". In response to this call, Lukyanov explained that this question "falls within the competence of the Congress of People's Deputies rather than the Supreme Soviet".

Aleksandr Obolenskiy formulated the stance of the Social Democratic Group of deputies in softer terms. He very politely invited the Council of Ministers to resign. He was supported by Deputy Leonid Sukhov, who thought that the Ryzhkov government "would, certainly, have to step down".

Many speakers reproached the prime minister that, having failed to present his programme, he used the parliamentary rostrum to criticise a plan that was developed by the group headed by Academician Stanislav Shatalin.

President Gorbachev intervened in an attempt to calm things down. He said that the combined variant of the programme for the transition to a market was ready and deputies would get it on Wednesday. However, this statement, too, did not suit deputies, who demanded that they be given an opportunity to acquaint themselves with all alternative drafts.

Academician Shatalin himself poured oil on the fire, saying that "the agreed-upon programme is based 99 per cent on the Gorbachev-Yeltsin plan", that is the one which was drafted by the group headed by him.

As a result of the stormy debate, the adoption of a resolution on the first item on the agenda was postponed.

Ryzhkov Declares Economy 'Under Control'

LD1109132990 Moscow TASS in English 1321 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Lev Aksenvo, Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The Soviet Government has the economic situation in the country under control, embattled Soviet Prime Minister Nilolay Ryzhkov claimed today.

Talking to reporters in the Soviet parliament's press centre, he said: "The government has the situation under control and is doing everything at this difficult time to keep the national economy working at a regular pace."

"If the cabinet stops doing this, the situation may become very serious," Ryzhkov said.

He gave a news conference during a break in parliamentary debates on ways to put the Soviet economy onto a market footing.

Deputy premier academician Leonid Abalkin said that this can be done either immediately, giving the economy "shock treatment," or under the government's "radical-moderate" plan.

He said the parliament should soberly assess "the readiness of society and the economy for either path."

"There are different options and they cannot be reconciled," Abalkin continued. "The question is which way is more realistic, suits current conditions, involves smaller social costs and, although longer, is smoother and not going to produce, in several months time, the kind of shock that will make the populace and the govenrment allergic to the market idea for decades".

Commenting on differences between leading Soviet economists on the transition to the market, Abalkin said they are "involved in a real political struggle."

Supreme Soviet Committees Discuss Market Economy

LD1209091590 Moscow TASS in English 0850 GMT 12 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary analyst Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—The fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which opened here on Monday, continued its work in committees and commissions today. They are expected to receive alternative plans for the country's transition to market economy.

Yesterday this question was heatedly discussed at a joint plenary meeting of both chambers of the Soviet parliament. Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, who addressed the morning meeting, said a joint programme would be submitted for parliamentary approval, incorporating the proposals of different groups of scientists and experts. He also outlined the government's view on problems of transition and its attitude to the concept of the Academician Stanislav Shatalin's group.

The parliament demanded that it be given a chance to study the different approaches and to draw its own responsible conclusions.

Mikhail Gorbachev, who took the floor at the plenary meeting, said all the documents were ready and now being printed. Today they are expected to be submitted to the parliamentary committees and commissions.

Presided by Boris Yeltsin, the parliament of the Russian Federation, the country's biggest Union republic, voted in favour of Shatalin's programme, thereby confronting the federal parliament with the dilemma of either joining Russia or adopting an alternative programme.

Supreme Soviet Approves Persian Gulf Policy

LD1109194390 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The Soviet parliament today approved a report by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on results of the September 9 superpower summit.

The parliament adopted a resolution expressing support for the position of the Soviet leadership on Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

It approved the joint statement by President Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush calling for durable and just peace in the Middle East and the Gulf.

The parliament asked the Foreign Ministry to regularly inform the parliamentary international affairs committee and all deputies about developments in the region and Soviet efforts to promote a political settlement of the Gulf crisis.

Deputies approved measures to evacuate Soviet citizens from the conflict zone.

Threat of No-Confidence Vote 'Has Been Lifted'

LD1109204390 Moscow TASS in English 2029 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Boris Zverev, Ivan Ivanov, and Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The threat to topple the present Soviet Government by a no-confidence vote at the current fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet (parliament) has been lifted for the time being. Only 28 out of the 381 deputies voted for putting confidence in the government to the vote.

President Mikhail Gorbachev, speaking after the vote, said that debating government resignation at this point would take up a lot of precious time and do harm to the parliament's key business at present—the adoption of an economic reform programme.

The deputies eventually adopted a resolution saying that it is advisable, after the president presents his proposals and other materials relating to the transition to a market-based economy, to let the supreme soviets of Union and autonomous republics consider these documents prior to their approval by the national parliament before October 1.

Later in the afternoon, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told the parliament about the results of the working summit between President Gorbachev and President George Bush in Helsinki and about the Soviet policy with respect to the Persian Gulf crisis.

Deputies expressed support for the Soviet leadership's stance towards Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and approved the joint statement by the two presidents.

Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov then replied to a question relating to an article published in the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper which alleged that he had bought the state-owned summer house he was now using as the head of the government. Ryzhkov denied the allegation.

The incident-related debates turned into a discussion of privileges. Deputies noted the need to adopt new regulatory enactments to ensure the social protection of statesmen.

On Wednesday [12 September] the Supreme Soviet is due to continue its work in committees and commissions. The next plenary meeting of the chambers is scheduled for September 17.

Texts of Leaders' Speeches at 11 Sep Session

Gorbachev's Address

LD1209002390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1816 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Speech by USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev at the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin on 11 September—recorded]

[Text] Generally speaking, I am not disturbed by the radical way all questions are being asked regarding the discussion of the central issue of the present session. I believe that this is the central issue. What our society will be like in the next few years depends on the kind of decisions that are adopted, on the kind of choice we make. This will be decided in the next few days since these decisions must be followed by fundamental and radical changes which, of course, will have a corresponding effect also on the all-Union treaty for it is greatly dictated by the economy, and we all sensed this during work on the programs. The economy dictates what political institutions there should be, what the distribution of functions should be, and so on and so forth.

Therefore, this is the key issue today. We will have to make a most fundamental choice; one can even speak here of a choice of fateful significance, as it were. Nothing that preceded the present session—that is the last session, though on the whole things strictly speaking started a year ago...nothing is coincidental, comrades. Look at the processes under way in society.

Some people are tired; some people know it all. I come across this every day. A lot of people like this have sprung up among us, both among politicians and speakers. I am not one of those who thinks he knows everything. I am trying to understand—with the participation of scholars, with your participation, and with the participation of representatives of different points of view, so as not to err and not to push this enormous country in the direction that would lead... [changes thought] it is not a matter of us, not a matter of us personally but of the country. People are saying that this should have been done, that time has been wasted, and so on.

I have said this many times and I will say it again now: It would be too simple if one could say that if this campaign is no good, let's ditch it. Strictly speaking that is what it comes down to. Time has not been wasted. In that time, we have realized some things: what our own notions are, what has been stuffed in our heads and what we need to be freed of, and what kind of system functions in society and whether it is capable of imparting dynamism to our country or not.

More than this, remember that only about a year and a half ago we began talking about pluralism of views and were still unable to go further than that. Today we have only just approached political pluralism with all its features, as it were.

What about ownership? And what is slackening of State control? And what is this? Do you really think that if those who are shouting that we are in such a state—given this kind of understanding, given these brains of ours, given such a mass of psychological complexes—were to make us rush headlong toward the market that anything good would come of it?

That is nonsense! If you are capable of thinking, and I believe you are because I already know you well, all 100 percent of you, then let us think. Why are we engaged in such nonsense?

If someone wants to change those in power, to replace this person and that person; if someone has a program of stages to bring down the government now—there is an opportunity even in September rather than October—and then the Supreme Soviet which has exhausted itself, and then the people's deputies, (?and) then the Congress, and to do away with the president and so on, that is one thing.

It is another matter that here we have a country and one that is in such a state that...you can give even more facts here but for myself, well I imagine that you are aware that I know what is going on. That is what the situation today is like.

Yesterday—because of what was going on in our heads, the concepts we held of the past and the present, and the forecast we had for the future—we were unable to raise matters so fundamentally. That is absolutely, I am convinced of this [word indistinct], otherwise there would have been a tragedy and a mix-up in the country from which we would not have escaped.

Perhaps we can do it tomorrow? No, the time is now. It will already be too late tomorrow. Why? Because there really is a collapse of structures going on. The old lines are receding while the new ones are not yet formed. The system has disintegrated. Basically, there is no system. We have lost one and it is in a state of disintegration. Processes of destabilization in the economy, so to speak, the functioning of the legal bodies and political power are all evident. Moreover, negative processes in the economy itself are on the increase. Economic relations are falling apart. There is a reversion to bartering and isolation. They want to introduce customs around oblasts to decide what to let through or not. They want goods in-kind rather than money. In other words, there is every sign that there can be no further delay. It has to be dealt with.

Moreover, and this is very important, even in the spring when you held discussions here, and even in a most difficult atmosphere in society regarding the market, the Supreme Soviet took up the very serious stance that work needed to be done but not everything needed to be discarded, including this choice in the direction of the market. At that time effectively the majority of society did not want to talk about it. You can remember the atmosphere you were working in. All the same, the professional political analysis you made here indicated the need to carry on research, making it more profound, and to be ready by September so as to be ready on the basis of all of this discussion in time for the new session.

In those months society went through what it should take decades to go through, and all the polls now show that people do understand that there is a need to move to the market. It is not because they still see it as they did earlier in the spring as a bazaar, the Rizhskiy market [busy public market in Moscow], as a collective farm where anything goes, but because they understand that it is essential to put the individual in production into a different place and to provide different incentives; and that to do this the individual has to be brought closer to the means... and thereby come to new forms of economic life; and that this means basing yourself on and engaging in the restructuring of property relations.

This is now understood in society. Nowadays society is only concerned and rightly so about whether this may be accompanied by the kind of negative features that can be survived or whether it might lead to a most serious situation and one that might be very difficult to correct. That is what the people are afraid of. How to move to the market? What does it mean?

Nevertheless, from this aspect also, the situation in the country is now such that the people are also pushing us if you like, saying it must be done. Today people are also saying: Let us get something done, please. So from all points of view, wherever you start from we are now at the stage where a choice has to be made and we have to get going. So at the stage of the drafting of these ideas—and this went on not only after the Supreme Soviet in the government, but also in the republics and in scientific centers—the idea arose.

At one meeting with economic journalists, Comrade Shmelev spoke and said: Mikhail Sergeyevich, I am woring with Academician Aganbegyan. I am in the know. Now I can see. I am familiar both with the alternative drafts that we were examining and I know the government one, and now the situation is such that I can see that there is an opportunity to draft something of the sort that would, so to speak, integrate all these opinions and draw up a unified line and unite all forces so as to avoid disagreement at this crucial stage.

I spoke then with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin. He sent a letter, I telephoned him, and we had a conversation. We agreed to opt for this, and then came the note written by a group of comrades; on this we—myself, Yeltsin, Ryzhkov, and Silayev—approved the joint work of drafting. And the government—although it already had work in hand, had ideas, and so on—agreed on the basis that it was better this way to unify efforts and keep moving.

What is bad about this? Nothing, I think. In my opinion it is all very sensible, it goes to show that in order to get a document on the basis of which we can move the country in this direction, a document in which agreement is synthesized, in my opinion this is very much the right way, correct both politically and from the point of view of the matter in hand.

And so this process got going. The process was going badly. In this process a split emerged, and there were uncautious statements from the one side and the other, our press pitched in, and passions flared up. I sensed that matters were acquiring a very acute and dramatic character. With the country in such a situation I abandoned my vacation because on vacation I had to sit by the telephone and not go away from it, maintaining contacts with everyone all the time; I saw that a process of disintegration was simply taking place among the people from whom we counted on receiving this document. So I returned, and right away we arranged and held the joint session of which I have spoken. And then we managed to agree that we had to try to arrive at a unified document.

Comrades, I assess all this as a serious process, an attempt to arrive at a document which would reflect agreement and reflect the realities. It seems to me that we are arriving at this. How do things look? Comrade Ryzhkov has said frankly—and in this sense one can indeed say that on certain issues this has been done and that is not complete—that overall there are shortcomings.

That is another matter, but the fact that he said that there are differences which have not yet been overcome... that is so. If you were to ask me, I am more greatly impressed by the draft prepared by Shatalin's group. He integrates the ideas of the Union republics, and in this sense what has been done there already rests on the agreement of the republics, and by this token all the republics are united. And so, if this document is sent around a republic it will be based on the foundation that we need. And without unification of society around these issues, nothing will come of it, it will be a fight that we will not come out of. So the reckoning here is one both of business and of politics. But it has to be said that this can in fact be overcome.

Even Nikolay Ivanovich, I think, strongly emphasized the idea, and in the new draft which I think will be given to you tomorrow it is ready and will be duplicaed—I think that certain issues will look different in it concerning the future of our state.

Here I think we already have a consensus that can be enshrined already in this document, although one should not drag into this document what ought to be contained in the all-Union treaty. This document is being purged of this too. However, comrades, there are fundamental differences, fundamental ones.

And it is with these that I was concerned. I have three times held meetings that each lasted several hours. And by the way, before I left by air for Helsinki, it was between midnight and 1 am that I ended a routine hearing of the sides who are working on the variant of the united draft.

What, comrades, do these concern? The Shatalin group and those who work with him rely, as a matter of principle, on proceeding through the stabilization of finances; changing the situation of the ruble in monetary circulation; and entering the new economic situation when the pools from the imbalances that have emerged in our economy and market have not only already been collected, but when the stopcocks are adjusted in such a way as to preclude the emergence of these pools yet again. This is because if they do emerge, if nothing happens in finances, the money in circulation and in the market...and if we fail to rectify things in the budget, then I must say that no approach will yield anything. But if this is done one can then go for the market, letting prices off the leash gradually, as it were. Incidentally, it must be done step by step, and they must not be let off the leash altogether.

If at some stage or other a situation arises in which money is sought—now people are running away from money—a situation in which people begin to look for money everywhere, then comrades, prices will not go wild. This then is what this approach consists of. So I think it will be the market itself that will exert influence, and at long last we will have the real prices that will determine what each individual is worth and powerful incentives will have been created to set structural changes in motion. Yes, these will be painful changes but this is how it will be. Then this will be a proper process. I am more impressed by this approach. Well, comrades, if I have not plagued the life out of.... [changes thought] You can see that Shatalin is sitting there, and all the others too. I have said to them: provide stabilizing measures, that is the most important thing; give us those measures, so that we can present them here and discuss them. I must say that we are making progress in that direction. So if there is a real plan to stabilize finances, money in circulation, the ruble, and the market, then Shatalin's idea should be accepted.

The way I see the government's position is that it is not confident that it is possible to implement the stabilization measures. Here is where the main differences lies and hence this approach. Then, I mean, we will have an administrative increase in prices. Then instruments will be preserved together with this, the administrative functioning of the economy, the selfsame system, and so forth. All the same we want to proceed in this direction: that the economy and other mechanisms will be changing. But then the structure will be different along with the management of the economy, authorities, and so on. Here is where disputes are to be found. I would ask comrades not to be sidetracked by accusations and labels, by saying here it is, what has it yielded, and so on. Do not succumb to that. I have publicly said for all the country to hear, and I am accountable for these words and I insist on this, that this is what the approach ought to be like. If we now get bogged down in shaking up everything, all the political institutions in the country, then we shall have buried and lost the final three or four months which are essential and which can no longer be put back. The economy will itself dictate to us and move toward disintegration. Then we will all be completely worthless—the president, the government, and the Supreme Soviet—if they have allowed the political process to get out of hand and if they have permitted themselves to be involved in this idle venture. This is what we must get down to. It will then be clear that if any sort of structures need to be made more precise, if someone is unable to cope and is incompetent, let us remove him; but this is how we must proceed normally. We must not just simply act on impulse, as it were, to shake someone up or to throw someone out or to do this, that, or the other to him. Listen, this is not it; it is not a political process. It is an attempt, you know, to make use of the tension in society and of the fact that passions are on the boil; they only need to be lit and we can launch an all-out onslaught. This is unacceptable. We will then have buried everything that we have attained over the past five years up until now.

So far we have been keeping this country, with such complexities and problems, mainly in the channel of political processes although bloodshed and clashes have proved unavoidable. Things are hard, and it cannot be otherwise. If someone says—I have already said it 1,000 times and I repeat it for the 1001st time—that those who wish to put cheap solutions our way, all that you know is gargage.

And if you reflect you will arrive at the same conclusion. If you want the president, bypassing the republics and disregarding everything that has been done during these years—new supreme soviets and local soviets have been set up; new people have emerged; and the president started saying without consultations: for me this is of no importance—then what kind of state are we dealing with?

After all, we are proceeding from the unitary to a real Union of sovereign states. You know, we very much need to understand one another and support one another now. This is very important. We will bury this decisive phase when we make a really fateful decision, both as regards the transition to the market and as regards the shaping of the all-Union treaty.

By the way, the committee which is made up of the prime figures of the republics—the president, the prime minister, and the chairman of the supreme soviet—has been set up and formed in order to implement the second stage: shaping the draft of the new all-Union treaty. So we are on the threshold of the most important decisions; we have come up to them.

Just now we would start squabbling, and this is what they want to toss at us—to society and to the Supreme Soviet and to everywhere. Let us all be attentive and not allow ourselves to be drawn into this! But this does not mean that we do not have to hear out all points of view and compare. We have to make a choice. And in this respect all here have the right to speak on this topic. This is a most crucial choice. That is why I request your cooperation.

And so you agree, we wanted to propose this. The program—it was completed today—tomorrow it will be here. There will probably be alternative stances in this document. I see that we will not reach the end. And we probably....[changes thought] And it is not necessary to claim that this will already be a completed document. This would be claiming too much.

The republics must discuss it; you must discuss it. I think that it will be enriched. What is important is to move as quickly as possible in this direction. If you have a wish and a need—apart from what was done there, so to speak, in these teams—to receive yourselves the government's draft, to receive the draft of Comrade Aganbegyan and his group so that you could look at it from the very start, let us supply you with all that. Let us supply you with all that. In the end I see that there should be no suspicions here at all, from any quarter.

Thus I call on you, dear comrades, to work for unity, to reflect, and to make a responsible choice. I am ready to hold discussions with you and to take part in all discussions insofar as my competence suffices, because I do not claim to be an expert in all spheres. Nevertheless I can say something, so to speak, and I am ready to cooperate together with you. Thank you.

Ryzhkov's Address

LD1109164990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Speech by N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, at USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin on 11 September—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies, the country is on the threshold of the adoption of major decisions which will fundamentally change its economic structure and the whole sphere of economic relations. This historic step is dictated by the logic of the renewal of socialism and by life itself, and proper consideration and a careful forecast of the possible consequences of the actions taken are especially necessary here. And naturally, oversimplification is not permissible here, nor lack of thought, especially now that the practical implementation of everything planned needs to be started. The time for abstractions has gone. Decisions need to be taken in an exceptionally complex economic and sociopolitical situation. The national economy is in deep crisis. The slump in social production is continuing. The commodity-money imbalance is growing. Economic links are being destroyed. A reversion to bartering is occurring. Group egoism and local separatism are patently manifesting themselves to a greater and greater extent. The rapid growth in the population's income has not been successfully curtailed. New shortages are continually arising on the consumer market. The country's situation with regard to hard currency is in a critical state.

The deepening of the crisis on all fronts at the contemporary stage cannot be explained solely by economic factors. It is evident that the instability of the political situation in the country is having an increasingly adverse effect on the economy. The country is ceasing to take laws into account. Respect for the authorities and administrative bodies has been undermined—from the executive committee of the village soviet to the USSR Council of Ministers. New processes not known in the past have emerged, such as mass strikes, interethnic conflicts, the economic blockade of whole regions, and the stoppage of factories which are of a priority significance for the national economy.

All this has been interwoven into another knot of very acute political and economic problems. There are no traditional solutions under such conditions, especially given the growing crisis of authority at all levels. The CPSU—as a real, governing force in the past—has moved away from the resolution of specific economic issues and the local soviets have not yet properly acquired the art of administration.

They have still to pass through the practical lessons of how to work and leadership of society; to acknowledge the necessity of daily, routine work and the whole complexity of the problems which are specific but vitally important for people; and to fully take upon themselves the responsibility for resolving them. To this it should be added that the crisis of power is in many ways a result of the fact that the legislative bodies have started to substitute for executive ones to a greater and greater degree. This has already been felt in the localities as well. Where is the way out? In the economic sphere the government, as before, connects this with the transition to a regulated and socially orientated market.

Attitudes toward the market vary. Some people see it as the panacea to all of our misfortunes and the only chance to build a genuinely contemporary, flourishing society. Others regard the market with doubts, fearing a worsening in their living conditions—especially in the transition stage. Still others, and there are no small number of these either, do not accept this idea itself in principle.

However this may be, the country and the people are faced with an extremely crucial choice. Naturally this requires from the supreme soviets of the USSR and of the Union republics, as well as from all administrative bodies, a careful comparison of the proposed drafts and variants for the transition to the market when the action program is being drawn up. At the same time the government sees that extremely complex work lies ahead, and here the situation which has taken shape in the country needs to be taken into account. It dictates the following:

First, it is essential to combine time-wise—in time—(?measures) providing for both the transition to the market and the stabilization of the economic situation in the country. And first and foremost a reduction in the budget deficit, bringing the state of money in circulation into a more healthy condition, strengthening the prestige and purchasing power of the ruble [R], and the saturation of the consumer market should be especially singled out.

Second, things need to be viewed realistically. In discussing major and radical changes one should not forget that economic life cannot be stopped for a single day. The movement of trains and airplanes; the smelting of metals; and the work of chemical enterprises, livestock complexes, and bakeries should not be interrupted. In order for this to be prevented, it is necessary that economic links be preserved side by side with the development of market relations—whatever the cost may be—and that a severance of them not be permitted either in the time remaining until the end of this year or in 1991.

The third, and perhaps the main thing, consists in achieving political stability, in restoring respect for legality and law and order, and in the most rigorous observance of executive discipline. A country in which the law ceases to operate inevitably becomes an arena for the clash of opposing groups, the influence of corrupt elements intensifies, and destructive processes press harder and harder on the system of government.

Understanding the full responsibility of the government, I state clearly and unambiguously that if these three conditions—stabilizing the economy, maintaining vital capacity at the necessary level, and the political stability of society—are not met, then chaos could ensue in the country. Particular concern is caused by the situation that is taking shape with the formation of a plan and budget for 1991. Their elaboration is being implemented on fundamentally new tenets which take account of the beginning of a transition to market relations while preserving the methods of direct state regulation within definite bounds.

The foundations for the introduction of new market relations in the economic life of next year have already been laid by the laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, including on the demarcation of powers between the Union republics and the USSR. The formation of plans and budgets has to take place in conditions of stability of the most important legal norms of economic legislation. These are primarily the norms provided for by the laws on ownership, on land, on leasing, on enterprise, and on taxation. If we now renounce them, economic life will become completely disorganized.

Unfortunately, the aspiration of the supreme soviets of a number of Union republics to revise laws already adopted has lead to many local soviets still not knowing what proportion of tax payments they will come to have at their disposal next year. This means that they also cannot form the expenditure part of the budget, and the main thing is this part is expenditure on social measures as well as the wages of teachers, doctors, and cultural personnel. A fundamental issue in state regulation next year is the preservation of the economic links that have arisen between enterprises, and a substantial enhancement of their responsibility for carrying out deliveries.

This is particularly important in conditions when economic levers have not started to operate, conditions have not been created for competition, and virorous antimonopolist measures have not yet begun to function. The compulsory state order for all-Union needs is being substantially reduced which is opening up broad possibilities for the development of market relations. For the purpose of the normal functioning of the most important sectors, and primarily those supplying people's needs, the government is making provision for state support for such national economic complexes as the agro-industrial and the fuel and energy complexes, and also for fulfillment of the most important scientific and technical programs and basic research.

The work of the national economy in 1991 will be adversely affected by the influence of the foreign currency situation in the country. The level and structure of the foreign debt requires for its servicing 12.5 billion rubles in freely convertible currency. This means that the volume of finished and raw materials, component items, consumer goods, medicaments, and foodstuffs bought for such foreign currency has to be reduced approximately threefold as against 1990. This cannot fail to have an effect on the balance of the national economy and primarily on the production of consumer goods. It is essential to find a solution here jointly with the Union republics. If we do not find one, it means that the national economy will suffer.

In such conditions the government, on which lies prime responsibility for extricating the country from crisis, has to have powers commensurate with this responsibility. It is essential immediately to open those enterprises that have been shut down by local organs of power without the consent of the Union and republican governments, and to introduce a special regime of administration on railway transport, on the oil and gas main pipelines, and in other spheres of providing vital supplies to the population. It is necessary within the shortest time to achieve a voluntary no-strike agreement with labor collectives this year and next year, that is to declare a moratorium. The country's government is fully aware of the acuteness of the problem of ensuring legality and law and order, of protecting citizens' safety, of curtailing organized crime, and of preventing its growth to a level of mafia structures.

A decision has been taken to entrust the USSR Council of Ministers commission for emergency situations with coordinating the activity of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB with the broad involvement of labor collectives in combating crime and in establishing the necessary order in towns and populated centers.

The role of the procuracies and courts has to be substantially invigorated. At the same time the corresponding organs in the republics and in the localities have to take immediate measures and make use of the possibilities provided by the USSR Constitution for combating crime in all of its forms. We are building a law-governed state and we have to observe rigorously the rules of behavior appropriate to it. In a law-governed state it is the law that possesses supreme authority. Observance of the law has to be sacred and punishment for disregarding it has to be inescapable. The full force of state power, the full might of public opinion, and all of the possibilities of the mass media now have to be directed toward defending the law. Otherwise legal nihilism is inevitable, a backward slide and new versions of arbitrary rule by the authorities or by unoffical public structures.

Until the signing of a new Union treaty, the need for which is obvious, everyone must strictly observe the USSR Constitution and the relevant laws adopted in it. It is precisely because it is guided by the realities of life that the government is obliged to defend a radically moderate version of the transition to the market. It is fully set forth in the draft government program which, in accordance with a resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was worked out by 1 September of this year.

This program develops and makes concrete the approaches approved by the Second Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. I could have announced it today as a completed document, revealing in detail its content, the logic of the stages of movement towards the market, and specific ventures planned in various directions. It seems to me however that this should not be done. As you know, under a directive from the USSR president, a concept for a program of the transfer to the market has been worked out and now, under an accord reached at a sitting of the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation, work is in hand to unite this material with what has been proposed by the government. A single document is to be worked out on the basis of these two programs. It is intended that in the near future it will be presented for consideration by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics and the USSR.

It must be said that these two drafts have much in common. First of all they have a single aim: to get the country out of its crisis and increase the prosperity of the Soviet people on the basis of the formation of a qualitatively new system of economic management, a socially orientated market economy. Many trends and specific measures to be implemented en route to the market coincide. I have in mind improvements to finances and the money circulation, the strengthening of the ruble, the establishment of various forms of property, demonopolization, the development of enterprise and the revival of the free commodity producer as the main character in market relations, and the formation of a market infrastructure and new approaches to foreign economic activity.

We have a great interest in actively and jointly carrying out this work, primarily because it will give us a chance to adjust the government position time and time again on such fundamental issues as the tactics of moving toward the market on a basis of appraising the real situation and its specific manifestations, and consequently the possibilities and timescale for stabilizing the situation in the country which is currently the most important requirement.

I should now like to dwell upon the government position regarding reform of price formation. Here too we are primarily governed by the concrete demands of life. The most important demand today consists of the need to adopt a decision either to embark upon a on-off price increase controlled by the state or to commence the road to the market on 1 January next year with free price formation. We justify our position in favor of a on-off revision of wholesale prices above all by the fact that an immediate transition to free price formation will in the present and most difficult conditions lead to a great increase in them and the destabilization of economic life, disorienting enterprises during the formation of the production program. For this reason the government proposes carrying out a centralized review of wholesale prices with their subsequent liberalization, especially about retail prices.

I shall not repeat what I have already said time and again on this subject. I will only point out that the government is openly informing the people of the need to raise prices once and for all, with simultaneous full compensation to the population for the ensuing rising cost of living on certain types of consumer goods and foodstuffs.

At the same time it is proposed not to raise in 1991 prices of certain types of refrigerators, television sets, radio equipment, and certain light industry goods to an overall sum of some R8.5 billion.

The question of raising prices of liquor and vodka products and municipal services is being taken off the agenda. It is also proposed to reduce the prices of a number of light industry goods by R5 billion.

The year 1991 will see the beginning of the gradual transition of certain groups of goods to free pricing, bringing the proportion of these goods to 70 percent in 1992. What is the essence of the other variant which is being insistently proposed to the people?

I have already spoken about prices of goods intended for production and technical purposes. They also propose not setting new agricultural purchase prices, but rather starting to reprice them from scratch on a contractual basis. But how this is to be implemented the authors of the draft do not say. For instance, with whom will the collective and state farms of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and the Ukraine reach agreement on purchase prices for sugar beet, for grain, for livestock, and other types of produce? As a result agriculture too will be placed in conditions of complete uncertainty and vagueness of prospect of economic work in 1991.

As for retail prices, here also what is proposed is essentially their rampant growth in the process of the transition to free pricing.

The all-round forecast appraisals and calculations which have been carried out show that in this case their growth will be multiple. This is also confirmed by the experience of many countries: Yugoslavia, Poland, and others. The question arises of who will provide compensation for such an increase, in what measure can this compensation be implemented, and who will bear the brunt of this rampant rise in prices? Both our analysis and foreign practice show that this will mean that primarily the lower and middle income strata of the population will be bearing the losses. They have to shoulder the burdens of the accelerated transition to market pricing. The standard of living will fall by 30 percent, or perhaps even more. Unpredictable rates of inflation will spiral in the country. This is what the proposals on giving up administrative price increase may mean in reality.

True, the authors of this draft propose maintaining prices of 150 designations of goods. But familiarization with the list of these prices makes it clear that the total sum of their sales at existing prices amounts to R2.5 to R3 billion. That is less than seven percent of the goods turnover and embraces only 25 percent of the minimum consumer budget.

It is proposed, for example of all types of bread, to preserve current prices only on white bread—at a price of 13 kopecks a loaf—as well as on Orlovskiy bread, and of all fish products only on cod, but to sell all other types of bread and fish at unregulated prices. It is natural that at low prices food products will simply disappear from the trade network. So the government cannot embark on the implementation of such proposals. This would be an irresponsible step. With such a diversity of positions it is, in our view, impossible to find a compromise. A choice has to be made here.

Comrades! To briefly comment on the government's position in approaching the rise of market relations in the agrarian sector, its essence boils down to the following. In the first place we cannot agree with proposals counting primarily on peasants, farms, the introduction of private ownership of land, and permission for its purchase and sale through a system of land banks which forecast—without confirmation by calculations—that as early as 1 January 1991 it is possible that every fourth collective and state farm will be bankrupt.

The Union government considers that neither now nor in the future should the collective and state farm be set in opposition to the independent peasant farm. The main point does not lie in opposition but in the right of the peasant himself to choose the conditions of land husbandry, and in improving them by way of production and other cooperatives, and sensible specialization and integration on the basis of diverse forms of ownership. A rational combination of the public sector production of the collective and state farms with peasant farms, cooperatives of various types, and private farms of the population is how we see the model of a multi-structured agrarian economy.

Second, propositions that the degree of saturation of agriculture with the main types of machinery already exceeds real needs, and that in view of this it is proposed to go over to unregulated prices and wholesale trade in the main means of production, are in our view unfounded. The government considers that it is expedient during the transition period to preserve the guaranteed provision of the main types of machines and equipment to the agro-industrial complex at centrally fixed wholesale prices. This has to be done without fail in the interests of accelerated technical retooling of the agricultural sector, and particularly of the processing industries, and also in connection with the need to protect the farms' interests from the diktat of the producers of machinery and from an uncontrolled rise in prices for it.

Third, one must not reduce concern for the social development of rural areas to the mere provision of various benefits to regions where peasant farms are being set up as is being proposed. The problem lies considerably deeper. It is precisely here that fundamentally new approaches and solutions are needed, coordinated actions and integrated programs in every republic, kray, oblast and rayon. These are in essence the most important areas of agrarian policy on the implementation of which the efforts of the Union and republic governments need to be concentrated. Comrade People's Deputies! Our program is designed for an open economy, for the integration of the domestic world market. Its main point is creating a competitive economic mechanism in the country and securing enterprises' foreign economic independence.

This is precisely why it is based upon the unity of the Union-wide market; a customs, currency, and patent territory; and the fundamentals of economic legislation. The establishment of a new exchange rate for the ruble, making it convertible, and assimilating new forms of cooperation serve the very same aims. All these approaches are reflected in the drafts for new customs, investment, and currency legislation which have been submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet and which you have already started to debate.

The foreign economic sections of both programs contain a great deal in common and can be merged. True we still have difficult work to do to prevent curtailment of the rights of enterprises, including the right to dispose of hard currency profits, to prevent the eroding of the status of the Union as a business partner, and to prevent the devaluation of the entire system of our international treaties.

In the government program foreign capital is attracted mainly in the form of capital investment in the production sector through various kinds of ownership. This is meeting with understanding among foreign business circles. We cannot rely on thousands of millions worth of financial aid from the West, mainly directed towards current consumption. It is highly dubious that we would succeed in this way in shifting the social cost of the transition to the market onto the world outside. Nor is it clear how we would then repay these loans.

And the final but actually the most important thing: In putting forward the program for the transition to a new economic model, the government is proceeding on the basis that the main aim of the transformations which are being outlined is to create an opportunity and the conditions for all the citizens of our country to have the material and spiritual life which they deserve. Therefore the pivot of the government program is an integrated system of measures providing a guarantee that the basic social rights of the population will be implemented and that it will be protected against the negative manifestations of the market.

The organizational and legal foundations of these measures are being drawn up by the government ahead of other matters relating to the shaping of market machinery.

It is essential first and foremost not to permit the emergence of unemployment as a persistent phenomenon in society. This must be facilitated by the phased nature of our entry into the market economy, preventing the drastic breakup of its structure. A draft of the basic legislation of the USSR and the Union republics on the employment of the population has been drawn up and presented to the USSR Supreme Soviet in order to reinforce the most important legal and economic guarantees for the population in the labor field.

Great importance is being attached to the creation of a consistent system of social guarantees and support for the most vulnerable groups among the population: pensioners, families with children, and the disabled for whom essential measures are envisaged in the laws and decisions of the government which have been adopted. As for the disabled, a draft law of the USSR on their social protection has been submitted for your consideration.

It is a fundamental aspect of the structure of a system of guarantees for these categories of the population that only minimum levels of the relevant payments and benefits are set at the all-Union level. On the one hand, this enhances people's confidence in society, and on the other does not limit the opportunities of the republics to increase these payments.

And of course, immense importance is attached to protecting the population's purchasing power given the possibility of mounting inflationary processes. We are firmly convinced that citizens must be fully compensated for an on-off rise in prices, and it is planned to implement this as early as this December.

During work on the government program, account was taken of the proposals of Union republics on the transfer to them of the sum of compensations in accordance with actual levels of consumption. The republics will decide themselves how to distribute these resources among the various groups of the population.

What is more, compensation will be carried out not only through additional payments to current incomes but also through the recalculation of Savings Bank deposits and insurance contributions as well as also through a change in the face value of securities. To compensate for losses in connection with the current growth of prices, the indexing of the population's incomes is to be introduced and regulated by an appropriate USSR law as well as the adjusting of interest rates for deposits and securities.

The creation of conditions for the stable functioning of such areas as education, healthcare, culture, and art are particularly important for ensuring reliable social guarantees for the satisfaction of the population's vital needs. It is essential that the development of market relations does not undermine their economic base and that workers employed in these areas can work to a high standard and be creative.

We must not allow this sphere to function chiefly on commercial principles. This is especially dangerous for culture and art where the pursuit of profit will inevitably result in a lowering of moral and aesthetic standards.

Therefore, in addition to increased backing for these nonproduction spheres from the resources of all budgets, the setting up of special purpose funds is envisaged, formed from the contributions of enterprises and organizations based on various kinds of ownership and from public donations.

Such are the fundamental approaches to the major (?program) of the transition to market relations which the government is convinced are correct and which it is going to defend.

Concluding my speech, I would like to stress once again that the consolidation and uniting of all healthy forces, committed to the stabilization of the economy and to getting the country out of crisis, are more necessary now than ever before. There should be no place here for political ambitions and group interests.

We are duty bound to rapidly finish drawing up a single all-Union program for the transition to a market and to undertake its implementation with determination and with the support of the people.

[Announcer] Then Comrade Ryzhkov stressed that, in his view, the most difficult issue during the switch to a market is the restructuring of economic relations within the Union. He believes that it would be an unforgivable mistake to postpone the transfer to the market until a Union treaty is concluded, work on which is moving slowly. Therefore it is necessary to combine two tendencies: on the one hand, the process of strengthening the state and economic sovereignty of the Union republics, and on the other, the actual need for integration that exists in the world today.

Describing the government program the speaker set forth its three main principles. These are above all: Recognition of the sovereignty of the Union republics, their equality, and economic independence; second, the creation of the conditions for the formation of an all-Union market as a basis for the efficient functioning of the economy of each Union republic and the deepening of processes of integration; and third, the guaranteeing both by the center and by sovereign republics of the most favorable conditions for the free activity of enterprises of all forms of ownership. This does not at all mean that the government is ignoring republican declarations of sovereignty, something frequently attributed to the government. This is a matter either for the Union as a federative state or for an economic union of states. The government will not accept the second path since it believes that the people of our country will inevitably suffer serious losses.

Defending his point of view, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov set out a proposal on the demarcation of the functions of the USSR and the Union republics. It was stressed that until a market mechanism is fully introduced, certain structures functioning today will have to be preserved to some extent, which is extremely important now during the period of stabilization of the economy.

Shevardnadze's Address

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[Text] Moscow, 11 September (TASS)—Speaking at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet today Eduard Shevardnadze said:

In view of the requests of people's deputies, the president of the USSR has instructed me to report to the Supreme Soviet on the development of the crisis in the Persian Gulf region and on the Soviet Union's actions in this situation, as well as on the results of the Soviet-U.S. summit meetings in Helsinki.

Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the subsequent annexation of that state have created a dangerous threat to peace and international security. I will emphasize: it is primarily a question of a global and not just regional threat. That is precisely how it was qualified by the UN Security Council.

I will remind you in brief how events developed. On the night of 1-2 August Iraqi troops—about 150,000 men—crossed the border with Kuwait, simultaneously mounting an air and seaborne landing in the capital of that state. The Amir and members of the ruling dynasty found refuge in Saudi Arabia. In Baghdad initially the creation of a so-called "provisional free government" of Kuwait made up of regular Iraqi officers was announced. A week later the Iraqis announced the complete annexation of Kuwait.

Large forces of Iraqi troops advanced to the Kuwait-Saudi border. Under these conditions Riyadh appealed to the U.S. Administration for help and agreed to the stationing of U.S. troops on the territory of Saudi Arabia. A similar request was made to other states.

"Multinational forces" were created in which Britain, France, Australia, Canada, and other western countries agreed to participate. Egypt, Morocco, and Syria formed the inter-Arab component of these forces.

How have we been acting in the situation which has arisen?

On 2 August, within a few hours after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait became known, a Soviet Government statement was made carrying a clear condemnation of the use of force, and an appeal to Iraq to immediately and unreservedly withdraw its forces from Kuwaiti territory.

Our qualification of Iraq's aggression is known to you: Key principles of international law have been breached, the sovereignty of an independent UN member state has been trampled underfoot, and the lives of tens of thousands of people have been placed under threat, including citizens of foreign states who are being illegally detained on the territory of Iraq.

It was politically and psychologically difficult for us to take such a postion by virtue of advanced and multilateral ties with Iraq and the existence of a friendship and cooperation treaty signed in 1972.

But we could not act otherwise for there are principles, norms of international law, such concepts as respect for the inviolability of established borders and observance of world law and order.

If we had acted otherwise, we would have rendered null and void everything done in recent years by our state in the international arena.

Building our political line under crisis conditions, we endeavored and are endeavoring to ensure that it should be as well thought-out as possible, should preserve the possibility of dialogue with all sides affected by the crisis, and at the same time should take our political and economic interests and concrete realities into account. For a dangerous hotbed of tension has arisen not so very far from our borders. About 9,000 of our citizens were in Iraq and Kuwait at the moment of the aggression. Ensuring their safety and dignity was and remains for us a cause of primary importance.

I should like to single out two key points of the Soviet position.

First, from the very beginning of the crisis we placed the main emphasis on collective efforts based on full use of the possibilities and machinery of the United Nations.

Second, we gave and are giving preference to non-military, political-diplomatic methods of resolving the crisis.

We have endeavored, and consider it necessary, to adopt all decisions within the framework of the UN Security Council. As you know, the international community reacted to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait with five council resolutions, and each of them flowed logically from the context of the situation taking shape and was a reply to particular actions taken by the Iraqi leadership.

The Soviet Union has been actively participating in working out these resolutions and has voted for all of them with a clear conscience for the very nature of what has occured, as well as the behaviour of the Iraqi leadership which has had time to think and which we urged to reconsider and make corrections to their line of action, have given us no other choice.

At the same time the Soviet Union has spoken out in favor of making full use of the potential of the UN Military Staff Committee which it possesses under the UN charter. In our opinion, this body should begin to function as a basic aide to the Security Council in appraising the military-political aspects of the crisis and in working out appropriate recommendations for the council.

It should be pointed out that all the leading countries hold similar appraisals as we do of the situation which has now developed in the Persian Gulf. This follows from contacts with the leadership of the member states of the Security Council, first and foremost its permanent members—the United States, China, France, and Britain. We have established an active dialogue in connection with the Persian Gulf situation with the leaders of Yugoslavia, India, Italy, the FRG, Japan, and many other countries. Consultations with the member states of the Warsaw Pact continue uninterrupted.

The Arab countries are a particular direction of our work. The foreign ministers of Egypt and Yemen as well as special representatives of the leadership of Saudi Arabia, Tunis, and Libya have been received in Moscow.

Active dialogue with leaders of the Arab states has been maintained through diplomatic channels, through the Soviet leadership's special representative who travelled to the region, through ambassadors, and by way of exchanging messages. We saw our aim as stimulating the efforts of Arabs themselves to wind down the crisis and to stir them to influence the Iraqi leader more actively.

In turn we took into account the assessments and considerations of Arab leaders when determining our own policy. Of course, at the sharp end of our efforts were contacts with the Iraqi leadership which were aimed at turning it away from its unthinking policy of confrontation.

Much effort was made in this respect both through the personal messages of M.S. Gorbachev to the Iraqi president, and in the course of the negotiations with S. Hammadi, Iraqi deputy prime minister and T. 'Aziz, minister of foreign affairs, which were complex and tense in their tone and content. Conversations with them were conducted in such a way that the Iraqi side could not be left in the slightest doubt regarding the firmest resolve of the international community and the USSR to oppose the policy of "fait accompli" in relation to Kuwait.

Almost immediately after the Iraqi action, the Soviet Union announced the suspension of deliveries of arms and military equipment to Iraq, and after the Security Council passed its resolution on sanctions the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decision to halt all activities in the field of trade and economic ties with Baghdad which fall within the remit of this resolution.

We intend to unswervingly adhere to the ruling introduced by the Security Council with regard to Iraq, although it must be acknowledged this creates quite a few problems for our country, including problems of a financial and economic nature. This year the shortfall in the deliveries to our country of hard currency and oil from Iraq and Kuwait will be approximately $800 million.

From the very first day of the crisis our main concern was the fate of the Soviet people in Iraq and Kuwait. On 2 August, 883 Soviet citizens—including 94 women and 67 children—were in Kuwait, and 7,791 people—including 699 women and 274 children—were in Iraq.

A special interdepartmental working group headed by I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has been set up by a decision of the USSR president to organize the evacuation from the zone of immediate military risk.

You know that all our fellow countrymen who were in Kuwait have been evacuated, although this involved great difficulties.

People had to be conveyed by road from Kuwait to Baghdad to Amman—another 1,200 km or so—from where they were brought home by air.

By now all the children and most of the women have been brought out of Iraq. A process of reducing the number of specialists working there has been started. Approximately 5,500 of them remain. Those whose contacts have expired and those who wish to leave will be the first to do so. Military specialists will also depart gradually.

I will say frankly that there still remain difficulties with the evacuation process. The issuing of Iraqi exit visas is being held up, and there have been certain incidents with the luggage of those departing and problems with the provision of food. We have reacted in the proper manner to all this and have sought solutions to these questions. We have been given assurances that the Iraqi side will not impeed the departure of Soviet citizens wishing to leave. We will insist that the practical actions of the Iraqi authorities correspond to their promises. All the Soviet people are alive and there are no grounds for saying that any of them have become hostages.

The extreme complexity of the situation created as a result of the Iraqi aggression and the high degree of its explosive nature prompted the Soviet leadership to embark on such an unusual step as the meeting with U.S. President Bush in Helsinki on 9 September. In this respect the initiative came from the U.S. side, but we also proceeded on the assumption that an urgent juxtaposition of our assessments, a frank exchange of views, cooperation, and interaction in seeking a way out of the crisis were required.

It is hardly possible to recall an occasion when the heads of the two states—the USSR and the United States—got together so quickly because of a specific critical situation and with the clearly outlined ambition to act in the interests of peace.

Almost all of the seven hours of the talks in Helsinki were devoted to the subject of the Persian Gulf crisis in its numerous aspects.

Were there any divergences or disagreements in their views and appraisals of certain aspects? Yes there were, and in some respects they remain. But in the main—and this is of fundamental importance—the USSR and the United States have reached the same conclusion: One must not tolerate Iraqi aggression. The shared position of the USSR and the United States is to oppose this aggression. Iraq must unreservedly withdraw from Kuwait, enable the restoration of the lawful government there, and release all the hostages now detained in Iraq and Kuwait.

It is also impossible to overestimate the importance of the fact that the presidents of the USSR and the United States have reached agreement in preferring a peaceful settlement of the crisis and have deemed it necessary to register this position in their joint statement on the results of the talks. After all, previously one had heard other opinions on this.

The undoubted merit of the meeting in Helsinki is the fact that today one may feel revitalized with new energy in order to continue the search for a decision excluding the military option which would cost far too much for many countries.

The USSR and U.S. leaders confirmed the necessity to continue with the utmost strictness the observance of the regime of sanctions with regard to Iraq, which have been established by the Security Council, and called upon the whole world community to do this. Since the Iraqi leadership refuses to fulfill the UN decisions, there is no alternative. If the circumstances require it will, evidently, be necessary to make the regime of sanctions more severe. However bitter this remedy could be, it is still a peaceful method of influence.

At the same time the Soviet Union has not thought and does not think that economic sanctions could be used to cause famine and epidemics among the population in Iraq. The fact that the presidents of the USSR and the United States reached agreement concerning their interpretation of the relevant Security Council resolution, to the effect that it allows exports of foodstuffs to Iraq and Kuwait for humanitarian reasons, represents an undoubted positive achievement of the meeting in Helsinki. At the same time it has been agreed that special priority will be given to the satisfaction of children's needs.

This just and humane position has also been reflected in the joint statement.

One of the most complex aspects of the crisis situation which exists in the Persian Gulf region today is the presence there—and in considerable numbers—of foreign troops. By virtue of the obvious geographical proximity to our southern borders, this circumstance is by no means a matter of indifference to us too. Even more obvious are the anxieties of a whole number of Arab countries. At the same time, we would be acting against our conscience if we did not take into account the fact that it was Iraq's aggressive actions which were the prime cause for the deployment of U.S. and foreign troops in the Arabian peninsula. In light of these circumstances, we made the required assessment and took cognizance of the statement made by President Bush in Helsinki that the U.S. Administration had no intention of leaving its troops in the Persian Gulf region following a settlement to the crisis which has arisen there. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we shall continue to formulate our actions in this situation strictly in accordance with the principle of collective actions within the framework of the UN based on the decisions of the Security Council.

The discussion of the Iraq-Kuwait crisis caused the participants in the meeting to ascertain the need to tackle in earnest the settlement of other conflicts which have for decades been ailing the entire Middle East, above all the Arab-Israeli and Lebanese ones. The overall unfavorable state of affairs in the Middle East aggravates the acuteness of individual crisis situations and makes it more difficult to overcome them. The mutual link here is a dialectical one. That is why the Soviet Union constantly insists on starting real work as soon as possible on eliminating the hotbeds of tension in the Middle East. This should be done on a collective basis.

In this connection one cannot help expressing satisfaction at the fact that the U.S. side expressed readiness to begin, after achieving the aims set in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the Iraqi aggression, active and wide-ranging work on a settlement of this entire conflict at a global level.

I think these are all grounds to believe that the Helsinki meeting will have a strong stimulating impact on the search for a formula which would make it possible to ease the Persian Gulf crisis. Its lasting importance lies in the moral and ethical charge it gives to interstate relations and its display of irreconcilability toward large states engulfing their smaller neighbors. Tolerating this would mean planting by this precedent a mine under the present world order which is being built on the principles of a new political thinking.

Will one manage to make use of the opportunities which are opening as a result of the unprecedented interaction between the USSR and the United States, all the five permanent members of the Security Council, and a broad international consensus on the Persian Gulf crisis? The answer to this question depends on how active are the efforts of peace-loving states, primarily the Arabs themselves, and on their desire to avert a military clash and achieve the execution of the world community's will by peaceful political means. To an even greater extent this depends on the mode of actions to be chosen by Baghdad.

From our side everything will be geared to the speediest implementation of the non-military solution to the crisis in the future, too.

Before answering any deputies' questions I would like to take this opportunity to briefly inform the people's deputies of my recent trip to the Far East.

As you know, there were visits to the PRC, the DPRK, and Japan. I also managed in an interval between these visits to take part in the work of the international forum on the Asia-Pacific region which was held in Vladivostok.

My first stop was in the town of Harbin where, by agreement with the Chinese comrades there, a working meeting took place with Qian Qichen, minister of foreign affairs of the PRC.

China is one of our main partners on the international arena. Our meetings and conversations with Chinese representatives have been marked by growing mutual understanding. In Harbin we noted the closeness and, in such questions as the situation in the Persian Gulf, essentially the unity of our positions. On the whole we have a common approach to the Cambodian settlement, while until only recently this problem disunited us to a considerable degree. Similar appraisals were expressed regarding the situation on the Korean peninsula.

In furtherance of agreements which have been reached, talks about mutual reduction of armed forces and improvement of trust in the military sphere in the region along the Soviet-Chinese border started in Moscow yesterday. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of these talks. They will enable us to move toward dismantling the military confrontation, which is a burden to both countries, on the principle of mutual and equal security. This will be a good example for all the Asia-Pacific region.

As to the border settlement with China, a new stage is beginning in this process—the stage of the legal registration of the sections of the border which have already been agreed upon by the sides, with their subsequent demarcation. And this is no more and no less than over 90 percent of the entire length of the border. Several problem sections still remain, but work on them continues.

In Pyongyang, the DPRK capital, talks were held with Kim Yong- nam, the country's minister of foreign affairs. The situation on the Korean peninsula was, naturally, at the center of discussions, and specifically ways of overcoming the sharp military confrontation in this region. We expressed our support for the DPRK initiatives for lessening tension, and also expressed a positive attitude to the constructive elements in Seoul's approach toward normalization of the situation on the peninsula. We view the meeting of the prime ministers of the North and South, which has taken place in the past few days, as the beginning of a movement toward the peaceful unification of Korea which will help in every way to further this process.

Many deputies have asked the question of how our relations with South Korea will be built. I would like to report that an understanding has been reached regarding a meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries in New York during the period of the work of the 45th UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] session. We shall, of course, be informing you about the results of these talks.

In deputy circles, some people have been expressing the opinion that our foreign policy, while focussing much attention on European affairs, does not always act with sufficient vigour in the Asia-Pacific direction. There is an element of truth in these remarks. We are taking this into consideration, and in my address at the beginning of September at the international meeting "Asia-Pacific Region: Dialogue, Peace, and Cooperation" in Vladivostok, on the instructions of the Soviet leadership I set out a number of new proposals addressed to the Asia-Pacific states. The purpose of them is to speed up the shaping of the mechanism of negotiations in the region in order to commence a specific discussion of the problems of ensuring security and establishing cooperation. For example, we have invited the ministers of all the Asian states to Vladivostok in the autumn of 1993 to take part in a meeting to discuss a broad range of urgent regional problems.

By moving through certain stages it will be possible to lead matters toward a pan-Asian summit conference some time in the future.

A number of specific ideas were brought forward to establish regional, multilateral, mutually beneficial cooperation in trade, economic, scientific, technical and cultural spheres, environment protection, and others.

I cannot fail to say that this was especially acutely manifested when visiting Vladivostok. The city is beautiful, but it has a lot of problems. That is what was discussed at my meeting with the leaders of Maritime Kray, and Vladivostok residents to whom I managed to talk in the streets of the city discussed it heatedly and keenly. I would like to single out what caused the most emotions—it is necessary to do away with the "closed" status of Vladivostok without delay. This would make it possible to fully realize the truly unique potential of this beautiful city.

The last port of call was Tokyo where negotiations with the leaders of Japan were held. I would like to note in particular that a completely different atmosphere prevailed at them compared with the one that was there quite recently. Japanese colleagues showed their readiness to work very seriously in order to make the forthcoming visit of the USSR president to Japan in April 1991 a major turning-point in Soviet-Japanese relations. During this visit it is planned to elaborate and prepare for signing an impressive packet of documents on the following matters: on the Soviet-Japanese intergovernmental consultations; on Japan's technical assistance of perestroyka in the USSR; on cooperation in overcoming the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station; on the trade turnover and payments for 1991-1995; on coastal trade for 1991-1995; on cooperation in the sphere of environmental protection; and on cultural exchanges for 1991-1992.

In addition to this, the preparation will begin on cooperation agreements in the peaceful use of space, in the search and rescue of people affected by disasters at sea, and also on humanitarian issues. For our part we promised to make a study of the Japanese initiative on the elaboration of agreements on ensuring safety at atomic power stations, on holding reciprocal large-scale industrial exhibitions on a regular basis, and on cooperation in the protection of historical monuments.

Agreement in principle was reached that the summit meeting should be concluded with a solid political document.

The Japanese side supported in principle the idea expressed by our side of making joint efforts to elaborate the concept of the development of bilateral relations for the forthcoming decade, that is up to the beginning of the 21st century.

As always, we heard about the well-known territorial claims on our country, but the posing of this question does not now have the nature of an ultimatum or a precondition as was previously the case. At the talks, there was mention of making mutual efforts to develop relations in all fields, and at the same time of continuing to work out a peace treaty in which all questions are discussed including the territorial one.

I would like also to note this positive fact: On the results of the discussion of the situation in the Persian Gulf a joint statement was adopted—the first bilateral document of this kind on political questions of international affairs in history.

It is very important that for the first time in the whole period of bilateral talks we started with our Japanese partners a fairly serious dialogue on military-strategic problems, on confidence-building measures in the military field.

On the whole the conclusion can be drawn that a fairly good basis has been laid for the visit of the president of the USSR to Japan, and opportunities are being opened up for a considerable strengthening of the constructive foundation in Soviet-Japanese relations.

In conclusion I would like to inform the people's deputies that tomorrow, 12 September, will see in Moscow the fourth and most likely the concluding meeting of foreign ministers of the GDR, the FRG, the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union in the framework of the six-sided machinery created, as you know, for resolving the external aspects of the building of German unity.

Talks will also be held with H.-D. Genscher, FRG foreign minister, who is coming to Moscow for the session of the "six", on the principles of building our relations with a united Germany.

We know that for Soviet people, perhaps, there is no subject more sensitive that the German question. Therefore, if it is deemed expedient, I would be ready to speak specifically on this subject in the next few days at the session of the Committee for International Affairs of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Sobchak's Address

LD1109115690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1840 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Speech by A.A. Sobchak, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Economic Legislation Subcommittee, at USSR Supreme Soviet session in Moscow on 10 September—recorded]

[Text] Having become acquainted with the agenda of work for the fourth session that has been put forward by the Supreme Soviet Presidium, we believe that it really does include a number of very important issues which need to be given priority consideration, but that at the same time it includes a mass of issues of secondary—even third rate—importance which should not be the subject of our consideration today at all because the country is facing the need to adopt most important decisions, not only of economic development but of further political development as well. So we propose that changing the role and functions of the supreme bodies of state power and taking into account the declarations of sovereignty adopted by the republics should be examined as the first issue on the agenda.

The need to examine this issue is dictated, in our view, by the following reasons. First, the Supreme Soviet's entire work on adopting laws could turn out to be futile if the Union republics, proceeding from the adopted declarations on their sovereignty, refuse to implement the laws adopted by the Supreme Soviet. Second, we believe—and Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, in his responses to the questions confirmed—that in his opinion, prior to adopting this or that Union law there needs to be specific agreement with the republics. We must determine here today how we fundamentally regard these declarations of sovereignty and what kind of agreement is needed. Otherwise all our work could prove useless.

In my opinion, the reasoning already expressed here that a decision on the issue should be delayed until the adoption of the Union treaty is untenable since adoption of the Union treaty is point 19 on the agenda, and then it is not a question of adopting it but simply of working out the basic directions and the procedures for adopting a new Union treaty. Thus the question of when we will work out and adopt this new Union treaty does not even feature on the agenda. In other words, we are once again running the risk of being late—as we were with Article 6—by at least six months, and such a delay could be fatal since we are approaching the fall and winter period, as has been said for a long time now, with serious difficulties regarding food and fuel. For this reason we think it necessary to examine this matter of fundamental significance to start with and to reach agreement on this issue. I can confirm this even if only from the point of view that many Union republics are now unilaterally ceasing to comply with their obligations to such cities as Moscow, Leningrad, and other industrial centers, and we are faced with adopting the most serious decisions so that each of us will know how we are to live from now on.

For this reason we propose that it is precisely this question, which I think will also be the question of relations between the republics and the future of our Union, which is examined first.

The second issue concerns the economic situation in the country, measures to stabilize the national economy, and the programs for the transition to a market economy. This virtually coincides with what we have proposed in the agenda with only one difference. We wish to hear not simply the latest government program—we have already heard two, and both of them have turned out to be untenable in the course of this past year alone. We wish to hear from the lips of the country's president and the head of government an appraisal of the country's present economic state so as to see how realistically and critically they evaluate the present situation, and from this point of view to appraise all those programs which may be, or are being put to us, for the transition to a market economy; and above all the stabilization of the economic situation in the country. But unfortunately, even today, until these programs are put forward, we can only make suppositions as to what kind of program will ultimately be presented to us.

The third issue—and I would even give it top priority despite its relatively particular nature, it would seem—is the state of the country's gold reserves and the emissions of money and transfer of its control to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

We believe that the further uncontrolled money withdrawals by the government under the guidance of the Politburo of the Communist Party could lead to an even worse crisis and cancel any measures for the economic improvement of society. We must immediately adopt a decision on transferring control over money withdrawals from the gold reserves to the Supreme Soviet, create a special committee, investigate the activity of the government and Politburo in money withdrawals and spending of the gold reserves over the past five years, and the Supreme Soviet should adopt a most principled decision on these matters. This concerns the whole country, the people as a whole and all the Union republics.

The next issue is that of the international situation of the USSR in connection with events in the Persian Gulf. That is followed by the question of a vote of no-confidence in the government of the USSR. The deputies of the Interregional Group are putting this issue to the vote in connection with the fact that the government has twice presented its economic programs in the course of the past year. Our speeches predicted that these programs would not be tenable and unfortunately we have been correct. For this reason we simply do not have the right today to continue to keep a government in power that has demonstrated its inability to get the country out of its crisis. Therefore the deputies of the Interregional Group ask that this matter be included on the agenda.

[Lukyanov, interrupting] Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, two minutes....

[Sobchak] I am coming to the end. The next issue is that of food supplies to the population and preparations for the winter. The importance of this matter has already been mentioned. Regarding the issue of legislative activity, we believe that it is essential at this session simply to adopt laws that affect the basic political rights of all citizens of the USSR: the law on public organizations and parties, the law on freedom of conscience and religious organisations, and the law on leaving and entering the USSR, and only these laws. As for all the other laws, these can wait a while.

The next matter is that of convening the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the agenda of that session in order to resolve once again, and for all, the matter of relations between the republics, the conclusion of an economic union, the conclusion of a Union treaty, and the fate of our union as a whole. We suggest that point 10 on the agenda be an examination of the decrees of the USSR president from both the point of view of their effect and that of their legality. We believe that consideration of this issue is of particular significance from the point of view of preventitive measures so that the president's further activity by decree might less frequently infringe the laws in force.

And finally, two last issues. That of measures to strengthen the security of society and its citizens, and that of appointing deputies to investigate how the instructions operating within the system of the Committee for State Security correspond to the laws of the USSR and instances of human rights violations noted in a number of speeches by former staff of the USSR KGB. In raising this question of the security of society and its citizens we do so in its broader aspect, not just a question of depoliticizing the Army and the bodies of the KGB and Internal Affairs, but as a question of rebuilding these basic punitive bodies of the state as state bodies and of removing them from subordination to any political party and in particular of examining how so-called military-political bodies have been created within the Army by the latest presidential decree and how there is now a mass transfer of staff from the apparatus of the Communist Party Central Committee into these military-political bodies.

The Supreme Soviet must give the necessary approval of these concrete facts.

Political & Social

Ryzhkov Sees Danger of 'Disintegration' of USSR

AU1109210990 Vienna Television Service in German 2000 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Interview with USSR Premier Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov by Raimund Loew in Moscow; "On the Sidelines of Today's Parliamentary Session" on 11 September—recorded; Ryzhkov statements in Russian with superimposed German translation]

[Text] [Loew] You are being attacked to an ever greater degree and from all sides. Is this very hard for you?

[Ryzhkov] Of course it is very hard. Just imagine living like this for three or six months. I have been a target of criticism for almost a whole year.

[Loew] One gets the impression that even President Gorbachev has now joined the ranks of your critics.

[Ryzhkov] He has signalled to a certain degree that he prefers the other program. Why am I insisting on my reservations? These comrades around Shatalin want to lock up all available funds through privatization within a few months—by selling factories, apartments, and shares. Psychologically, the people are not yet ready for it. They say that they do not want to raise prices, yet they fail to mention that a more liberal attitude will automatically result in soaring prices. This will severely hit the vital interests of the population. The central government must continue to be able to levy taxes, and it must maintain a certain degree of control over the basic industries, otherwise everything will go too quickly.

[Loew] What if Shatalin has his way? Will you then not be able to continue your work?

[Ryzhkov] If his program remains unchanged, then I will not be able to do so.

[Loew] Is this a crisis of the new political system in which there is no longer a Politburo?

[Ryzhkov] The Politburo no longer makes such decisions. I believe we are in for a very serious crisis if the president, the government, and the parliament oppose each other, a crisis for the whole country.

[Loew] Is there a danger of the disintegration of the USSR?

[Ryzhkov] Of course there is such a danger. Some people these days only speak of an economic union. This really worries me. I support a political union, a federal state.

Besides, any other form would endanger the international system. The disintegration of our country would have terrible consequences for all. I regard this danger as very great. If I were a foreign politician I would also be worried. It is something different having to deal with just a single state which speaks on behalf of everybody, than suddenly being faced with a great number of republics, republics for heaven's sake that all have perhaps their own armies and maybe even nuclear arms. All this is totally absurd.

Commentary Examines Gorbachev's Appeal on Law

LD1109134290 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Excerpts] We will not reach our objectives without guaranteeing the prerogative of law. This is said in an address by President Gorbachev to the leaders of soviets of all levels, from local to supreme soviets of the republics. Vitaliy Gurov of our staff makes these comments:

No doubt the issue raised by the president is one of the most important and is probably a key issue now. Calls for building a law-governed state in the Soviet Union leads to a paradoxical situation ever more often. The Supreme Soviet works hard to draft and pass laws. Naturally, every person can have his or her own opinion about their quality. But these laws are hardly ever observed. Recently I talked to a leading member of a regional council in Uzbekistan. I asked him about the way the recently passed laws on land, the press and enterprise are carried out in life. The official replied: They do not work. We do not have instructions on the way they should be carried out.

That is one side of the matter. The other is the active law-making process at the local level. The decisions passed by the local authorities often run counter to national laws. This can result in nothing but chaos and anarchy. Many people blame perestroyka for this. However, the presidential address says that perestroyka has entered a decisive stage of qualitative changes in society. [passage omitted]

I would want to draw your attention to one more aspect of Gorbachev's message, Vitaliy Gurov writes. It is addressed solely to members of soviets. It differs from old messages because it does not speak of the tasks of Communist Party bodies. I think this demonstrates primarily the changing role and place of soviets in the country's political system. The message makes it clear that soviets will have to bend considerable additional efforts to build up their authority.

KGB Officers Comment on Kalugin Affair

90UF0517A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 36, 8-14 Sep 90 p 3

[Letters from KGB employees on former KGB Major General Kalugin: "Such Varied Opinions"]

[Text] **In response to the publication of materials on former KGB Major General O. Kalugin, the editorial staff has received several hundred letters, including from former and current workers of the USSR KGB. We offer several of these responses for your attention. Remember that the positions expressed in the letters published here do not always coincide with the editorial viewpoint. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.**

Does Their Silence Mean Their Agreement?

I have been a rank-and-file worker for the KGB for five years now. In his statements former General Kalugin speaks of paid informers who regularly receive remuneration. KGB organs actually do recruit nonstaff assistants when necessary. But among those who do this on a voluntary basis, as far as I know, there are none who do it for the sake of the remuneration.

Now about whether KGB organs have to experience any material difficulties. Kalugin says that the KGB has never had such problems. I do not believe that he had them either: He had a private car, a luxurious office, special rations, and many other things. But the rank-and-file workers do not have all this. They work with three or four people in an office and without rugs, air conditioning, and other elementary things.

I do not understand the position of the leadership of the USSR KGB which has remained silent since the publication of the last libel from its former general. Why are the people's deputies who are KGB workers remaining silent as well?

[Signed] I. Shavyrin, Leningrad

Fired... for the Truth

I shall take the responsibility of asserting that everything O. Kalugin said was true. The lack of radical changes in the activity of KGB organs under the conditions of perestroyka; the leadership's adherence to the old work methods; the disinformation of the public concerning the activity of the organs; the notorious secrecy, the concealment of cases of demoralization, persecution of those who disagree, unjustifiably inflated staffs, the unjustified salary hikes at the beginning of 1990; and many other negative phenomena in the KGB system led me to the idea of quitting these organs which I did in April 1990 after serving for almost seven years as an officer of the operations staff. They released me with the formal reason of "not being suited for the job." When I disagreed with this formula they explained to me: Nothing else is provided for by the "Provisions on Performing Service."

I am writing this not out of a sense of personal indignation—there is nothing for me to be offended at; I made my choice conscientiously—but out of a desire to make the public aware that Kalugin is not alone in his desire to achieve perestroyka in the KGB.

[Signed] S. Goryushkin, Kirevsk, Tula Oblast.

Comrade Kalugin!

Unfortunately, much of what you so generously shared on the pages of the press could have taken place. But under the conditions of a one-party system the KGB could not have been an exception. And you, who for a number of years worked directly as a leader in the KGB, could not but know this. You have selected the most foolproof variant—deliberate defamation of everyone and everything with a simultaneous "whitewashing" of your own character and speculation about artificially created agitation around the KGB. This is simply unseemly and dangerous for the country.

Without disputing your professional qualities I wish to state that you, unfortunately, are not the exception in taking advantage of the country's difficulties for your own selfish purposes.

From a professional standpoint it is quite possible to entertain the idea that you have betrayed not the KGB but the homeland. And at the present time you are working out the line of behavior assigned to you by Western special services.

And the last thing. In order for you to avoid the temptation to declare me a participant in a campaign against you as an individual, I wish to emphasize: Because of circumstances beyond my control, this letter was not published before the decisions pertaining to you were reached.

[Signed] V. Altukhov, Major, KGB senior operations officer, Moscow

I Know I Am Violating the Regulations

Last year I sent to the First Congress of People's Deputies a telegram with the following content: "Reduced to despair by certain vicious methods used in the KGB organs, and also wishing to do my part for the construction of a rule-of-law society, I am asking for an opportunity to place a concrete proposal before the deputies." But my suggestion was placed on the shelf.

And here suddenly the statement of Major General O. Kalugin became known. Some of his suggestions regarding the activity of the KGB coincide with the ideas I came up with.

Here they are. Place KGB organs under the jurisdiction of local and central soviets. Organize strict deputy control over the activity of the KGB, beginning with the central apparatus right down to the oblast administrations. Remove party influence. Abolish military relations, nominally keeping the ranks as is done in the public health system. Reduce the staffs by a minimum of 50 percent, having rearranged the subdivisions into real administrations. Use some of the released funds for providing basic new equipment for the operations workers—their technical equipment is at the level of the age of the tsarist Colonel Zubatov. Conduct an anonymous poll of the popularity of all leaders beginning with the division chiefs and draw organizational conclusions based on the results of the poll. Discharge the leaders who were sent to the KGB from the party apparatus "for reinforcing personnel"—they brought with them into the environment of the Chekists an atmosphere of careerism, blind obedience, dogmatism, and fanaticism.

[Signed] Lieutenant Colonel T. Akhmetov, division chief of KGB administration, Kazakh SSR, Alma-Ata

Bureaucratism Is to Blame

I wish to express my disturbance at the declaration of reserve General Kalugin. In Lenin's words this person turned out to be a political prostitute. If one analyzes everything Kalugin said one can draw the conclusion that there are serious shortcomings in the system of selection and placement of personnel in the KGB and also in questions of political education. Cases of betrayal of the homeland by certain KGB workers have shown and warned us about existence of shortcomings in the personnel policy. These were the first signals of a future crisis. The facts presented show that bureaucratism has penetrated into the holy of holies of Soviet power—the KGB organs.

[Signed] S. Yuldashev, KGB major, retired

We Will Not Fire On the People!

I do not think I will be mistaken if I say that I, a KGB lieutenant, am not the only one who can attest to every word of Major General Kalugin. I will not talk about the old officers, but very many rank-and-file workers in the Soviet political police who bear the whole weight of the thankless work are looking hopefully at Kalugin, Yeltsin, and Popov.

Incidentally, about elitism—I would not want to place the CPSU Central Committee on a level with the KGB. We have many people who almost never go to the closed stores. In recent years they have reduced the number of apartments, automobiles, and dacha plots they have allotted, and they are distributed far from fairly.

We have two sections in the KGB: On the one hand we have people with satisfied faces and good wages, sitting in offices and frequently giving orders that do not do anybody any good; and on the other hand we have the pale people, tormented by sleepless nights and frequently drinking too much for there is no other way to relieve the stress and constant tension, 30 years of age and already suffering from an array of occupational diseases beginning with varicose veins and ending with gastric ulcers. Look at the ordinary operative: Who is given awards and promotions for an operational inspection and who is given a brief leave and a bonus of some 50 rubles for doing the same work?

We need people like Kalugin for a reform in the KGB cannot be entrusted to people have never encountered the specific work of the secret police and who can reduce it to correspond to their dilettante ideas or destroy it altogether. This will lead not only to economic losses but also to increased crime—we are getting new, well organized bands comprised of former Chekists.

In conclusion I ask that you tell your readers: If it reaches the point of bloodletting we will not shoot our own people but will join them in the fight for democracy.

[Signed] A worker of the operations subdivision of the KGB, Moscow

KGB Public Relations Center Opens 11 Sep

LD1109202890 Moscow TASS in English 1934 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Borisov and Igor Gvritishviliy]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The KGB today opened a public relations centre at its headquarters in Dzerzhinskiy Square. The centre plans to keep the Soviet and world public briefed on the aims, directions and activity of the State Security Committee (KGB) and maintain links with mass information organisations.

The centre is headed by 44-year-old General Aleksandr Karbaynov, a KGB career officer with an impressive service record at the committee's headquarters. An engineer by education, he worked in Krasnoyarsk helping to develop satellite communication systems and was later elected a Young Communist League official before joining the security force.

Karbaynov told Soviet and foreign journalists that the centre was a new structural component of the KGB system which will operate as an independent unit.

One of its functions is to guide, organise, coordinate and control activity in the KGB central apparat, its agencies and troops to further develop openness and strengthen links with the public and the deputy corps.

Asked how secrecy and openness could be combined in the activity of the KGB, Karbaynov said that this combination was "a law that should be obeyed".

"Understandably, intelligence and counter-intelligence activities cannot be fully exposed. Otherwise, the purpose of these activities is betrayed," he noted.

"All the same, historical experience shows that security agencies should not seek to be fully closed to the public," Karbaynov said.

"We believe that we have found an optimum solution to the dilemma, taking into account today's realities," he continues. "Everything relating to the aims, directions and results of KGB work should be open to the public, while methods, forms and techniques used to perform specific operations and the security agents should remain hidden from public view for the time being."

In this connection, Karbaynov stressed the need for a rapid promulgation of a law on state security and security agencies which will supply a legal basis for the committee's entire activity. He expressed hope that needed regulatory enactments would be considered and approved at the current session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

After the news conference, Soviet and foreign journalists were taken around an exposition in the KGB Museum, which will be open to the public in late September, according to Karbaynov. He also told journalists that the centre had plans to issue a magazine devoted to KGB activities for the circulation in the Soviet Union and other countries.

Details Provided of Moscow Priest's Murder

PM1209092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by TASS correspondent V. Itkin: "Aleksandr Mene Murdered"]

[Text] Zagorsk, Moscow Oblast—His body was was found not far from the house where he lived, near the small Semkhoz railroad station in Zagorskiy Rayon near Moscow. Doctors certified the cause of death as loss of blood resulting from a blow to the head.

Last Sunday the priest left home as usual at 0630, setting off for his parish located in Novaya Derevnya in Pushkinskiy Rayon. Judging from the evidence, the criminal or criminals accosted him on the forest path leading to the station. Aleksandr Mene found the strength in himself to turn back home but covered only a few dozen meters....

He was 55 years old. There was a time when his theological works were published only abroad. He was a man of encyclopedic knowledge. His lectures drew huge audiences. In them the priest appealed for decency and faith in the goodness of mankind. The opening of a Sunday Orthodox university was scheduled for 30 September in Moscow, its rector Candidate of Theological Sciences Archpriest Aleksandr Mene. And now he has passed away....

The archpriest fought against false patriotism, anti-Semitism, and the infringement of human rights with all the means available to a priest and decent person.

The militia has instituted a criminal case concerning the commission of the crime. An investigation is being conducted.

Status of Periodical Publications Examined

90US1300A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 35, Aug 90 pp 3,17

[Interview with Ye. Manyakin, USSR deputy minister of communications, by N. Kishchik; place and date not given: "I Read SOYUZ With Interest"]

[Text] "Indeed, I read SOYUZ because I am deeply concerned and very responsive to all the events taking place in the various corners of our country which is raging like a volcano," confirmed Yevgeniy Alekseyevich. And he suggested beginning our conversation on the problems of Subscription Drive 1991 with the articles which interested him on a purely professional level.

[Manyakin] I quote A. Shalnev's article "No Problem" in SOYUZ (No. 31) when I am asked what workers under the Ministry of Communications are supposed to orient themselves toward over the long term. There is no problem in the United States with delivery of the press. And soon after that article I was in Switzerland for just a few hours, but I stopped in at one of the printing houses which had a circulation of 150,000 issues and I convinced myself that there was no problem there either. Why? For the same reason—the main role in distribution is played by the publisher himself, the person who is vitally interested in the results and in eliminating any unnecessary functions anywhere in the chain. A circulation of 50,000 is put in the mail for distribution with delivery from 0900-1200; 50,000 are put out for sale in newsstands; and another 50,000 go into the hands of paper boys hired by the publishing house and they deliver the newspaper to houses early in the morning. True, the paper boys cost twice as much as the mail.

Practically all our distribution in this country is carried out by mail. We certainly do not print the subscriber's address on the newspaper the way the publishers do "over there;" in fact, the typographers sometimes fold one issue of the newspaper inside another so that it will be easier for them.... And the postman?! If the whole chain from the printing shop to the apartment were in the hands of one boss, he would not be shifting the burden from one person to the next, but instead would be trying to figure out how to lighten the process. They do it this way abroad: As it compiles the subscription list the printing house enters the address into the memory of a computer, and the computer manages an uncomplicated system whereby each copy leaves the publishing house with the address of the subscriber. The computer also keeps track of the subscription list as a whole, and it prints out a letter in advance warning you to renew your subscription.... And if you ask me why we at the Ministry of Communications insist on monopolizing delivery of the press, I will answer that we do not insist on it.... That is the way the system arose in past years. Is it to anyone's benefit? Clearly not. I am for everyone taking responsibility for his own area. In short, I am for changes. Today the readers, the communications workers, and the publishing houses are all in favor of changes. The publishing houses in particular can look forward to playing a leading role in the distribution of their own publications in the future.

[Kishchik] Let us return to the present. This time the subscription drive is beginning a whole month late. What is the explanation?

[Manyakin] The catalogs were prepared by 2 January when the subscription drive was supposed to be started. Life has changed quickly, as you know. I acknowledge that communications workers were the troublemakers—I am referring to the change in prices. Circumstances forced us. Endless debates have been underway since November of last year concerning the situation of communications workers and the fact that efforts to deliver correspondence to the communications departments are operating at a loss. It is a paradoxical situation: The more newspapers the mailman delivers you, the poorer he gets.... Income does not cover delivery expenses for we even hire taxis, and the funds of our enterprises are being spent....

When we began to talk about similar problems with typography and the paper plants, the threat of a general strike of communication workers arose. A committee to save the mail was created which raised the question of forming an arbitration commission. The results are familiar to you.

[Kishchik] And nonetheless, the issue of the subscription drive still was not resolved by August?

[Manyakin] The subscription drive did not begin because the publishing houses were slow with the prices and the new catalog had not been printed.... Now it has been. It indicates almost 1,000 central publications. It does not include republic and city newspapers and journals. As opposed to previous years, the USSR Ministry of Communications is not concerned with this work; the republics themselves are in charge of those publications....

[Kishchik] The catalog is the final document? And what if the publications wish to change prices in some fashion after the beginning of the subscription drive?

[Manyakin] The publisher is in charge of prices, and the author of the catalog is not the Ministry of Communications but the State Committee for the Press. You are asking whether it is possible to change the price after 1 September and make it cheaper or more expensive if the State Committee for the Press and the publishing house think it is warranted? It is possible. But it will cost them more money for having led us and the readers astray and for restructuring the subscription drive. I expect that a change is possible only in some sort of exceptional circumstances.... We must not repeat last year's experience with UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA and RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA when they restructured themselves endlessly.... The cost of publication, I repeat, is wholly determined by the publishing houses, editorial boards, and their founding organizations. And the prices for our services have increased exactly 30 percent....

[Kishchik] Are the informal presses included in the catalog? Have they made such a request to you?

[Manyakin] It is not the ministry's business to decide whether a press is formal or informal. There is the Law on the Press. Registration takes place. If an all-Union publication is registered, or if we know that it will be registered, there is no problem.

Everyone knows that a number of publications are undergoing lawsuits with their founding organizations. It is clear that these journals will remain, while it is not so clear what will happen to the founding organizations. We could take a formal position to the effect that we will not conduct a subscription drive where there is no founding organization and publications have not been registered. But the reader should probably not be punished. Let them be part of the subscription drive.... Registration of newspapers and journals has begun late, and to wait until everything settles out will only complicate things. It is a matter of trust.

The catalog has some new publications: MEGAPOLIS, an international express newspaper; and the weekly RADIKAL; and MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI has concluded an agreement with our enterprise concerning deliveries around the country and has fulfilled all the conditions of the agreement. That is to say they have the paper and the printing base, and they guarantee that subscribers will receive the newspaper....

[Kishchik] On which publications has a limit been established?

[Manyakin] A number of publications are requesting that limits be set. But I have recommended that the word "limit" not even be spoken. We do not need to get mixed up in a new wave of confusion. The public's reaction should be uniformly positive. Incidentally, no one knows how the circulation of any particular publication will be affected by the rise in prices. In general we are not adherents of limits. After all, to conduct a limited subscription drive is much harder, and one must put up with waves of confusion and analyze statistics almost every week. And fight the rumors....

Take for example the journal ZA RULEM—every year they fight with us about keeping the subscription within the limits of the previous year. In general, everyone who has announced a limit has in mind the circulations that have already been achieved. But with a general increase in prices is it reasonable to expect that even a very popular publication will pull an increased circulation? I do not think so.

I will mention one more journal with a limited subscription—NASHE NASLEDIYE. It has refused our services. The catalog says that subscription will take place in book stores.

[Kishchik] Are there other publications which refused your services?

[Manyakin] Yes. In particular those that you called informals. Note that on the last page they designate the address to which money should be sent. That means that the editorial board itself is responsible for delivering its newspaper to each subscriber.

[Kishchik] That is to say that they have moved to the European experience that you talked about at the beginning of our conversation?

[Manyakin] Yes. But it is true that these are publications with very small circulations.

[Kishchik] By what percentage are prices for a publication increasing?

[Manyakin] With the catalog in my hand I could give you more accurate information. I would estimate that the cost of a subscription for central newspapers and journals has approximately doubled.

[Kishchik] In connection with this I would like to ask you the following question: The publishing houses explain the abrupt increase in prices for a subscription by the fact that your services have increased by 50 percent. How true is this?

[Manyakin] The entire subscription drive for this year is taking in 3.3 billion rubles [R]. In order to be profitable, the communications workers need an additional R1 billion. As a result, R4.3 billion are being taken in. Therefore it is clear that the cost for a subscription should not increase more than 30 percent, but it has doubled and you are right to note it. The other 70 percent is the fault of the others....

[Kishchik] If the sum you receive is known....

[Manyakin] No, if subscriptions fall off our receipts will fall off to the same degree.

[Kishchik] Nonetheless, will the individual mailmen feel the changes? Will the money reach them? Where will these funds go for the most part?

[Manyakin] To communications enterprises. Not one ruble will go to the ministry or its apparat. We are financed by the government. Moreover, our expenditures on the maintenance of the apparat will decrease as it is reduced. The ministry itself is being reduced. There is a Ministry of Communications in every state. It concerns itself with distribution of radio frequencies, standards for the goods we produce, development of long-term engineering, etc.... There must not be any regulation of finances in the ministry if we are seriously to move to a market economy.... As a result, we should not think about any sort of "handout" to the Ministry of Communications or the apparat as the political television commentator Tsvetov has implied, leading television viewers to the conclusion that "If the workers do not know where the ministry's profits are going, it means that the profits are remaining in the ministry itself...." That was the way it was said.

[Kishchik] Let us take the opportunity to state where those profits are going.

[Manyakin] The money belongs completely to the communications enterprises with which the publishing houses conclude agreements. But let us look at what they in fact receive. If there is a tax of 45 percent on profits, then 45 percent is taken away.... Out of each billion, R450 million are not reaching the enterprises.... They return to the state in the form of taxes. In addition, the sum is to be distributed to various of the enterprises' funds—technical development, the fund for social development, and finally the fund for payment of labor—each postman benefits quite tangibly from the latter.

And what does he receive? We have estimated that approximately R30 will be added to the monthly wage. Right now the postman receives R90-110 in rural areas and R110-140 in cities. They receive approximately 20 to 40 percent more in bonus wages. Now it is possible to raise the salary of the postman by another R30. The figures have been verified. Latvia has already instituted such a raise this year.

But there is one danger. The money will reach the postman only if the managers do not chip away at it in order to increase the salaries of the middle level of leadership and other managers.... What will save the postmen? For the collective to purchase the communications department or lease it. Then the local labor collective becomes the boss of all the money received, and it rents the managers—and the suppliers and anyone else—with its own money. In the village, perhaps, the most acceptable form is the family contract. One family might well even purchase a postal department.

[Kishchik] Are there such examples?

[Manyakin] The Chelyabinsk communications workers are close to it.

[Kishchik] People are asking whether the postal schedule of deliveries—hours of delivery—has been discarded entirely.

[Manyakin] Of course not. But at present not one publishing house puts out its newspaper on time. Have you noted that now there are fewer publications criticizing the communications workers for deliveries?

[Kishchik] They have lost hope.... And they have understood the meaninglessness of such criticism.

[Manyakin] No. The publishing houses are not putting out the newspapers on time.

[Kishchik] Allow me to object. IZVESTIYA has abandoned all conditions of dependence and is ceasing to be a semi-official organ. The schedule is being observed exactly, with rare exceptions; but the subscriber still does not receive the newspaper on time.

[Manyakin] Very well, we will take your example to its logical end. Do your postmen deliver only IZVESTIYA? Postmen deliver all the newspapers! If somewhere the newspaper TRUD comes out last, the postman must wait while they bring TRUD even though he already has PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, and he will deliver all the newspapers together. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA almost never comes out on time and holds up the other newspapers. TRUD never meets its deadline. It is late almost 100 percent of the time.... And so you make the attempt, but your colleagues hold up the production line.

[Kishchik] Consequently, the only conclusion is to gradually move toward delivery of newspapers by the publishing houses themselves?

[Manyakin] Any newspaper in Moscow should arrive at a communications department no later than 0500. But by 0500 only the first newspapers are showing up.... Another tragedy is that we rent taxis for conveyance.... And they finish their work with us at 0800. And if there are no newspapers by that time, the taxis leave. We pay them the money, but the newspapers are not delivered....

[Kishchik] The subscription drive is taking place under unusual conditions—tight deadlines, high prices, an increased quantity of publications. How do you predict that it will turn out?

[Manyakin] At present no one dares to say how much the subscription drive will change in comparison with last year.

[Kishchik] Is it unpredictable?

[Manyakin] I questioned many of those who have lived through a period of increases in prices for subscription publications. The specialists say that there may be a drop in subscriptions for newspapers and journals by as much as 30 percent.

[Kishchik] And for IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA? What about for these newspaper "giants"?

[Manyakin] Those newspapers that do not simply proclaim their price but find ways of softening the "blow" to the subscriber will win....

[Kishchik] How many publications, in your opinion, will find themselves in a difficult position?

[Manyakin] That is not important. What is surprising is that ARGUMENTY I FAKTY is not losing many subscribers.... In general, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI will pick up a large circulation....

I feel some alarm about children's publications. They really need help, but decisions concerning subsidies are made at the level of the government. I know that the Central Committee of the Komsomol appealed to the government on this issue.

[Kishchik] Do you have grandchildren, Yevgeniy Alekseyevich?

[Manyakin] Two. I sign them up for subscriptions, of course. I am sure that I am not the only who does this.... I subscribe to the old PIONERKA. But even at my relatively high salary, I wonder whether I will continue to subscribe to all the publications I used to get.

[Kishchik] Tell us your opinion of a number of publications. What do you subscribe to?

[Manyakin] My wife is on a pension, my daughter is on maternity leave, and I have the grandchildren.... I subscribed to IZVESTIYA—I consider it obligatory and I will subscribe to it again—MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS and KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, and the journals VESTNIK SVYAZI and KROKODIL as well as GOVORIT I POKAZYVAYET MOSKVA and the journal GORIZONT. And for my wife, VOKRUG SVETA; she is insisting that I subscribe again. I buy PRAVDA and SOYUZ at stands....

But today I am cutting back my personal subscription. I admit that I am refusing KNIZHNOYE OBOZRENIYE, and for a simple reason—it is senseless to read about books you cannot buy anywhere. Why cause extra grief? Do you see what kind of criteria are suddenly being used...?

Will I subscribe to SOYUZ? I expect that I will. I like that weekly and I buy it. But it is difficult to buy a publication at a newsstand regularly even for me. I would prefer not to subscribe but to buy your SOYUZ at the newsstand as I have in the past. But there is no guarantee that I will not miss the very issue which contains an article that is interesting to me.... In short, by subscribing I pick out the publications I cannot do without. I believe that many do that at first.... In any case, it is impossible to live without the press.

But if there were a guarantee that I could buy any newspaper at a stand on any day, there would be three or four newspapers that I would read at home and I would buy the rest at retail prices.

[Kishchik] What is your opinion of the fact that vendors at newsstands have their steady customers?

[Manyakin] I am not troubled by it. When a newspaper appears in the newsstand for invalids and for people the vendor knows by face, and the vendor knows how important this very publication is for them, what is wrong with it? But when there is a shortage of newspapers and journals, suspicion is aroused and the vendor is charged by the OBKhSS [Department for Combating the Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation].... And no protestations by the invalid are taken into account.... This is how we live....

[Kishchik] Do you believe that we should have more faith in the vendor?

[Manyakin] Yes. In any other country people enjoy the services of newsstand vendors and pay them the money in advance. That is a guarantee that you will not miss the newspaper. Incidentally, it also has a negative effect on you when your weekly does not appear in the newsstands.

In general it seems that our tradition is to hold retail sales in low esteem.... Ninety percent of the circulation goes out through subscription. There are newspapers which do not sell a single issue retail. This is a clear defect.... Publishing houses should sell their product under general circulation, not by subscription. And out of this circulation you can conclude an agreement with us: We will sell so much retail and so much by subscription.... We still do not know what is most profitable. But you, the news people and the publishing houses, seem to think that it is better if they subscribe—it is a guarantee that the subscriber will always be there.

[Kishchik] Perhaps it too comes from the old times when everyone struggled for circulation?

[Manyakin] Of course.... But I believe that everything will right itself. The press is the first to enter the market. The present subscription drive will show us much....

Philosopher Sees Parallels With 1917 Revolution

PM1009150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
9 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Nikolay Mikhaylov: "High Tension. Civic Accord, Order, and Common Sense Are Needed to Counter Political Turmoil"]

[Text] **Do Not Expect Any Miracles**

These two letters arrived simultaneously. One was from Perm Oblast's Yekaterininskoye Village, the other from Volgograd Oblast's Katrichevo Village. A bread voucher—today's version of a bread coupon—was enclosed in the "Perm" letter. "There is no flour, there are no bakery products," teacher A.S. Maltseva writes. "You can have the voucher which I cannot exchange for bread, since the village receives only 500 to 800 loaves instead of the 1,400 it actually needs...." On reading the second letter from the "Volgograd", one gets the feeling of...how can I put it mildly...? Better to quote it: "Three seven-year old children disappeared from our village," S.I. Baybakov writes. "Their parents looked for them absolutely everywhere. The children were found in the cemetery, looking for the candy people leave on graves. The girls found one piece of candy—nibbled by ants—and divided it in three equal shares...." There we are, these are the letters from the time perestroyka.

It is probably time to say it bluntly and honestly: We are precipitously heading for a disaster. Events in our society today are reminiscent of the theater of the absurd. The tobacco crisis—the latest tiny incident on the stage of universal collapse—has made even the staunchest of optimists believe in this absurd. As a matter of fact, just try and explain to a normal person in a normal country that the September ration of cigarettes will be issued in exchange for December's sugar coupons which, if saved, could be used to obtain foodstuffs in the new year.... What will a normal person think of us on hearing all this gibberish?

It is more than five years since the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum—a long enough period of time. It is longer than it took to introduce the NEP [New Economic Policy] or to defeat fascism during the Great War. And yet we are still on the distant approaches toward our goal. Is it any wonder that the revolution of expectations which was born our of April's euphoria is yielding ground to disappointment and weariness?

Yes, there can be no argument that politically and spiritually perestroyka has made society take gigantic strides forward. But the man in the street measures social successes not in decibels of glasnost but in more prosaic units—foodstuffs, goods on store shelves, efficient medical services—in other words, in terms of what is commonly known as the standard and quality of life.

Let us be frank: Over the years of perestroyka this quality has improved for only an insignificant stratum of people. Who are they? I suppose a certain section of the creative intelligentsia which has gained broader opportunities for self-expression and maybe certain additional benefits. More tangible gains have been made by those bold enough to successfully and efficiently find their way among the new forms of economic activity (cooperative members, lessees, founders of joint ventures and joint stock enterprises, and so on). Anyone else? Certainly the entire criminal world—from shadow economy big shots to petty speculators; they have really become "thieves under the law" in the sense that they openly scorn all laws. As for the majority of working people, perestroyka for them so far has meant a decline of real living standards and has become a factor of social tension and lack of confidence in the future.

Facing up to the truth, it must be admitted that the country today is in the grips of a real social panic stemming from the announced transition to the market and the impending price rises. Workers in many key sectors, the miners are the most graphic example, openly demand the government's resignation, the depoliticization of state power, the creation of independent trade unions, and the party's withdrawal from enterprises.

It is also clear, however, that no society can remain for long in a state of tension. The easing of tension will follow one way or another. But how and when—these are questions the answers to which should be known in good time.

People who ask themselves these questions (and who does not do so nowadays?) are of course driven by more than just idle curiosity. They all realize if the prevailing chaos exceeds an invisible and hitherto unidentified critical mass, the ensuing explosion will be immediate, universal, and merciless. Then of course we will "take measures"—state of emergency will be declared, national salvation committees or whatever else they might be called will be set up, the Constitution will be suspended, parliaments will be dissolved, and so on and so forth. But this will happen only afterwards. For the time being, we are going all out pretending that nothing special is happening.

It seems as if we are still expecting a miracle like a military leader who is losing a war but hoping for a superpowerful miracle weapon capable of turning the tide of events. Two decrees to be adopted in the future play the role of such weapons today: the new Union treaty and the program for transition to the market. Fine, but with God's help, as the saying goes! I would be prepared to believe in this miracle—only too willing to believe!—had it not been for a nagging, simple, and mundane question of who will actually implement these miraculous draft decrees? Are we not nurturing the usual illusion that all it would take would be for the president to issue a threatening decree and the USSR Supreme Soviet to elaborate a series of wise laws, and everything will immediately "fall in place"? Is there today a really effective "force" capable of enforcing—not asking, not persuading, but actually enforcing!—the implementation of any supreme acts that will be adopted? While reserving the right to revert to this question toward the end of this article, I would like to offer readers a brief historical digression.

Is There "Such a Party" Today?

I am convinced that I am not alone in finding the current political situation in the country reminiscent of the post-February period in 1917. The similarities are actually striking: The selfsame, almost boundless glasnost; the selfsame intoxication on almost boundless democracy and altogether boundless soapbox oratory; the selfsame hasty creation of sundry parties and movements; the selfsame chaos of economic mismanagement. Not as active as then, but nonetheless noticeable "intellectual ferment" within the Army—which was until quite recently monolithic, invincible, and legendary. Not as widespread as then, but increasingly frequent outbursts of strikes and work stoppages in the cities and muffled grumbling in the countryside. Growing unpopularity of the government, which at the time was dubbed Provisional. Heated debates among the intelligentsia about extricating the country from the crisis and the fatherland's future destiny. Blazing hotbeds of national movements in the former empire's outlying regions. Rising crime. Flourishing populist thinking with its hatred of all kinds of privileges and demands for immediate redistribution and cancellation of benefits.... Compare all this, and you will agree: Much that is happening today is reminiscent of those stormy pre-October times.

It is well known how it all ended. The only unknown factor is who will actually manage—and whether anyone will manage?—to play past roles in the new political drama. Which force, if any, will play the part of say the bolsheviks of that time? Will today's ruling structures manage to prevent repeating the mistakes made by the Provisional Government at that time? Will the contemporary "leftists" manage to retain their popularity among the people, in contrast with the post-February democratic coalition? How realistic is an attempted neo-Kornilov coup d'etat today or tomorrow? Could it be that we might witness a different attempt—a revival of the idea of convening a new Constituent Assembly elected on a multiparty basis?

It is, of course, easier to ask questions that to answer them. But let us ponder them nonetheless.

First of all, it makes sense to turn back to a question which Lenin formulated with merciless accuracy in the past the way he always managed to do: "Will the bolsheviks hold on to state power?" It could be asked in a different form: Is there today such a party, such a social force which the country would follow with complete confidence and hope?

Many people today are still inclined to believe that the CPSU remains such a force. Everyone agrees that the Communist Party is living through a profound crisis, everyone points out the decline of its prestige everywhere, everyone notes its widening internal split—if not organizational, then certainly ideological. In other words, everyone agrees that the omnipotent party of the past is no longer what it used to be. But while seemingly fully aware of the critical nature of the situation, many party leaders, party apparatus officials, and even members of the elected party aktiv are inclined—to put it mildly—not to exaggerate the danger. They remain convinced that the CPSU is the sole effective force to which there is no alternative in our society today, nor is any alternative to it likely to emerge in the immediate future. Fine if a given proportion of its 18 million members leave the party—or so they reassure themselves. How big a loss would that be? The CPSU will still remain the broadest and best organized political vanguard, having moreover at its disposal a powerful material and publishing base. As for the opposition, or so they say, it is still wearing diapers, and its numerous and fragmented parties and movements are made up of a few pitiful thousands of neophytes and renegade turncoats from among former Communists.

In my view this is more than just reckless, lulling, and shortsighted self-confidence. It seems as if all who think this way are still nurturing the illusions of past comforts enjoyed by a party exercising boundless power. They still seem to think that all they have to do is order: "Vanish Satan!" and everything will immediately vanish—the miners' strikes with their political and not only economic demands, the rally crowds, the anticommunist orgy in the samizdat press, and the growing popularity of so-called informal movements.... No, they firmly believe in the CPSU's immutable consolidating might right now, and henceforth for all times.

The most amazing point is that many of these people have read Lenin in the past, maybe fleetingly, but read him nevertheless; they should know about the headlong growth of the influence of opposition forces among the masses at times of nationwide crises.

The best confirmation of this is provided by the history of the bolshevik opposition's coming to power in October. Let me remind readers that the numerical strength of bolsheviks in Petrograd's "cradle of the revolution" in February 1917 stood at just about 2,000 members, fewer than the total number of janitors at the time. But they had reached 16,000 already by April, and that figure doubled by the end of June. Just four months later the bolsheviks took power overnight and virtually without a single shot.

And yet back in February of that year, in June, and even in August, the bolsheviks did not even dream of such a swift victory. At the initial stages of the "perestroyka" at the time, the Provisional Government enjoyed literally universal and enthusiastic support, both in the country and abroad. Bolsheviks were not even allowed in their own soviets of workers and peasants—they were dominated by mensheviks and socialist revolutionaries who joined the government in April.

It cannot be said that the bolshevik opposition had been underestimated. The bolshevik leaders were subjected to all-out persecution and defamation. Surefire means of exciting mass awareness, like anti-Semitism and patriotism, were set in motion. It was not enough to have the rightwing press forcibly implanting mistrust in social democratic "adherents of different creed"—read "Jews"—who had "nothing in common with Russia's interests." The bolsheviks were openly proclaimed to be German agents. Let me remind readers that, in the course of the July demonstrations, the Petrograd Military District counterintelligence published in the press "revealing material" according to which Lenin had organized these demonstrations using money received from the Germans especially for subversive activity in Russia. "Lenin is a provocateur!"—pamphlets on this topic were printed in a hurry and handed out at all crossroads in the city.

I would like to see just one of today's leaders whose popularity would withstand such a blow. The prestige of Lenin and the bolsheviks withstood. Neither "exposures," nor arrests, nor the closure of bolshevik publications were of any use. The February enthusiasm and applause for the provisional Government were gradually replaced by profound mistrust in it and mass support for the bolshevik radicals in October.

It is well known why this happened. The bolsheviks were of course not a group of adventurist conspirators, as the critics of October are trying to prove nowadays. This party was perfectly well aware of the needs and moods of the masses. It was the spokesman of the working masses, and the critical salt which bolsheviks generously rubbed into the people's wounds at their rallies was perceived by ordinary people as a healing balsam, as the long-awaited truth and protection of the people. Not a single political party fired at the democratic "provisional" power with the precision and accuracy of the bolsheviks, especially since there were good reasons for making it their target—not only because of its unwillingness to end the war due to grain shortages, but also because of the delays in transferring land to the peasants, of the mediocrity of economic management, of the lack of clear-cut answers about how and when the country should be extricated from the crisis, and of the indecisivenes in implementing urgent social reforms.... These slogans would be dubbed populist today. They actually were populist. But they were raised by proletarians in the street, and the bolsheviks at that time were perfectly capable of heeding their voice.

And while the "February revolutionaries," from constitutional democrats to mensheviks, were getting drunk on democracy and babbling about freedoms, while they were contentedly dreaming of a new constitution and playing their parliamentary games, the bolsheviks were acting... and gained victory.

The October coup thus became the price that had to be paid for the opportunism of the February "perestroyka's" founding fathers—for their inconsistency, for their wavering from right to left, or in contrast for their fear of radical reforms and actions.

As a matter of fact, all this was best described by Lenin. The socialist revolutionaries and the mensheviks "say that the bolsheviks drowned the country in blood during the Civil War," Lenin wrote in 1920. "Come now, you socialist revolutionary and menshevik gentlemen, did you not have eight months to try things out your way? Were you not in power with Kerenskiy between February and October 1917 when you were helped by all the constitutional democrats, by the entire Entente, by all the richest countries in the world? Your program at that time was social transformation without civil war. Would there have been even a single fool to embark on revolution if you had really launched a social reform? Why did you fail to do this? Because your program was nothing but empty words, nothing but a daydream."

Time Is Running Out

Of course being in opposition and criticizing the ruling structures is one thing, but heading the move to extricate the country from the crisis is something else, something completely different. Former oppositionist S.B. Stankevich already complained from the television screen recently that the party newspaper MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA is taking an anti-Soviet line—meaning its criticism of the Moscow City Soviet. But God forbid that today's soviets, headed by liberals and democrats, should again become exclusion zones as regards criticism! We experienced that already during Grishin's and Promyslov's tenures. I would go even further and say that the Communist Party could today become the pike which, according to the proverb, keeps the liberal-democratic carp on its toes. How could it be otherwise if it seriously, rather than just in words, wanted to cease being the party of the bureaucratic clique and to become a real people's party protecting "the working people's interests?"

Honestly, I find it hard to imagine Communists in the West—in prosperous Sweden, for example—persuading their voters to accept price rises and expansion of the private ownership framework. Be patient, comrade workers, this is the only path to progress. Who would listen to such Communists? No, render unto God the things that are God's, and unto the fitter the things that are the fitter's. Let progressive gentlemen there in their parliament worry about the country's future prosperity, let the president appeal—again for progress' sake—for tightening of the belts. Let businessmen modernize the economy, but—begging your forgiveness—do not look to us for any help. We have a different goal: not to allow any decline of workers' living standards, to protest against the drop in purchase prices for peasants' output, and not to allow small employees to lose their jobs. You say that, from the viewpoint of society's long-term development, this is a conservative stance? You are indignant because it is at odds with progress? These, gentlemen, are your problems.

This is how Communists in the West reason, and this is the normal logic of any Communist Party in opposition. It has its own political niche in the social edifice, it has its own clearly defined role.

As for our own Communists, they are still trying to determine their stance, they seem to be taking stock of the new political situation, consoling themselves that theirs is still a ruling party. The "weightiest" argument is that Communists are in the majority on soviets. Yes, many soviet deputies today carry party membership cards. So what? After all, the people voted for most of them not as Communists but as specific Ivanovs, Petrovs, or Sidorovs many of whom, by the way, got elected as deputies actually on anticommunist slogans. I think that we will soon experience elections on the basis of party platforms and party factions within soviets—that is when we will actually see the real deployment of forces.

Yes, I agree that the CPSU is still strong, very strong. Its positions are as strong as ever in the Army, the KGB, the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the mass media, the defense industry sectors, among economic leaders, and among people from the older age groups. But it is disastrously losing support among workers and young people, in other words among those on whom any party's future depends.

Meanwhile, it is beyond all doubt that, despite all the importance of "the individual's role in history," the country's future will depend not on Polozkovs and Yeltsins but on the workers movement which is gathering strength.

Until quite recently the USSR working class was a "class in itself," to use the Marxist-Kantian terminology. People were proud of it, it was lauded, its representatives were solemnly "appointed" to elected organs of power, and so on; but the only thing it was really allowed to do was to drink vodka and to apply its shock labor to the building of the bright future, receiving in exchange a far-from-bright and low-income present. So much for its "leading role" with which the administrative edict system was perfectly happy. And the working class kept silent.

Recent events show that it is no longer happy with the role of the "great" silent partner. It is increasingly annoyed by the verbal clashes in parliaments and congresses. What it demands are not words but specific results—economic autonomy for labor collectives, real as opposed to "statistical" rise in living standards, and freedom from all external diktat. In other words it is once again, like in the distant revolutionary past, becoming a "class in itself," an active political force. And if any political party would like to claim power, or at least influence, in the future, it will have to show some serious concern about its standing among the workers right now.

But the tragic facet of its situation is that today's Communist Party, as represented by the party apparatus, is obviously confused. It lives and acts by inertia, and it has been deprived of the clear-cut political directives to which it got accustomed during the years of dominance by the administrative edict system and which have now been replaced by what it perceives as vague humanist declarations with social democratic overtones. Brought up in the Stalin-Brezhnev traditions, the apparatus finds it hard to accept these declarations and resents its steady transformation into political ballast which is no longer reckoned with by either the "grass roots" (production collectives) or the "summits" of state and parliamentary structures.

But the position of the champions of perestroyka, headed by the president, is equally alarming. Reality is such that people do not believe in the likelihood of a swift stabilization, they are afraid of the market and are petrified by the total license enjoyed by crime. Is it an accident that the man in the street is increasingly actively and increasingly loudly demanding an "iron hand" which could impose order in the country? Many people believe that the president simply has no other choice: If he intends to finalize the planned perestroyka reforms and to protect the tender shoots of democracy, he will have to resort to tough administrative sanctions. No matter how strange this dialectic might appear—toward democracy through force—it is increasingly becoming a reality. The alternative, which our society fears, means further escalation of civil disobedience, acute national conflicts, crime, and political extremism.

The country's common sense indicates that it would be simply impossible to go through the transition period from totalitarianism to a democratic and humane society without clear-cut management; without observance of elementary discipline; by yielding to the elements of economic, political, and national waves. Otherwise mafia-style formations will arm themselves with Kalashnikov rifles while metallurgical plants will barter rolled steel for beef. This is not, of course, a question of putting democracy and economic reforms on the back burner. It is a question of something else. Until we learn the civilized methods of political struggle; until economic incentives teach us to be responsible to our consumers and partners; for as long as laws and decrees remain impotent before crime, effrontery, and devil-may-care wilfulness, then all this must be taught by the power, strong executive power relying on perestroyka's democratic institutions.

No, the country certainly does not want any fresh shocks. We may be very different—leftists, rightists, reds, greens, blues, or whatever you like—but essentially we all wants one and the same thing: To live, to love, to bring up children. These eternal human values are more precious to us than any progress bought at the cost of blood and suffering. People who do not understand this must be made to understand. As the USSR president said recently: "Time is running out."

Democractic Forces Chairman Vornin Interviewed

LD1209042790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Excerpts] TASS correspondent Chernobrov interviewed Voronin, chairman of the Sakharov Union of Democratic forces. According to a decision made by leaders of the central bloc of political parties and movements operating in the USSR, he has been elected chairman of the organizational committee on preparations for and conducting the forthcoming forum of the country's democratic forces.

We do not think that everything is bad in our country, he said. However, in general a complex situation is taking shape of course. We have to get the country out of this situation in the shortest period possible—in the course of one year—and peacefully. The forum for unification of the country's democratic forces is tc be summoned on 21-23 December of this year in Moscow. Already now, Comrade Voronin noted, we require the creation of a Union coalition government of the national trust. [passage omitted]

Now the main parties of the central bloc are the Liberal Democratic Party, the fraction of radicals of the Moscow National Front, the Russian Democratic Forum, and the Sakharov Union of Democratic Forces.

Democratic Parties Call for Coalition Government

PM1209140390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Center Parties' Bloc Session"]

[Text] The enlarged session of the center bloc of political parties and movements ended with a decision to hold an all-Union forum. At it representatives of the coalition of radicals and moderates discussed the political situation, describing it as critical.

As a result of the arguments and debates the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party, the Moscow People's Front radicals' faction, and the Union of Democratic Forces named for Sakharov as well as representatives of the Peace Party, Demnocratic Party, party of urban and rural proprietors, and other political organizations decided to give the Union government a vote of no confidence. They decided to demand the creation of a coalition governnment of national confidence and even expressed a willingness to participate in its formation.

Exiled Writer Zinovyev on Publishing Plans

PM1109152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Second Edition p 5

[Telephone interview with writer Aleksandr Zinovyev by correspondent V. Bolshakov in Paris; date not given; published under the headline: "'I Am Still a Russian Writer....'"— first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] Since PRAVDA published my interview with the writer Aleksandr Zinovyev, readers have been sending their questions and responses to him in Munich, to me in Paris, and most of all to our editorial office in Moscow. So I telephoned Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, who is receiving medical treatment in a sanatorium near Munich, to put these questions to him.

[Bolshakov] In what languages have your books been published?

[Zinovyev] In addition to Russian—mainly by the Lausanne l'Age d'Homme Publishing House—they have been published in English, German, French, Italian, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Norwegian, Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Hungarian, Spanish, Portuguese, Japanese, and others. I cannot name them all here.

[Bolshakov] Are there plans to publish your books in the Soviet Union?

[Zinovyev] I have received a lot of proposals from Soviet journals and publishing houses recently. My main literary work, "The Yawning Heights," is being prepared for publication by a new publishing house formed under the Writers' Union. The Moskovskiy Rabochiy Publishing House intends to publish my books "Homo Sovieticus" and "Parabellum," and the journal SMENA plans to publish "My Home, My Foreign Land." The Yunost Publishing House and other journals and publishing houses have works of mine in their editorial portfolios. But most of these meetings with Soviet readers will take place next year.

[Bolshakov] Do you mean with your books or you personally? Many readers ask whether you have any plans to return to the Soviet Union since your Soviet citizenship has been restored to you?

[Zinovyev] I have no specific plans at present. There are many reasons for this. The main reason is that I am waiting for my books to be published in the Soviet Union and to see how readers react to them. Obviously a great deal depends on how my works are received by the Soviet people.

I am also waiting for the scientific titles stripped from me to be restored to my name. After all, if I go to the Soviet Union I do not want to go as a tourist but in order to give lectures, including lectures on philosophy. Finally, I have too many responsibilities here which will all take time. First of all there are my publishing contracts; I am currently writing a book which requires me to travel all over the world. I am paid for this in hard currency here. But who would do that in the Soviet Union? I am hardly likely to find such a generous sponsor there. And there is another, very important factor. My daughter Aksinya was born four months ago. So the question of my returning home is not feasible at present. But I have always been and still am a Russian, Soviet writer—that is the most important thing. [Zinovyev ends]

I wished Aleksandr Aleksandrovich more success in his work on behalf of our readers and reminded him of his promise to write an article specially for PRAVDA.

[Zinovyev] I will send it to you soon. It is entitled "Where Are We Going?"

'Ecological Militia' Formed To Combat Pollution

PM1209103990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Sergey Zhigalov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Ecological Militia Established"]

[Text] Kuybyshev—A new service—a public health and ecological militia—has been established under the internal affairs administration in Kuybyshev by a decision of the city soviet.

The service will begin operating before the end of September.

The allocation of considerable resources by the standards of the meager city budget confirms the seriousness and consistency of the city soviet's intentions to fight for a healthy city. A little earlier the city soviet deputies had adopted a decision on fines penalizing enterprises releasing pollutant wastes into the sky above the city and into the Volga.

Over 70 militia officers will now be keeping an eye on how enterprises, institutions, cooperatives, and owners of individual dwellings observe public health standards and look after the cleanliness of open areas, lawns, parks, squares....

The new service will also complicate life for motor transport enterprise managers who let dirty cars with defective exhausts out onto the city roadways. Nor will slobbish drivers escape the sanction of being fined. The ecological militia has the right to impose a fine of between 10 and 50 rubles for violations of public health standards.

Military

Shlyaga Makes Speech to Ideological Cadre

90SV0025A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 90 First Edition pp 1-2

[Abridged version of speech by Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, at a meeting of ideological workers of the Armed Forces; date not given: "Taking a Stand on Renewal"]

[Text] About two months have passed since the 28th CPSU Congress. The congress showed that the CPSU remains the vanguard political force in the campaign for the renewal of society. The party, which in several years will mark its 100th anniversary, is alive and will continue to live, it will make its historical contribution to the progress of our country and to the progress of world civilization.

The congress once again confirmed the correctness of the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and on behalf of the country it declared that the CPSU will defend its world outlook and moral values, propagandize program objectives and policy, and attract citizens to the side of the CPSU and into its ranks.

Today all military cadres, party aktivs, Communists, and personnel of the Army and Navy must first and foremost place on the agenda the thorough comprehension, study, and propaganda of the decisions and materials of the congress as a paramount and long-term task.

What especially needs augmentation?

In an atmosphere of ideological and political pluralism, it is the ideological workers as no others who must help personnel make the proper social choice and define themselves through actions and the system of values and ideals. They must move from a passive state to an active offense along the entire front of ideological work since today this is becoming a necessary link in the political struggle. In this situation, a special mission is entrusted to ideological work: **to ensure the consolidation of Army and Navy ranks and to direct the energy of servicemen into a constructive and creative channel.**

It should be added that never before has the task of consolidating the Communists themselves so sharply and unavoidably confronted the ideological workers of the Armed Forces. Today the task has reached its full magnitude because, as is well-known, several political platforms have surfaced in the CPSU whose directions in many ways do not coincide. Some of the military Communists have been shaken, some have panicked, and some have hastened to part with their party cards. This year 3,400 members left the party, 69 percent of them are workers. And although seven times more—24,000 persons—have been accepted into the CPSU, the processes that are taking place cannot but alarm us.

Current ideological work is also being filled with a new meaning because of the whole complex of economic problems that our people have encountered recently. The growing economic difficulties have resulted in despair, pessimism, and distrust in the policy of perestroyka among a certain part of the people. We understand that speeches cannot fill stores with commodities. It is clear that the decisive role in neutralizing these negatives will be played by an effective economic policy, but there is no reason not to see a role in this process for ideological work. An accurate and objective elucidation of the economic situation is one of the conditions for a faster way out of the crisis.

It is impossible not to see that much of the new emphasis in the content of ideological work is conditioned by the situation in the ideological sphere itself. On the one hand, there is the large-scale cultivation of people by some political parties and associations and the actual ideological diktat of who is not with us is against us. On the other hand, there is the rejection of ideology entirely. But between these extremes we see many people who have lost their heads, are confused, and are duped by political gossip, questionable allusions, and nonsensical rumors. It seems that there is nothing that escapes merciless criticism, destructive irony, and narrow-minded hooting.

In this situation, ideological work is obliged to come to the defense of historic values and ideals and to place a reliable covering force in the way of ideological extremism and nihilism, no matter what form it takes. In the first place we must defend Lenin, October, and our culture, history, and traditions.

As previously, overcoming distortions in the conscience and psychology of the masses and their spiritual-moral cleansing and cultural enrichment is a critical task.

People make perestroyka. Therefore, a most important ideological concern was and remains the individual with all of his complexities of character, attitudes, thoughts, and behavior. We must not lose sight of this main reference point when we explain the decisions of the congress.

In propagandizing, explaining, and agitating for them, we must firmly combine all of this work with the task of putting the military policy of the party into practice. This is the second direction of our work for the near term and for the long term.

The beginning of this work was set by the directive of the minister of defense and the chief of the political directorate "Concerning Organizational and Political Work to Implement the Resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress 'Concerning the Main Directions of the Policy of the Party at the Current Stage.'" Unfortunately, some people are still temporizing and some people are wavering. Work around the resolution is moving slowly. Once again, people are waiting for instructions from above and for additional "urgings" and "pushes." It is necessary to break this amorphous state and passivity. To get the leaders out of a semi-lethargic condition. To fill each line of the resolution with constructive content.

Within the context of our conversation, I would like to dwell especially on the problem of ideological support of military reform.

Serious passions are raging around these questions today, lances and pens are being broken, and the airwaves are humming. Even those who never were involved with military questions are also hastening to make their contribution to this matter, and even to come out with some kind of an alternative reform project. There is a boundary path here that divides different political forces. The label of "conservatives" is hung on some, others are defined as "radicals," and still others as "centrists," etc.

Just what is military reform in the USSR? The understanding of this question by the ideological cadres will in many ways, without doubt, determine the quality of their ideological support.

Thus military reform is taken to mean essential and fundamental transformations of all structures of the state associated with its military construction and resolution of defense tasks. **And here I believe that I am obliged to emphasize that the initiative for military reform in the USSR initially came from the CPSU, and that it was not the result of the "mental insight" of some comrades from among a number of people's deputies and military specialists, as some people are persistently trying to convince us, the military, and public opinion in the country as a whole.**

In the party and its Central Committee—based on a thorough analysis of the results of the USSR's new policy in the area of defense and security, the evolving situation in the world and inside the country, and the development of a new military doctrine—a deep conviction was formed gradually that the time was ripe for radical military reform on a country-wide scale, including of course reform of the Armed Forces as the most important element in the system of our defense. This task was initially set in October 1989 at the Main Military Council, and after many and rather extensive studies it was finally formulated in the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress. In concentrated form, the concept of a phased implementation of military reform was officially declared in the Resolution of the 28th CPSU Congress "Concerning the Main Directions of the Military Policy of the Party at the Present Stage."

In the process of military reform, a comprehensive reform is also being conducted in the entire system of party-political work in the Armed Forces. Its concept was studied and discussed in the Bureau of the Main Political Directorate. Its initial principles are as follows:

—establishment of V.I. Lenin's ideas that the Army has always been and remains an instrument of the state, and therefore cannot be outside state policy as a basis;

—thorough consideration of the principal changes in the position of the CPSU in society and in the Army;

—separation of the functions of party and political organs, and giving the latter the status of state organs in the system of the Armed Forces;

—critical interpretation of the many years of experience of party-political work, and the retention of that which is valuable and the rejection of that which is negative;

—in the interests of resolving defense tasks and training youth for service in the Army, establishment of new relations of political and party organs between themselves and with all social-political organizations functioning within the scope of the USSR Constitution.

All of this does not just need interpretation. But to begin with, it needs an objective elucidation in the media. **I will put it this way: Work on the implementation of military reform needs good publicity today so that the people are able to comprehend the prospects for the defense condition of our country so as to ensure a good social background on the part of the public for future perestroyka.** But this, as the saying goes, cannot be done by a telephone call "from above." It is necessary to arrange the coordinated action of military collectives with labor collectives, of republic and local organs of authority, and of political parties and social movements. In this plan it is important in a timely way to counteract those who superficially, adventuristically, and in a populist way interpret the essence of military reform. At the same time, Army and Navy ideologists must listen very attentively to effective and constructive proposals that contribute to the implementation of military reform. We must also not underestimate the need for a comprehensive understanding of the experience of implementing military reform in our country and in other countries. For example, in giving meaning to the experience of military reform in the United States, it can already be said now that it was conducted for more than 10 years; and moreover, that it was based on a firm economic basis and that it was well-thought-out and organized. Against this background an attempt to conduct military reform in our country in three to four years, as is proposed by some hotheads, looks risky at the very least.

I think that the Army is not an institution on which such experiments can be made to satisfy someone's ambitions. Miscalculations here are dangerous.

Simultaneously, it is very important to concentrate efforts on military-patriotic propaganda, coordination with the media, participation in socio-political actions of a patriotic nature, work with pre-conscription youth and school children, and contacts with creative artist unions and associations.

Ideological support of military reform presupposes special attention to questions of reforming the political structures in the Army and Navy. Of course some people look at reform as the elimination of ideology entirely, as a de-ideologization of the Armed Forces, even though de-ideologization is also an ideology. The whole question is whom and what purpose does this ideology serve.

In the West this is understood well. It is calculated that there are about 23,000 specialists-ideologists today just in the line units of the United States. And no cuts here are foreseen. By 1992 their number will be increased to 26,000. More than $2.5 billion are allocated annually to maintain and equip them for scientific-research work in this area. Our expenditures simply are not comparable to theirs. So to abandon ideological work—and some people are calling on us to do this—means to move backwards and to desire a demoralization of the Armed Forces.

There is a lot that is positive in ideological work and there are even new forms and new means. However there are also a lot of gaps. What is the reason for them, and why are we again compelled to talk about the lag of ideological work in the needs of military preparedness and of all military life?

I think that the whole concept of the perestroyka of ideological work, especially its strategic questions, was not sufficiently thoroughly reasoned. Therefore local ideological workers frequently found themselves in the position of soldiers who were brought out of the trenches for the attack but who were not equipped and were not told in which direction to advance.

Our concept moreover proved to be insufficiently receptive to innovation and insufficiently communicable and open for dialogue, argument, and polemics. Many sharp questions, non-standard ideas, and original actions as the saying goes were being turned away at the threshold, losing sincere friends and reliable allies.

And still the main thing lies elsewhere today, to go farther, to look ahead, and to act decisively and bolder. Not to shiver in a developing complex situation, but to understand that the content of ideological work is broadening substantially today. Now it will rest on a constitutional-legal basis and on a system of patriotic, moral, international, and military values.

Does this mean that party propaganda is excluded from it? No, because the CPSU remains the ruling party and the vanguard of Soviet society. It does not have a policy that is special and distinct from the interests of the state. Therefore the activity of the party and the propaganda of the decisions of its 28th Congress will be the basic theme of the ideological work for the coming period. And the main thing here is the transition to new political organ structures to guarantee the full unity of their actions with party committees in a system of ideological work. This is an important aspect in our work. It must always be kept in mind.

It is necessary in the main to change the attitude toward opponents and the tone of the conversation. Past militancy and implacability toward dissidents must remain in the past. Renewed ideological work must acquire intellectuality and tactfulness, patience and magnanimity, and it must master the language of democracy and the ability to listen to and understand an opponent. No one today has a monopoly on truth, and no one can consider himself to be a greater patriot than someone else. And since this is the case, then all participants in the ideological process are its coauthors, collaborators, and co-defendants.

We must constantly intensify the idea that ideological work is not important in itself, but as a means of resolving operational tasks and as an integral component of combat readiness.

This criterion remains key as previously. True it should be used skillfully and intelligently, understanding that ideological work itself does not replace combat training and that it can never do this. It influences it through the feelings of people and through their inner attitude toward the "productive" process, toward combat training, and toward service.

Large reserves in ideological work can be seen in the analysis of the military discipline situation. This is precisely the sphere of Armed Forces life where the end result of all of our efforts in personnel training become evident.

The fate of discipline today is determined exactly by those transgressions that form the root of a low level of consciousness and that are defective in their moral condition. These are: evasion of military service, outrages against the local population, and mocking and humiliating servicemen.

Of course one cannot fail to consider that the work to strengthen discipline has to be conducted in a more complicated situation now. The qualitative indices of replacements arriving in the Army and Navy are falling. According to the totals for 1989, among the conscripts the number of those who did not work and study anywhere grew from 6.5 to 9.8 percent, and almost every seventh individual sent to a military construction unit had been previously convicted. The behavior of servicemen and military builders is negatively influenced by defects in interethnic relations, direct anti-Army actions, encouragement of desertion in a number of Union republics, and by a lowering of the prestige of authorities. Nonetheless the main reasons for the worsening situation has to be sought in our own work. Therefore, it is extremely important to consolidate the entire ideological potential for large-scale and effective influence on the problem of strengthening military discipline.

The main objective is to stop the increase in crime and incidents by the end of this year, and to renew the process of their reduction in the future.

We will not achieve anything in discipline if we do not ensure an improvement in the education of the educators themselves, that is the officers. However, I do not want this phrase to be interpreted as a call for a search for new opportunities to envelop this category of servicemen with ideological measures.

It seems extremely important today to overcome service and socio- political inertia, and I would say the amorphous part of the officers, first and foremost through the creation in the officer collective of a situation of trust, personal respect, and its protection from injustice. Problems associated with the propaganda of honorable officer work must be broached more actively. Each one of us must clearly understand that the fate of discipline in significant measure lies in the area of ideological work and that creativity and initiative are required of each of us. In fact, the fate of the Army is also in our hands.

The process of politicization in the Armed Forces has achieved the very highest marks. This process today affects literally everything: deployment, manning, supplies, operational-tactical training, the ecology, political work, the mood in the barracks and headquarters, and families and military trade stores. And we have to forecast all of this; foresee the good and the bad; think how to act in different situations; and analyze, reinterpret, and reappraise taking into account not only our desires but also the realities that do not lie with us. And the main thing is that we should not produce enemies today, but on the contrary search for and rally supporters. I am convinced that this is also important now, and that in the future it will have greater and greater significance.

It is impossible not to see that, together with democratic and healthy elements, extremely dangerous forces have now come onto the political scene: nationalist, antisocialist, and even fascist. For the present they are not sufficiently organized yet and they are few in number, but history teaches that extremes can easily close ranks and form blocs, and then their threat increases many fold. We have felt this in practice in some regions of the country.

What has been said, undoubtedly, concerns national relations whose contradictions and severity have brought them to the forefront of perestroyka processes. **The conclusion from this is: Our ideological work must take into account, express, and reflect the interests of all nations and peoples of a multinational federative state, and it must ensure dialectical international and national unity in practice. It must be a subject of constant concern of the political organs, of party committees, of party organizations, and of every Communist.**

In reinstating historical truth and disclosing negative phenomena in interethnic relations, we cannot allow the flood of difficulties to push into the background the fundamental values of socialism which were formed in the years of Soviet authority and on which the framework of the political and state system is based. Therefore the imperative of our dynamic and ambiguous times must be the indisputable fulfillment of the responsible mission that has been entrusted to us, that is to preserve and strengthen the paramount gain of the October Revolution—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the friendship and fraternity of the people that populate it.

But our main international task is to be a school of internationalism in the future since the Soviet Armed Forces are and henceforth must also be the most concentrated social institution in a national sense.

Apparently the need to develop a single coordinated position both in the center and in the localities for work in the soviets of people's deputies also cannot be put off. We must pursue the closest contacts and attract deputies to ourselves; together with them go to the labor collectives; together with them build up military-patriotic education and prepare youth for military service; promote the principles of military policy in the public conscience; and conduct political discussions in the soviets.

It seems that it will be proper if we formulate and set forth in suitable documents for next year the requirement to conduct a political campaign, especially since the outlook is for a campaign that is complex, sharp, and harsh. Its echoes will resound in all directions. We must quickly and efficiently and accurately react to all of this.

In a large sense, the question also concerns a search for ways and methods to strengthen ties and cooperate with creative unions and associations.

Briefly it is necessary to change the situation. It is necessary to establish new ties, to correct our mistakes, to win over public opinion, and to gain allies.

It is necessary in the political organs and in each element of ideological work to establish qualitatively new mechanisms that are capable of raising the prestige of the Armed Forces.

Or take such a political question as the social sphere of the Army and the Navy. Yes, I want to emphasize that questions of the social conditions plan have now become political questions. They are being actively parasitized by certain extremist elements in order to whip up public opinion to discredit the leadership of the Armed Forces. It seems that the political organs and our ideological service have to become more active in this direction.

The party today needs strong ideological work. In the Army, you, dear comrades, are its main creators. And an unprecedented campaign, work, and responsibility are required of you today.

Congress of Soldiers' Parents Has Second Meeting

PM1109153490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major A. Vorobyev: "Congress of Soldiers' Mothers"]

[Text] The first All-Union Congress of Soldiers' and Seamen's Parents was held in Moscow 8-9 September. I am informed that it was organized by the committee of soldiers' mothers "Mothers Against Violence" and the "Shield" Union.

Some 389 people took part in the congress.

The Sunday session, the last day of the congress, began with...the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA roundup of the first day of the congress. RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputy V. Urazhtsev, in the chair, announced that despite its critical spirit the item "Following an Anti-Army Scenario?" is acceptable.

Like the preceding day, the final day of the congress was packed with emotion and the speakers were once again fired up with polemics. An attack on one of the female delegates caused a particular increase in the level of excitement. Apparently she was struck with a sharp pointed implement. The session had to be broken off for a time. Where and how did it happen? According to the victim's statement, on the way to the building where the congress was being held. Staffers of the internal affairs organs, arriving on the scene, promptly detained a youth who was one of seven deserters at the congress. He had no documents. On the demand of the delegates this "guest of the congress" was brought back two hours later to the auditorium where by then the discussion of the draft statutes, resolutions, and statement of the first All-Union Congress of Soldiers' and Seamen's Parents was proceeding stormily.

USSR People's Deputies S. Belozertsev, Ye. Gayer, and A. Obolenskiy; RSFSR People's Deputies A. Surkov and T. Koryagina; and recently elected USSR People's Deputy O. Kalugin took part in the day's work. Tatyana Ivanovna Koryagina was introduced to the congress as "a candidate for appointment to the post of Russia's defense minister." All the deputies addressed the congress delegates.

For instance Yevdokiya Aleksandrovna Gayer, member of the country's Supreme Soviet, reproached the Defense Ministry with the fact that "there is not a single official representative of the military department" at the congress.

I think it is apposite to recall here that on its first day the congress rejected an attempt by an officer of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office to reply at least to some extent to the questions raised by the mothers. How could such intolerance be useful?

The main task which the servicemen's parents set themselves was to bring about the creation of legal guarantees to prevent crimes against the individual in the Army and Navy. As for legal norms, these clearly did not fit in with the character of the speeches made by some of the congress delegates. For instance, I was astonished to hear the soldiers' mothers criticized from the platform by one of the event's organizers, I. Kugushev, a member incidentally of the organizing committee:

"...You should strive as hard as possible to find out the home addresses of everyone—from the defense minister to the commanding officers of military units."

The following proposal was also heard in the heat of emotion: to picket at the end of the congress a nearby apartment block where generals and officers live. This was put into practice in the evening.

Such steps are hardly to the credit of the congress delegates. Still less the threats by some of them to organize acts of civil disobedience "in certain eventualities."

As for the congress decisions, the soldiers' and seamen's parents adopted a number of resolutions and a statement.

Among the demands made by the soldiers' and seamen's parents was to introduce criminal accountability of officers for the death of a soldier or seaman, and also for using soldiers for their own personal purposes; compulsory training of conscripts for at least three to five months in the use of weapons and in a military speciality; abandonment of the draft for only sons as well as if any brother in the family has been killed while in the Army; and not to allow compulsory service in the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, their use in resolving interethnic conflicts, and so forth. The soldiers' and seamen's mothers and fathers put forward a demand for the formation of independent commissions of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets to investigate the causes of the death or disablement of servicemen, and the acceleration of military reform.

Damages Awarded to Victim of Army 'Bullying'

PM1109131490 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 90 p 1

[article by B. Utekhin: "Military Duty—10,000 Rubles. For the First Time the Army Will Pay Compensation to a Soldier Victim of Bullying. By Court Ruling"]

[Excerpts] On 12 February 1987 Sergeant Kashin, deputy platoon commander, once again beat up Private Kayl, a serviceman on his compulsory term of service. And that commonplace incident served as the grounds for Istra City Court to institute a new class of military expenditure on 6 July 1990, a unique event in our court practice.

The case itself is extremely simple—and repulsive. The soldier served in a military unit in Kiev Military District, and Sgt. Kashin was zealously carrying out his military duty in the same unit. There is hardly any point in recalling the matter today: Whether Pvt. Kayl failed to lift his foot high enough while in formation, whether his belt was pulled less tight than the norms laid down by the experienced sergeant demanded.... In general, "out of misunderstood interests of service," 10 days before Soviet Army and Navy Day the deputy platoon commander—to use the language of the court medical report—caused the private "grievous bodily harm which endangered life at the time of being inflicted and also led to a health disorder involving a persistent one-third loss of fitness for work in the form of a severe blunt closed craniocerebral injury...." And so forth. To judge from the results, the sergeant beat him long and frenziedly. Kayl was paralyzed as a result, and in addition he partly lost the ability to speak. [passage omitted]

Unlike tens of thousands of his predecessors, former Pvt. Kayl took his military unit to court. No, not Sgt. Kashin but his alma mater, the Kiev Military District military unit. He sued it for compensation for the damage to his health, an act which the unit's representatives deemed illogical and causing nothing but bewilderment. The military unit's representative who came to court said that he understood the plaintiff's claims in human terms, but all the same he had been beaten up by Sgt. Kashin who unfortunately had done this on the subunit's territory. Indeed, who is Kashin? For he is not the regiment's commander or the unit's duty officer or even the guard commander! He came, he served his prescribed time, and no one will see him in the unit again. Can you imagine what would happen if everyone who had been beaten up in the Army demanded monetary compensation from it? The entire reduced military budget could vanish into this bottomless pit!

I am afraid that, if Istra City Court had acted according to this logic, there would be no reason to write about a commonplace incident in a Kiev Military District unit which happened moreover back in 1987. But the court under the leadership of former naval seaman Konstantin Pechurin brought in an unprecedented verdict: The military unit must pay.

The presidential decree on legal and social protection for servicemen has appeared. I would like its compilers to know about the 9,894.85 rubles which the Soviet Army must pay to former Pvt. Kayl. A trifling sum if a broken life lies in the other pan of the scales. But maybe this small proportion of the "expenditure on defense" will help to protect an unprotected person—a serviceman in the world's strongest army?

Baltic Republics

Baltic States Seek Input on Two-Plus-Four Talks

Discuss Joint Actions

LD1209030690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] A television broadcast carried on Lithuanian Television this evening, which featured a bridge between the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian Supreme Councils, was dedicated to a discussion of the Baltic states' most important current problem: the three countries' international situation.

Most of the discussion centered around tomorrow's two-plus-four talks in Moscow and on the implications of German unification for the Baltic states.

The parliamentarians were united in their declaration that the war would end [as heard] only when three-plus-four negotiations took place, which would include not only the victors of World War II and both Germanys, but also all of the Baltics.

The Baltic states' parliamentarians discussed possibilities for joint action, on a state level, in preparing for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, scheduled for 8 November in Paris.

In assessing the current situation in negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Baltic Supreme Council deputies also spoke in favor of a joint policy and joint actions. They affirmed that only the one negotiation variant of three-plus-one was possible in negotiations with Moscow.

Lithuanian parliamentarians were represented in the television bridge by Deputy Supreme Council Chairman Bronius Kuzmickas, Secretary of the Supreme Council Liudvikas Sabutis, other deputies, and Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas.

Ozolas in Moscow for Talks

LD1109215190 Moscow TASS in English 2005 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Gvritishvili]

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—Lithuanian Deputy Prime Minister Romualdas Ozolas held a news conference here today to tell journalists about the situation of the three Soviet Baltic republics on the eve of German unification.

He said he was in Moscow as the leader of the Lithuanian delegation, which, according to him, also represents the interests of Latvia and Estonia, to attend a round of the two-plus-four talks.

Ozolas said he was ready to present respective clarifications if the problem of the Baltic republics arose during the negotiations. But he denied the possibility of any contacts with Western participants in the Moscow meeting on his own initiative.

The recognition of the Baltic republics by the world community, Ozolas said, is next in line after the completion of the two-plus-four negotiations.

He pointed to the need "to consider the problem of the independent status of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia and to recognise the existence of these independent states de-facto and de-jure".

"The confident development of a new Europe is only possible on this basis," he insisted.

Speaking then about the situation in the Persian Gulf, Ozolas sought to draw a parallel with a scenario "which may take shape under certain circumstances also in the Baltic region".

Lithuanians Picket Embassies

LD1109224190 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] A press conference was held at the Lithuanian Mission in Moscow today on the eve of the two-plus-four talks that will start in the Soviet capital on Wednesday. The Lithuanian Deputy Premier Romualdas Ozolas and the Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas answered questions concerning problems of the restoration of the statehood of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Romualdas Ozolas said the three Baltic states had the right to participate in the Helsinki process and will seek that.

Meanwhile, representatives of Lithuania's political parties, public movements, and organizations held pickets outside the U.S., British, French, both German Embassies, and the Soviet Foreign Ministry in Moscow. The manifestants [as heard] met with heads of the political departments of the embassies. An official of the West German Embassy said his government was not going to move that the Baltic issue should be included in the four-plus-two talks, but promised to immediately pass the Lithuanian concern to Bonn.

Landsbergis Expects 'New Economic Blockade'

LD1209054790 Warsaw PAP in English 2128 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Vilnius, Sept. 11 (ELTA)—"It is very clear now that Moscow does not want to negotiate. Our letters to Moscow were left without an answer in the past month, negotiations with Estonia have been also stopped," said Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania Vytautas Landsbergis during a programme aired by Lithuanian radio, the Lithuanian news agency ELTA reported today.

"We must be prepared that it will be very difficult to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union. Most probably, it will propose the signing of an agreement on federation what would mean our joining the Soviet

Union. Of course we will not accept such a proposal. That is why one has to expect in the near future a new economic blockade on the part of the USSR," said Landsbergis.

Lithuania's Ozolas Forsees Possibility of War

LD1109105890 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Lithuanian deputy prime minister Romualdas Ozolas in his regular Sunday message on Lithuanian Television, said that he regards the enlivened activities of political parties and organizations in Lithuania as the most welcome event of the past week.

According to him a roundtable of Lithuanian political parties and movements could draw all non-parliamentarian political forces of society together, rally them, and bring them up to the level of a moral arbiter which, according to the deputy prime minister, is very often needed by our society which still remains rather authoritarian.

R. Ozolas once again set out his idea expressed on Lithuanian Television a week ago. He said that he is concerned that Europe could enter the common European home through a war in Lithuania.

According to the deputy prime minister, two wars could break out in Lithuania: a liberation war and a civil war. Both of them could take place at the same time. The time for a liberation war could come when, having used all parliamentary and diplomatic possibilities, the need would arise to resist the attempts by a foreign state to impose its orders by physical force.

The time for a civil war could come when, exhausted and incited against each other, while seeing no other way out, we would set upon each other in the Republic of Lithuania—which we ourselves had restored.

The second case would be more suitable for Moscow; we do not need either of them. However, this does not eliminate the possibility or even the threat of war, the deputy prime minister stressed.

He also pointed out the three main causes of a war in Lithuania: first it could be as a result of economic and social chaos in the Soviet Union. A civil war could break out there which could then spread into Lithuania. A second cause could be the activity of forces of a foreign state present in Lithuania. A third could be the will of those people in Lithuania who do not want to allow the CPSU to resume its rule in Lithuania and who, from their military bunkers with the generals, regard themselves as the masters of Lithuania.

The second occupation would be more [word indistinct] than the first one. Resistance by force would be significantly more complex. However, it is absolutely clear that there would be such resistance if anyone attempted to stop our peaceful course by force, Romualdas Ozolas said.

Lithuania Signs Economic Pact With RSFSR

904A0581A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 17 Aug 90 p 1

["Agreement between the RSFSR Government and the Republic of Lithuania Government: On Trade and Economic Relations in 1991"]

[Text] The government of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the government of the Republic of Lithuania (henceforward called "the parties"):

taking as a basis aspirations to good-neighborly relations;

considering the decisions adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council on the parties' statehood status; and

proceeding from the expediency of an extension of mutually profitable economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit, conclude this intergovernmental agreement.

Article 1

Considering the economic ties and commodity exchange relations which have taken shape between the RSFSR and the Republic of Lithuania, the parties have agreed, as a rule, to preserve for 1991 the reciprocal supplies of raw material, products, and commodities at the 1990 level.

Article 2

The parties have agreed to practice mutual relations on the basis of the corresponding contracts, agreements, or protocols which are concluded or composed between territorial (municipal) organs of administration or organs of state administration, enterprises, organizations, establishments, and other economic subjects within the framework of their jurisdiction. The said economic subjects are fully responsible for compliance with the commitments they assume.

Article 3

The parties will assist in the preservation, establishment, and expansion of direct economic relations between enterprises, organizations, establishments, and other economic subjects in the sphere of the reciprocal trade in raw material, products, and consumer goods and the rendering of services with regard for the transition to market relations.

Article 4

The parties believe that enterprises and organizations may participate in the exercise of cooperation regardless of forms of ownership. Enterprises and organizations not located on the territory of the republics and also partners of third states may participate in cooperation with the consent of the parties.

Article 5

The parties have agreed to base cooperation on the principles of equivalent exchange and to make reciprocal payments in 1991 in accordance with current price lists and contract prices, (footnote 1) (with regard for the parties' interests, payments may also be made on the basis of individual agreements in accordance with world prices), which are coordinated and agreed in the corresponding contracts, agreements, or protocols. The parties will refrain from actions that could cause the other party economic damage.

The procedure of payments for goods sold and services rendered is determined by individual contracts, agreements, or protocols.

Article 6

The parties have agreed to complete the conclusion of contracts and agreements or the composition of protocols in the following areas of economic and cultural cooperation (entrusting this work to the pertinent government bodies) within two months as of the date this agreement is signed:

in the sphere of exchange of the most important types of production products and raw material—between the RSFSR State Committee for Material and Technical Support for Republic and Regional Programs and the RSFSR State Committee for Economics and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Material Resources;

in the sphere of exchange of consumer goods—between the RSFSR Ministry of Trade and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Trade;

in the sphere of finances—between the RSFSR Ministry of Finance and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Finance;

in the sphere of communications (footnote 2) (the corresponding contracts, agreements, and protocols on the part of the RSFSR may be concluded and composed with regard for the decree of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR "Delineation of the Functions of the Management of Organizations on the Territory of the RSFSR")—between the RSFSR Ministry of Communications, Information Science, and Space and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Communications;

in the sphere of transport (see footnote 2)—between the RSFSR Ministry of Transport and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Railways;

in the sphere of science and technology—between the RSFSR State Committee for Science and the Higher School and the Republic of Lithuania Government Science and Higher Education Department;

in the sphere of construction and architecture—between the RSFSR State Committee for Architecture and Construction and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Construction and Urban Studies;

in the sphere of agriculture and fish industry and the processing of agricultural raw material—between the RSFSR Ministry of Agriculture and Food and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Agriculture;

in the sphere of industry (see footnote 2)—between the RSFSR Ministry of Industry and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Industry and Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Power Engineering;

in the sphere of the environment—between the RSFSR State Committee for the Environment and Use of Nature and the Republic of Lithuania Government Natural Resources Department;

in the sphere of medicine and health care—between the RSFSR Ministry of Health Care and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Health Care;

in the sphere of culture and education—between the RSFSR Ministry of Culture and the RSFSR Ministry of Education and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Culture and Education;

in the sphere of coordination of law enforcement activity—between the corresponding law enforcement authorities of the RSFSR and the Republic of Lithuania;

in the sphere of population movement—between the RSFSR Ministry of Labor and the Republic of Lithuania Ministry of Social Protection;

in the sphere of foreign economic relations—between the RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and the Republic of Lithuania Government Foreign Economic Relations Department.

Article 7

The parties have agreed that economic subjects will use the products supplied them in accordance with the concluded agreements at their discretion.

Article 8

The parties have agreed on an exchange of lists of commodities and services whose removal by territorial (municipal) organs of administration, enterprises, organizations, establishments, and other economic subjects must be coordinated with the competent authorities of the exporting party.

Article 9

For the purpose of protection of internal markets and to avoid infringement of the interests of the population in the supply of basic necessities the parties have agreed to give timely notice of changes in retail and purchase prices and also other forms of regulation of the internal market, to coordinate their actions, and to provide for joint measures to forestall all attempts on the part of economic subjects aimed at an infringement of the interests of one party.

The parties entrust to their competent authorities the development of a mechanism of realization of these measures.

Article 10

The parties deemed it necessary to create a joint working commission for the elaboration of a draft program of economic cooperation, providing in it for the further development of these relations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit under the conditions of transition to market relations. To complete the elaboration of the draft of the said program in the first half of 1991.

Article 11

The parties have agreed to create a data bank on the contracts that are concluded and on their fulfillment.

Article 12

The parties recognized that relations between them would be built on the fundamental principles of international law and that agreements between the government of the RSFSR and the government of the Republic of Lithuania and also the rights and obligations ensuing from them may not be interpreted as the parties' incorporation in any alliance or community of states.

This agreement takes effect the moment it is signed.

The agreement was drawn up in Vilnius in two copies in Russian and Lithuanian of equal validity and signed on 15 August 1990.

For the government of the RSFSR,
[Signed] I. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

For the government of the Republic of Lithuania,
[Signed] K. Prunskiene, prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania.

Deepening 'Chaos' Seen in Lithuanian Market

LD1009203190 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] The chaos in the Lithuanian market is deepening. It has been announced that currently the citizens of the republic are holding 12 billion rubles that are not backed by goods. The government is investigating how to protect the market from total collapse. First of all it has been planned to set up customs houses on the main roads. This information was supplied by the department of the republic's security.

However, observers believe that economic control of borders will not be enough. It looks as if the government is preparing a package of extremely severe measures against the black market.

'Tension' Surrounds Army Presence in Lithuania

LD1209031590 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By Radio Vilnius commentator Juozas Kavolis]

[Text] A greater part of Lithuania's people keep treating the Soviet Army, which entered Lithuania's territory in June 1940 as occupational, but a number of non-Lithuanians who moved to Lithuania from various parts of the Soviet Union during the Soviet period reject such a standpoint.

Of course, two extreme views can't help raising tension in the Republic. Especially dissatisfied with the attitude towards them in Lithuania are Soviet Army officers. On the other hand in Lithuania there are people who can't realize that a soldier or an officer only obey commands given from above; in this case by the Kremlin. Thus there do occur incidents in the generally peaceful Lithuania. One of such incidents, a fight between Soviet Army soldiers and local youths, cropped up in Taurage, a town in the western part of Lithuania, a few days ago. This shows that tension here is as high as it is in the regions in which open conflicts are being reported.

More than once, Lithuania's authorities have given proposals for reducing tension. They offered negotiations that would determine the status of the Soviet Army. People in Lithuania fully realize the impossibility of the Soviet Army's immediate withdrawal; only much later, with the reduction [as heard] of political process that at present are taking place in Europe and in the world, could Lithuania consider its final goal—neutrality.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Army leadership so far shows no signs of goodwill. While during the first months of independence armored personnel carriers openly clattered along the streets of our cities and military helicopters circled over our heads; they have now found new ways of demonstrating their military power. In the seaport of Klaipeda, Soviet soldiers started guarding monuments of the Brezhnev era, ignoring the local authority. Day and night armored personnel carriers guard the central squares of the city. One of the means taken asks for no further commentary—the guards do not allow to clean the monument to Soviet soldiers that had been smeared with paint by someone (?still) at the end of the summer. [sentence as heard] Meanwhile, tourists from various cities of the Soviet Union are brought here to see for themselves what kind of people these Lithuanians are. Visitors usually remain unaware of the fact that the Lithuanian public at large condemns these acts of desecration. Lithuania's Procurator's Office has brought an action against the offenders, but forces opposing Lithuania's independence don't seek peace, and the Soviet Army willingly gives assistance to such forces.

Lithuania Opposes Civil Defense Exercise

PM1009132690 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[INTERFAX report under the rubric "One Paragraph": "Maneuvers Planned in Lithuania"]

[Text] The Lithuanian government information service reports that the USSR Baltic Military District Command plans to hold civil defense exercises on Lithuanian territory 8-13 September [as published], without having reached agreement on this with the government of the Lithuanian Republic. According to the organizers' plans, republic and city civil defense staffs are due to take part in these exercises. The government of the Lithuanian Republic, the report says, does not approve of this decision by the Baltic Military District Command, and instructs entities forming part of the Republic economy not to take part in these exercises.

Lithuanian Security Department Holds Briefing

LD1009224690 Moscow TASS in English 2225 GMT 10 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Vilnius September 10 TASS—The State Security Department at the Lithuanian Government today held its first news conference for Soviet and foreign correspondents.

"One of our main tasks is to elaborate a legal basis for the department's activities and to complete the formation of structural units," said Department General Director Mecys Laurinkus.

It was noted at the news conference that one of the department's main tasks is to combat organised crime, which is worrying the Lithuanian public.

Speaking of relations with the existing KGB of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, Laurinkus said he does not consider it "expedient to confront it. Our task is to search for ways for, and directions of joint activities with its employees".

Lithuanian KGB Activities Reported

LD1009202590 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 0000 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] The USSR secret militia or KGB has celebrated its 50th anniversary in Lithuania. This was reported by the newspaper RESPUBLIKA.

The article entitled "A Jubilee on Victims' Street" says that on the last day of the summer, the lights did not go out until very late in the KGB palace in Vilnius on Victims' Street, where bonuses for good service were handed out and the champagne was flowing.

Last week more articles appeared in the Lithuanian press about the activities of the modern security service in our country. According to the information given to the newspaper GIMTASIS KRASTAS by a former Lithuanian KGB officer, documents began to disappear from all security offices; they later appeared in the press. People are leaving this institution one after another in Lithuania—Lithuanians first of all. The former officer also said that two generations are now in confrontation within the Soviet security system. There are people who are absurdly loyal to the old system, and there is also a new generation of security men, said the anonymous officer.

However, the newspaper ATGIMIMAS, basing its report on reliable sources, said that the KGB in Lithuania continues to listen to people's telephone conversations, read people's letters, and search people's homes without residents' knowledge.

Meanwhile, a student from Vytautas Great University in Kaunas wrote to the newspaper RESPUBLIKA how KGB agents tried to recruit him when he was still in the Soviet Army doing his military service, and because the young man refused vigorously to be recruited, he has been persecuted to this day.

Lithuanian Education System To Be Depoliticized

PM1109094990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich under the "Direct Line" rubric: "No More Party Bureaus in Schools"]

[Text] Vilnius—On instructions from the Lithuanian minister for culture and education, the republic's education system is to be depoliticized.

The activity of party organizations and other political organizations in all academic establishments is now prohibited and existing organizations are being disbanded. Schools will no longer have Pioneer leaders as permanent members of staff. This does not mean that teachers will be banned from taking part in political activity or belonging to a certain party. The territorial principle of party membership "outside academic institutions" will come into effect at the start of the new academic year.

So, the process of depoliticization that has already affected internal affairs bodies, the KGB, and other state institutions and organizations is now affecting Lithuania's education system as well. The new minister's instructions have essentially ended the discussions that have been held in the republic's higher education establishments and secondary schools regarding the lawfulness of depoliticization.

During the last academic year the leaders of many schools took independent action, without waiting for instructions "from above," and eliminated the position of Pioneer leader; primary party organizations have essentially ceased to function and the termination of CPSU membership by teachers—particularly in schools that conduct classes in Lithuanian—has become a systematic process. As we can see, the question of whether Lithuania's state departments, institutions, and other organizations should be depoliticized is moving away from recommendations and wishes toward orders and instructions.

Estonian Group Recruits for Kuwaiti Liberation

LD1109182390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1640 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Tallinn, 11 September. TASS—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko reports:

"Kaitseliit," an Estonian organization which gained notoriety at the beginning of September by placing border posts at the site of the old frontier separating bourgeois Estonia from the Soviet Union, has started recruiting volunteers from this Baltic republic "for the liberation of Kuwait." Here an official announcement has been made of the address where volunteers are registered and of the telephone number to call to obtain the necessary information.

A "Kaitseliit" statement circulated here notes that "many citizens of the Estonian Republic are applying to the Estonia Committee and 'Kaitseliit,' expressing the wish to serve with the international peace-keeping force defending the Persian Gulf states." The document mentions the motives of these applications as being solidarity of the republic's citizens with the Kuwaiti people who have fallen victim to aggression.

The public reaction to this statement is varied. Some of the population may feel a certain sympathy for this action because people really feel solidarity with the victim of Iraq's aggresion. But other opinions are also being expressed. For instance, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the republic has stressed that the statement was made for propaganda aims in order to attract world public attention to Estonia.

As for the head of "Kaitseliit," Kalle Eller, it "suits him well" to display militancy. The Tartu newspaper 'EDASI' reports that the war minister of the government of the Estonian Republic in Exile Juri Toomepuu—a former "Green Beret" and veteran of the United States Korean and Vietnam wars—has allegedy promoted Eller to the rank of colonel. The more so, as Kalle has an army: The ranks of "Kaitseliit" already number 4,000.

Estonia Seeking To Force Russians Out

PM1209081990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report under the "Day's News" rubric: "People Without a Future. Why Are Russians Superfluous in Estonia?"]

[Text] Tallinn, 10 Sep—Political life in Estonia nowadays is distinguished by sensationalism. First the government presents the republic's inhabitants with a surprise in the form of an upcoming increase in the prices of basic foodstuffs, then assault detachments of the militarized "Kaitseliit" organization hold large-scale exercises involving the capture of Russian territory, and then one of the republic's leaders publishes his report "Estonia's Prospects," which makes a Russian's blood run cold.

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet session is portrayed as a struggle between reforming democrats and dark forces which might prevent the conclusion of treaties between Estonia and Russia. People are worried not only about the nature of the agreements but also about their points defining the position of the Russians who for various reasons find themselves on the soil of this Baltic republic. Former Russians are expecting their rights to be protected, while the other side is calculating when the "migrants" and "occupiers" will take themselves off to their Tver, Novgorod, or Pskov villages, and is apportioning expenditure and income.

Tension always has grounds, and it is not groundless in this matter either. The situation in Estonia in the very near future is forecast as follows: After the conclusion of agreements with Russia, Estonia officially announces its categorical refusal to sign the Union treaty, while at the end of the first half of October Estonia's committee [not further identified] declares full independence and noninvolvement with the USSR.

If you examine the escalation of tension through the prism of the forecast events of the near future then the persecution of Communists being carried out throughout the republic will also become understandable. The press is actively discussing the legitimacy of formulating the question as follows: "The only good Communist is a dead one."

Russians are the least welcome in Estonia. More and more often they are being called a fifth column. However, the attaching of labels is not the end of the matter. It is not hard to see this for yourself if you read attentively A. Ruutel's report in Helsinki at a session of the Paasikivi Society. He does not bypass the Russian question in it. The speaker does not doubt that at first there will be many "USSR citizens living in Estonia." However, in Ruutel's opinion their participation in elections of supreme state organs is absolutely ruled out. Estonia's prospects do not provide for a future for Russians. Their path heads east, with minimal compensation.

Estonia does not hide its desire to fleece Russia. The press has already carried a report on a demand for payment of huge compensation "for the period of Soviet occupation."

Estonian Miners' Statement Threatens Strike

LD1109162690 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1400 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Estonian miners and power engineers have sent a statement to the government of the Republic of Estonia, the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry, and the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, demanding a priority wage level for the workers in these branches of industry, a change in the draft income tax, and a halt to increases in food prices and the prices of basic commodities. A reply was called for by 10 September.

According to (Valdimir Pankratov), chairman of the united workers' committee of the Eesti Polevkivi [Estonian oil-shale] production association, no specific reply was received. There was, however, a shift for the better, even though this was late. This should have taken place in summer, when the miners were visited by the republican minister of industry and energy, and an agreement was reached to set up a commission whose work would be aimed at improving the lives of miners and power engineers.

The government was told that a warning strike has been planned for 18 September. On 13 September a discussion will be held on whether this is opportune.

Estonia People's Front Border Activities Viewed

PM1109112590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 First Edition p 5

[Report by Colonel A. Yurkin: "What's Behind the Incident? Assault Detachments Instead of Dialogue"]

[Text] The events on the Estonian-RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] border are the main topic of republic newpaper articles and radio and television broadcasts. Amidst the discordant choir of commentaries, interviews, and analytical articles you become clearly aware of an attempt to reduce it all to the independent action of detachments of Kaitseliit—the profascist organization which stained its hands with blood in nationalist acts in prewar and postwar years. With the accession to power of the Estonian People's Front [EPF] Kaitseliit has gotten a second wind. The organization has become legal and is now essentially the EPF's "strike force." Initially announced as a people's organization to combat crime, it now forms the backbone of Estonia's future armed forces and discharges security functions throughout the territory of the republic while carrying out measures of a nationalist and separatist bent.

The border incident was assessed by Kaitseliit leader Kalle Eller as follows:

"The expanded staff exercises 'State Border-90' have been held. The aim of the exercises was to rehearse the operation of the command and control system and familiarize subunit leaders with the sectors of their operations on the border."

In Kalle Eller's opinion, the basic aim of the exercise was achieved: The detachments are ready to quickly take up duty on the Estonian border. However, as the head of the EPF's strike forces complains, in Pskov Oblast the local militia put up resistance to crack Kaitseliit detachments and only reconnaissance scouts managed to visit a number of designated points. It should be added that both scouts and assault detachments operated on RSFSR territory within Leningrad and Pskov Oblasts. They set up border markers and barriers along the line of the old border of the bourgeois republic period. These actions have made Russians indignant.

The republic government's stance has been made known. While regarding the Kaitseliit action as an attempt to put pressure on the Supreme Soviet and government of Estonia, the republic leaders, who are overwhelmingly representatives of the EPF, consider that "it is necessary to establish control at the border." But border issues must be resolved not by strong-arm methods but at the negotiation table only. These thoughts are without any doubt both healthy and constructive, but the question automatically arises: Who, then, sent Kaitseliit strike detachments onto Russian territory, and why? Who needed the reconnaissance and tactical exercise of this 40,000-strong legalized nationalist military organization?

Estonian minister Raivo Vare acknowledges that Kaitseliit's actions were unsanctioned and were carried out, in his opinion, in a conspiratorial way. It turns out that the republic government is not only not in control of the situation but does not know the situation or does not wish to know the situation and is closing its eyes to the extremists' actions. Now, when the incident on the border has become public, the EPF leaders are not averse to disowning their offspring. Some people are already saying that Kaitseliit has not been registered as as a republic organization and is recognized in only a few rayons. And yet its detachments did commit unlawful and provocative acts on the border. Only the self-control and restraint of Russians helped avoid bloodshed. However, you get the impression that the republic is more worried by something else: How the talks with the Moscow and Leningrad City Soviets and the Russian parliament will fare now. The territorial claims are now evident and all the EPF's words about friendship and mutual respect appear hypocritical, to say the least. Will this be appreciated by the people's deputies of the capital, the glorious city on the Neva, and Russia, who have, instead of dialogue, been issued a challenge by the detachments of former henchmen of the fascists and nationalists whose bloody crimes have still not been forgotten in Pskov, Leningrad, and Novgorod Oblasts and Belorussia? Today Kaitseliit carries out a large-scale exercise on the border with Russia—but what about tomorrow?

Estonian Delegation Meets With Union Officials

PM1209090990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Correspondents on Events in the Country": "Discussion Held"]

[Text] On 8 September R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities; N.N.

Gritsenko, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; and V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received the following representatives of the Interregional Council of Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] People's Deputies and Working People at their request: USSR People's Deputy Ye.V. Kogan, Estonian SSR People's Deputies V.N. Lebedev, V.S. Malkovskiy, and S.G. Petinov, and others.

During the meeting the delegation members set out the council's position on carrying out consultations with the Estonian Supreme Soviet delegation and expressed their readiness to present their proposals on questions regarding a new Union treaty.

Estonian Parties Become Social Democratic Party

LD1009142190 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1700 GMT 8 Sep 90

[Excerpts] One of the main events today—at least in Estonian political life—was the congress which took place in Tallinn to unite Estonian social democratic parties. It took place in the Trade Union Building, and in the course of its work we succeeded in talking to Rein Veidemann [deputy chairman of the Social-Democratic Independence Party].

[Begin recording] [Interviewer] Who is merging?

[Veidemann] The Estonian Social-Democratic Independence Party, the Estonian Democratic Labor Party, the Russian Democratic Party of Estonia, and the Socialist Association, whose membership is outside the country. Members of the association will come along with us but the association as a whole will remain independent. [passage omitted]

[Interviewer] So what will be the name of the new party?

[Veidemann] Evidently the name of the new party will be the Estonian Democratic Party, and that way we would have restored the classic tradition of Estonian social democracy; we will be back to the origins of the Estonian social democratic movement. [passage omitted] [end recording]

We have just received some news from the congress hall: Marju Lauristin was elected as chairman of the Estonian Social Democratic Party, with Ulo Laanoja and Boris Voronov as deputy chairmen and (Andres Mandre) as chief secretary. A board of 13 persons was also elected.

Latvian Representative to Moscow Appointed

90UN2771B Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian No 31, 14 Aug 90 p 2

[Unattributed article: "The Eastern Policy—a New Level"]

[Text] Moscow—The government of the Republic of Latvia has approved the status of a permanent representative of Latvia in Moscow. Janis Peters has been appointed the new permanent representative.

At present the headquarters of the mission has 102 people, including technical and service personnel. There are plans to conduct certification of employees for professional suitability in two months.

On 7 August there was a meeting at the permanent mission of Latvia between Janis Peters and the leadership of the Moscow Society of Latvian Culture and representatives of Moscow's Latvian society.

Peters talked about new trends in the operation of the permanent mission. Of prime importance are economic ties with other regions of the Soviet Union. He noted the great significance of the eastern policy. The permanent representative considers maintenance of ties with Latvians living in the Soviet Union necessary. For all these years they have received no support from Latvia. Before World War II there were about 300,000 of them in Moscow. Their number declined steadily both as a result of emigration to Latvia and as a result of assimilation. According to Peters, it is time to address the needs of Latvians in Moscow.

The Society of Latvian Culture was formed in May 1989 and comprises more than 200 people. A Sunday Latvian language school operates under the auspices of the society. About 70 people cooperate closely with the People's Front of Latvia in Moscow. Previously, the permanent mission granted these organizations its offices on an irregular basis. Just recently a room in the permanent mission was allotted for them.

The new ambassador has begun to form a library for the permanent mission. In his work in Moscow he intends to rely on personal ties with the Moscow intelligentsia.

Janis Peters, who is a member of Latvia's delegation to the negotiations with Moscow, noted very successful results in the first round of negotiations. When asked whether the issue of restoring the borders of Latvia in accordance with the 1920 peace treaty was examined, he said that the decision was made not to broach that issue.

Troops Protest Social Conditions in Latvia

PM1109155790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Report from Riga by correspondent Colonel M. Ziyeminsh under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Why Military Men Attended a Rally"]

[Text] The Latvian parliament has convened after the summer recess in a tense sociopolitical and economic situation.

A. Gorbunov, chairman of the republic supreme soviet, deemed it necessary to stress this alarming and distressing "feature of the moment" in the parliamentarians' work when opening the second session. You can find confirmation of these words without special effort. In the morning several dozen pickets assembled outside the parliament. Their banners read, for example: "Inhabitants of Latvia, unite in the struggle against the revival of Red fascism.," "Deputies, do not forget that Latvia is still occupied," "Ivan, go home"... By the way, the phrase "Red fascism" is increasingly current in street demonstrations.

On the same day another political act—a protest rally—was held on Cathedral Square, a few hundred meters from the parliament building. Its organizers were the Committee for the Defense of Citizens' Rights and the USSR and and Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitutions, the United Council of Labor Collectives, Interfront, and the United Committee of War and Armed Forces Veterans and Internationalist Servicemen.

A large group of officers and members of their families figured among several thousand participants in the political protest rally. There have been several cases in the republic now of local authorities blatantly infringing servicemen's rights. Colonels V. Alksnis and A. Kolbinov, Captain Second Rank V. Smirnov, and Reserve Major General S. Marinkevich spoke from the rostrum. A. Gorbunov, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, was also obliged to acknowledge the acuteness of the issue. He formulated his standpoint in a letter to the participants in protest action. "The situation is indeed such," he says in the letter, "that military men and their families have become one of the most socially unprotected groups in the population. One can, of course, blame local authorities for this. But that will not solve the problems."

And they cannot be solved, in the writer's words, because "orders are issued exclusively at the center, while the Army's social needs are the responsibility of local organs of power, and innocent people suffer as a result." The parliamentary chairman's conclusion on this score is as follows: "We will discuss these problems once again very soon at a separate meeting with the military community. I will continue to insist that the Army's status in Latvia during the transition period should be determined by talks between Latvia and the USSR."

Judging by these words, the specific needs of servicemen and the members of their families are still far from being solved. It is no secret therefore that a society of homeless reserve officers has now been formed in Riga. And its representatives include people who have been waiting for accommodation in Riga since as far back as 1984.

Debate on Latvian Citizenship Previewed

LD1009135190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1047 GMT 10 Sep 90

[By TASS Correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga, 10 Sep (TASS)—"A tough, even dangerously tough debate lies ahead." This is how one of the Latvian deputies defined the character of the forthcoming discussions of the law on citizenship. The draft of the document, which is intended for adoption at the autumn session, has only just been distributed to the republic's parliamentarians.

The toughest stance, by their own estimation, is that taken by the Citizens' Committees. They recognize citizen status only for those who lived in Latvia before 1940, and for their descendants. Only this category of individuals is permitted to take part in elections to the Sejm. The remaining residents, and that is almost one half of the population, about 1.25 million people, may register as candidates for citizenship. The appropriate commissions in each rayon will determine the degree of a candidate's loyalty to Latvian independence and the level of knowledge of the language, history, and culture of the republic.

The objections of their opponents can be briefly summarized as follows: This stance will increase political instability within society and lower Latvia's prestige in the international arena.

A second concept has gained the name "the zero option." Like the first, it too has supporters within the People's Front. In their opinion, generally acknowledged democratic norms must be observed: At the moment at which the law is adopted everyone must be in the same position. This is also insisted upon by the "Equal Rights" [Ravnopraviye] faction which puts forward a further condition, that Union and republican citizenship be combined.

What is the reason for this third concept? When Latvian independence is restored there will be many people outside the Soviet Union and loss of Soviet citizenship would mean for them the loss of their link with their homeland. It is for precisely this reason, the members of "Equal Rights" believe, many Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and people of other nationalities will not agree to become citizens of Latvia rather than [the Soviet Union] because they are opposed to its sovereignty.

So, the debate is already underway. On its outcome depends whether or not the democratic world community will accept Latvia as it would like and whether nationalist upheaval or civil consensus await it.

RSFSR

Russian Deputies Approve Shatalin Economic Plan

LD1109112290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1030 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Report by commentator Aleksandr Ruvinskiy]

[Excerpt] What I have to say will be a continuation, in essence, of what is going on at the moment at the USSR Supreme Soviet session. The deputies of our Russian parliament have been working very intensively today, and the main result of this work, I can inform our listeners, is that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has approved the outline of the program drafted under the guidance of Shatalin and Yavlinskiy, the 500-day program intended for reviving and stabilizing the republic's economy. The resolution also adopted plans for publication of this program so that it can be studied everywhere, locally. Instruction is also given for the republic's government to work out specific measures for the implementation of the program.

It has to be said that one issue repeatedly raised at today's session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet was that the question of resignation of the government headed by Ryzhkov should be put to the USSR Supreme Soviet. In addition, in order for the program which has been approved should be carried out and implemented successfully, and all the decrees that hamper Russia's sovereignty must be abolished. It has been decided to return to this issue at one of the forthcoming sessions, which could take place in a day or two. [passage omitted]

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Debates Market Issues

PM1109133590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Hope Pinned on Market"]

[Text] The deterioration in the life of the republic's population—the catastrophic shortage of food and goods, the fantastic lines outside stores—has given rise to profound anxiety among the people's deputies, who discussed the concept of economic reform on 10 September. They subjected it to a thorough analysis at the first sittings of the Soviet of the Republic and the Soviet of Nationalities held in the building of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] House of Soviets.

The deputies' speeches at the Soviet of the Republic sitting were similar—only the market can save the situation. From these positions they approached a discussion of the concept of economic reform. V.A. Agafonov, chairman of the committee for the countryside's social development, agrarian questions, and food, began its critical consideration.

Speeches were delivered in the same analytic key by S.V. Stepashin from the committee for the affairs of invalids, war and labor veterans and the social protection of servicemen and their families; by Yu.M. Voronin, chairman of the commission for the budget, plans, taxes, and prices; by M.L. Zakharov, chairman of the commission for social policy, and others.

G.I. Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, informed the deputies of the progress of discussion of the program of economic reform and answered dozens of the deputies' questions.

The participants in the sitting of the republic's Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities actively joined in the discussion of the concept of the transition to the market launched by G.A. Yavlinskiy, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

The participants in the sitting elected V.G. Syrovatko deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the republic's Supreme Soviet. D.A. Volkogonov was relieved of this post at his personal request.

TASS Reviews Market Economy Conference

LD0809143690 Moscow TASS in English 1427 GMT 8 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 8 TASS—A conference to discuss a programme for the transition to a market, which was drafted by the working group headed by Academician Stanislav Shatalin, was held here on Friday.

The group was formed by the joint decision of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian Boris Yeltsin.

The conference was opened by Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev. Speakers included members of Russian parliamentary committees, Russian Government and managers of many enterprises.

They discussed problems that can rise on the way to a market. Proposals were made to solve the pivotal issues of the transition to a market economy.

The conference supported the main provisions of the programme. A statement by the conference will be published soon.

Participants included more than a thousand people, among them USSR and Russian Federation people's deputies, managers of industrial associations, heads of building and transport organisations, enterprises in the non-state sector of the economy, several regional and municipal governing councils and their executive bodies, ministries and agencies.

They represented almost all autonomous republics, territories and regions and over 200 cities in the Russian Federation.

Yeltsin on '500 Days' Program, Supreme Soviet

AU1109153590 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Sep 90 p 7

[Interview with Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by NOVOSTI journalist Feliks Alekseyev in Moscow on 3 September: "Great Concern"]

[Text] The second session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has begun in Moscow. Following the first day of the session, Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, gave an interview to NOVOSTI commentator Feliks Alekseyev.

[Alekseyev] What do you think will happen at the session?

[Yeltsin] The session will probably last more than two months. The agenda contains 65 points that were submitted by deputies.

Discussion of the program for stabilizing the economy and the transition to market relations is the most important issue. However, I would like to stress that we will be examining a program whose scope extends to the entire country and not just Russia. The program was drawn up by a group headed by Academician Stanislav Shatalin.

It has to be acknowledged that it is interesting and that it is markedly different from the program that was proposed by the government. If the Russian Supreme Soviet approves the program—once, of course, certain adjustments have been made to it—I would like to obtain parliament's consent to sign economic agreements with republics, and this should pave the way to the realization of the program.

These economic agreements are important, because they will provide for the establishment of a new network of mutual ties, which can bring the republics together today. In my opinion, a nationwide treaty will not be signed quickly, because too many problems are surfacing and the drafts of such a treaty that the republics are putting forward differ from each other too much.

However, economic agreements are something that everyone is in agreement on, even the Baltic republics, with the exception of Estonia. If the 14 republics and President Mikhail Gorbachev sign economic agreements, this will provide a strong impetus to the realization of the "500 days" program. We would like the implementation of the program to begin once the republican supreme soviets have adopted decisions, that is, on 1 October.

[Alekseyev] You made a statement that indicated to deputies that you intend to stand above party divisions. Do you intend to adhere firmly to this position?

[Yeltsin] That is why I made a statement on leaving the CPSU at the 28th Congress. Some people might think that I left the party's ranks in order to found a party of my own, but I have no intentions of that kind whatsoever. I simply believe that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet should not belong to any party. He has no right to realize the decisions of any one party and to defend the interests of any one group. That should be prohibited. It is my duty to act in the interest of Russia as a whole.

[Alekseyev] You have just returned from a tour of the republic. You saw what the situation in the republic is like, and you must have felt the mounting tension. Is it, nevertheless, believed that the "500 day" program can be realized?

[Yeltsin] My tour lasted 23 days. I visited 27 towns. About 300,000 people took part in the meetings that I had. I have to admit that I returned with a feeling of great concern. The situation in the republic really is very difficult; the further you are from Moscow, the worse it is.

At the moment, the Russians believe in the republic's new leadership; I received a lot of words of support during the meetings. This imposes a enormous responsibility, but it also arouses concern, because 500 days is not all that long for a program of this kind. After all, not only does the economic stabilization program have to be realized, but the Russian people's standard of living also has to begin to rise. Nevertheless, I believe that the program is a realistic one. Were that not the case, it would not be worth trying to realize it.

[Alekseyev] Are you sure that the president of the USSR will support the program?

[Yeltsin] That will emerge during the course of discussion. I hope and I would very much like the president to understand that it is the only realistic program at the present time. It takes account of the interests of all the republics, and its realization will begin with the adoption of legislation by the republics themselves and not by the center. That is very important.

Yeltsin Interviewed During July Trip to Latvia

On Election as President

90UN2728A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 3 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[First of two installments of interview with RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin by Aleksandr Olbik on 24 July in Riga: "I Believe in a Russian Miracle!"—first five paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] **I wanted very much not to bother a person who has been working hard for two months (the first congress and the session of the people's deputies of Russia) and who, in addition to this, has recently had an operation on his spine. But it could not be avoided: The readers were literally tormenting the editors—how is it, they said, that Yeltsin has been in Jurmala for several days now and the newspaper has said nothing about it? So I reluctantly had to get over the awkwardness and ask the honored guest to see me. The more so since (although this is not a justification for us) it has already become a tradition to get an interview from Boris Yeltsin: The first was dated August 1988, the second was on the eve of the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the third conversation took place at the end of last year and was published in SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH on 3 and 4 January of this year. I do not know whether it is a coincidence or the hand of fate, but a fact is a fact—this meeting took place exactly two years after the first one. ON THE VERY DAY. Many people are asking what the president of Russia is doing vacationing in Latvia. I can say quite definitely that Boris Nikolayevich, as if testing himself for physical endurance, plays tennis for an hour to an hour and a half, takes a 10 kilometer walk along the shore of the bay almost every day, and swims in the pool. And he also meets with people, gives numerous autographs, and even has his picture taken with fans he does not know. And in general he is not behaving himself in the most "disciplined" way, of course, from the standpoint of his personal guard. And although I have a very vague idea of how he plays tennis, I can tell you that Boris Nikolayevich**

is an excellent pool player. His shots are particularly dangerous when absolutely meticulous technique and calculation are required. While observing his game I automatically thought that the way he plays the game reflects to a large extent the qualities of his character: With all of his natural enthusiasm, he is not tempted by an easy victory and he does not get ahead of himself. And this is why both "his" and "others'" balls achieved their goals when he sank them. Our game of "Amerikanka" ended with a score of eight to four in his favor. But this was just a moment in the life of a person on whose political "shots" the fate not only of Russia but also of the adjacent areas and peoples depends. This is why the political score of one to three (I have in mind the meetings with the heads of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia which took place while Yeltsin was in Jurmala) fully correspond to the aspirations of the peoples—to be sovereign and equal among sovereigns and equals.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, as a resident of Latvia I find it very nice that such an important guest has come to our republic. But I would like to know the extent to which your visit is related to state affairs. Or is this a private trip exclusively for rest?

[Yeltsin] Actually, my ten to 12-day vacation in Latvia is no accident; I intend to work in addition to resting. Why did I choose Latvia in particular? In the first place the Baltic breezes and the wonderful climate of Jurmala, which I have often visited, have a good effect on me. And in general I have many associations with Latvia. As you know, the year 1988 was difficult and in some respects even decisive for me. At that time I had a good rest here and rallied my resources, and it was from here that the news flew throughout the country that Yeltsin was alive and well and had not backed down from the fight with the party bureaucracy.

My coming here is somewhat pragmatic: I wanted to relax and try to get to know Latvia better, to meet with the residents, and on the whole get a clearer picture of the Latvians' attitude toward Russia and the future destiny of our states, including toward our future treaty. Well, and then, of course, I also wanted to get to know the republic leaders better and the chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, personally. Although I know him formally, friendly relations develop more rapidly in an everyday, unofficial situation.

[Olbik] And what are the first results, Boris Nikolayevich?

[Yeltsin] Frankly, reality has surpassed all of my expectations. My meetings in Latvia seem to have brightened the prospects for our further relations. Anatolijs Valeryanovich Gorbunovs is a very interesting conversationalist who has a great range of human qualities. He seemed to me to be a very sensible and far-sighted politician with an optimistic outlook. This is a person with whom one would want to communicate and cooperate fruitfully. In my opinion, everyone would like him....

[Olbik] Did you discuss a treaty between Latvia and Russia?

[Yeltsin] Do you think this is why I am handing out the compliments.... (He laughs). Of course we did, and in principle our views coincide 100 percent. Possibly you recall that I have already said once before that it is most likely that the first such treaty will be concluded with one of the Baltic states. And this will be done without any preliminary conditions. I am speaking about an all-embracing treaty—political, economic, and social, with a section on interethnic relations and, of course, social ties, and so forth. That is, it will be a treaty between two equal sovereign states. And although we have sent letters containing proposals to all 14 republics, one must keep in mind that the first discussion of this subject took place before our official communications.

There was a conversation with the leaders of the three states—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—and we discussed questions of a bilateral treaty with Russia. I am convinced that consultation at this level will contribute to active reduction of tension on the part of the center and tension in general—both outside and within the Baltic states.

[Olbik] And how will that go with the, to put it mildly, not very enraptured attitude of the USSR president toward the Baltic states?

[Yeltsin] One gets the impression that Gorbachev has not thought everything out as well as he should have regarding this. Possibly he is very busy.... It is obvious that he considers the proposal from Russia concerning treaties with the Baltic republics to be the same "creeping" separatism about which so much has been said and written. All right, if you stretch things a great deal you could say that some republic has a tendency toward separatism.... But Russia and—separatism... Excuse me, but even a sick mind cannot digest this. Russia is an absolutely sovereign state with a clear idea of its position and role in the federation. We do not wish to be either elevated or lowered, we want only one thing: a peaceful, mutually advantageous partnership. Why is it so impossible that Russia intends to conclude treaties with the same kinds of sovereign states of the Baltic region? After all, we have almost reached the point of signing a treaty with England and we are conducting negotiations with the United States and Japan. Why can we not do the same thing with our good old neighbors?

[Olbik] And if the president of the country declares a blockade against Latvia what will the president of Russia do?

[Yeltsin] I have a sharply negative attitude about an economic blockade and I have already written and spoken to Gorbachev about this. With respect to Lithuania this was a large political mistake. For there was no such blockade against Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or the GDR. And that is correct. But against our own—there is a blockade.... If a people is already striving for independence, force will not restrain them. And the more pressure there is from the authorities, the stronger the resistance from the people will be. In Russia we have an analogous situation developing with certain autonomous republics. But we will act not with pressure and threats but through negotiations, having given unconditional agreement to the sovereignty of the autonomous entity. Let the republic itself decide within what limits it can actually exercise its independence.

[Olbik] Please tell me what stage the treaty about which we are speaking is at.

[Yeltsin] Working groups—with equal numbers of members—have now been created and they are working on the structure and content of each point of this treaty. For example, the section on interethnic relations reflects the desire of Latvia and Russia for a peaceful, moderate approach to problems of residency and migration of the nonindigenous population of our states. There must not be any confusion in this regard.

[Olbik] As you have stated previously, the bilateral treaty must be concluded within three months....

[Yeltsin] No, now we think that this treaty must be ratified sooner than that—in a month or a month and a half. This in itself, it seems to me, will reduce the tension in this region.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, the very word "treaty" conjures up such concepts as mutual advantage, independent partnership, and equal rights in the realization of the letter and the spirit of the treaty. But here is what bothers me personally: Russia is a rich country, and from its storehouses it can give Latvia (or any other state) invaluable raw material "nourishment." But what can Latvia give Russia?

[Yeltsin] You understand that with normal relations and not enslaving treaties even the poorest country can be an irreplaceable partner in interstate relations. And, after all, Latvia (and the Baltic region in general) is by no means an underdeveloped province but a state with highly developed industry. With a traditionally high culture, which in our day is more valuable than gold, and with a rich scientific and technical potential. And to this you must also add tourism, recreation, your light industry, radio technical branch, batching items, and so forth. And all this is of high quality. You have a highly developed agroindustrial complex, and in the future I think that Russia will be able to reduce the tension in the sale of surplus food products in Latvia. This will undoubtedly happen if dynamic market relations prevail. So there are quite a few interests uniting our countries. We do not want to assume the position of any kind of philanthropists—no, we want to be equals. I suggest that our treaty relations be set up in two stages. But so far we are not speaking about world prices for raw material or equipment, and everything will become clear only when we sit down to the negotiating table. And I am sure that this will follow from the preliminary meetings with the leaders of the Latvian republic—we shall find a mutually acceptable, viable variant in the relations between our states.

[Olbik] The Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council met on 20 July in Moscow, but neither you nor your current partners in the negotiations on "one-plus-three" were there. Why was this?

[Yeltsin] Before I left for Jurmala, Gorbachev called me and asked me to come to the council. I responded that I wanted to take advantage of the document he had just signed concerning the vacation of the chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet. Of course, he knew about the forthcoming meeting with the heads of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, which obviously did not fit very well into the president's program.

(On 26 July the LETA telegraph agency reported: "M. Gorbachev sharply criticized the leaders of the Baltic states who, in spite of his personal invitation, did not appear at the meeting of the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council which was held on 20 July in Moscow."—A.O.)

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, I wish to return to the First Congress of People's Deputies of Russia and ask you about certain things related to this event. For example, why was the party apparatus so openly against your nomination? Incidentally, the question is a rhetorical one.... Why did the party apparatus not draw any conclusions about its tactics against you which they applied so crudely and unsuccessfully during the period of the elections for USSR people's deputies and after it?

[Yeltsin] Several hours before the election of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Russia Gorbachev gathered together 250 Communists and people's deputies and began to encourage them to use any means to prevent Yeltsin's election. At that time I thought: What actually does "any means" mean? Might they remove me physically? Use any means to prevent the election of Yeltsin.... And having given this order he set out for Canada. And the next day I was elected chairman of the Supreme Soviet. So my opponents remained true to themselves: They did everything they could through their clumsy actions to "contribute" to my nomination. After this kind of wonderful advertising I could not help but beat Polozkov....

[Olbik] As I recall, even after he was in Canada, Mikhail Sergeyevich allowed himself to make several jabs at you.... This was probably in lieu of congratulations.

[Yeltsin] This, of course, is unworthy of the president. But in principle I understand it: He was taking my election very hard. Apparently he did not expect this outcome. He did not think that it was even possible.

[Olbik] But let us give Gorbachev his due—throughout all of your entry into the political scene he always gave you "kind patronage." And even in the elections he did not try to openly block you. Including by using the "lateral exchange" of Polozkov and Vlasov. In any case this is the impression that was created....

[Yeltsin] I have no doubt that the scenario of the elections was developed and approved by the president himself. It is just that the people who played the roles turned out to be a bit weak.

[Olbik] It turns out that the "generals" of the apparatus were so weak that there was no one to oppose you except for the figures who were mentioned.

[Yeltsin] It is not even that. The fear gave rise to panic and chaotic movements. They understood quite well that if Yeltsin got into power he would begin with what I actually did begin with: sovereignty, separation of management functions, depoliticization, and so forth. Previously their major sore spot was Lithuania and the Baltic region as a whole, but now they had a headache from Russia in addition. Now Yeltsin and Russia are terrible pains in their sides and there is nothing they can do about it. You cannot block Russia, it could do the blocking itself.... But it will never do that.

[Olbik] And did Mikhail Gorbachev ever congratulate you?

[Yeltsin] To his credit, he tried to rectify the blunder. For it was not a matter of the person of Yeltsin; it was a matter of the state he represents. If he had up and flown for one day from Canada and come to the Great Kremlin Palace where more than 1,000 Russian deputies had gathered and declared from the podium: I congratulate your newly elected president of the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and so forth... That would have been the act of a great man. That would have been a tribute of respect to Russia. That would have been a tangible step toward reconciliation. And that would undoubtedly have contributed to increasing his authority. But, unfortunately, his scheme did not go that far.... Then, of course, he did congratulate me on the election.

All right, all this is external. After the elections when I was asked about my attitude toward Gorbachev I always answered: I will take the first step to meet him halfway and I will be the first to extend my hand. After the Federal Soviet while almost all of its members were still in their places I went up to Mikhail Sergeyevich and in everyone's hearing said: In order for us to work on the basis of dialogue and cooperate on the basis of principles and in no case to the detriment of the interests and sovereignty of Russia, I extend my hand to you. I renounce everything personal and negative that has gone between us.... Gorbachev stood up and gave me his hand. "I agree," he said, and we shook hands.

On Withdrawal From CPSU

90UN2728B Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 4 Aug 90 pp 1, 3

[Second of two installments of interview with RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin by Aleksandr Olbik on 24 July in Riga: "I Believe in the Russian Miracle!"]

[Text] [Olbik] Is this "armistice" still in effect?

[Yeltsin] There has been no confrontation. True, my withdrawal from the party was, I think, like a splash of cold water on him [Gorbachev]. After all, he was already celebrating a victory at the party congress (referring to the 28th congress—A.O.) when suddenly there was this "trick" from Yeltsin.

[Olbik] But I, on the contrary, could hear exultation in Gorbachev's voice: After all, with the withdrawal from the party of the "troublemaker" Yeltsin, things would be calmer for the general secretary as well....

[Yeltsin] No, I think this was simply a game. He would never resort to petty ruses like that.

[Olbik] But your withdrawal from the party could cause a "mutiny" in the camp of the conservatives, including the conservatives in the Supreme Soviet of Russia. You took a step which could have truly catastrophic consequences for you.

[Yeltsin] You are absolutely right; there was a risk and a fairly large one. I was indeed bothered most about whether or not I would lose the confidence of the deputies of the Supreme Soviet and the congress. For my majority in the parliament hung in an easily destroyed balance and therefore I really did not know how the deputies would feel about my statement at the 28th party congress. No, I knew how the democrats would feel about it, but I was worried about the "lobbyists." Incidentally, a certain prevalence of conservative deputies of the Russian Supreme Soviet did not keep it from adopting a number of hard decisions which I would say are fateful for Russia. I think the First Congress of People's Deputies of Russia was much more effective and radical than all three congresses of the USSR.

On 12 July I announced my withdrawal from the party and on 13 July I was to have conducted a meeting of the Supreme Soviet. That was a moment that cannot be described with words.... I thought that this day would be lost for me and for the deputies in general. It was a terrible strain on my nerves. But then I entered the hall and there was...applause! I was even confused; I did not expect such a greeting. And everything that in general I had not hoped to carry out on that day, it all worked.

[Olbik] But did you really not prepare your deputies for this turn of events beforehand? I have in mind your withdrawal from the party?

[Yeltsin] What are you saying, Aleksandr Stepanovich! It is another matter that for three nights before that I did not sleep at all. I could not stop thinking. I had colossal doubts, but I could do nothing else. After all, I have always said that a one-party monopoly is harmful to society, that it should be placed under the control of the legislative powers.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, when did you arrive at the decision to leave the ranks of the CPSU? Was it at that October (1987) plenum that was so fateful for you?

[Yeltsin] No, I do not associate that with the October plenum. It is another matter that already at that time I began to understand that the CPSU was bringing up the rear and that there was no way the party could restructure itself and move from the rear guard to the vanguard. And yet it continued as before to state that it was playing a leading role. And this was already pointless and incorrect. It was similar to deception. In essence the party was incapable of changing structurally and organizationally, and, consequently, nothing truly innovative, which is always inherent in anything really revolutionary, could be generated there. But the main thing was that one felt that the party was morally impeded. Society was rushing forward, but the party was binding it hand and foot. But at the same time it was acting as though it was moving forward with the speed of a tropical cyclone.

[Olbik] Everything you have said has been excellently illustrated by past party congresses. Incidentally, were you a delegate at these forums?

[Yeltsin] The Sverdlovsk party organization sent me to the party conference as an alternate. But the status of a conference lasted only one day since the next day it was already the constituent congress of Communists of Russia. But why did it have to be done in that particular way? The delegates were authorized to work at a conference but certainly not at a constituent congress, which has altogether different tasks. Therefore I was at the party conference as a delegate for only one day and then I decided that I did not have the right to represent the Sverdlovsk residents at the unexpectedly formed constituent congress. At the conference it was necessary to create an organizational bureau, to discuss everything, to return to our various places, and begin elections for the congress. And not be in so much of a hurry.

[Olbik] Tell me, Boris Nikolayevich, was your withdrawal from the CPSU not a tragedy for you?

[Yeltsin] That is a somewhat simplistic view; it was not all that simple. But I thought that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet could not serve two masters—the people in the form of the parliamentarians, and the party, whose interests most frequently did not coincide with those of the people. The chairman must be an absolutely independent person in order to work only in the interests of the voters. The example that comes to mind is that of foreign presidents who represent the interests of one party or another. The fact is that any one party and not just one particular party is monopolistic. Abroad, in democratic countries, there is a struggle for influence, and the person who in the eyes of the people is fairer, more intelligent, and more active is the one who comes out on top. But in our country presidents have been placed in office—Brezhnev, Podgornyy... Whose interests were they defending? Those of the people who put them in office, of course. The people had no purpose there and nobody asked them their opinion. And so far the CPSU has renounced power only de jure while de facto it is still at the helm. And this is the way it will be for a long time until the new parties gain strength.

And therefore all discussions of a multiparty system are more a sign of the times than an accomplished fact. Tell me what party besides the CPSU could influence the Army, the KGB, or the management structures. The party monopoly remains and, unfortunately, it will remain for more than another year or two.... True, this will depend on how quickly the processes take place in the party itself. In any case, the past congresses have not given us any hope of this. So there has been no general reconstruction of the party edifice. Some things, of course, have been plastered over and erased. But we still have that same democratic centralism—that immobile something that cannot be reformed. I wish to emphasize once again: I must carry out the will not of the party and not of Polozkov, but only the will-mandate of my constituents, of all the people! And that is all! And this is the overriding principle in the actions of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

You ask if my withdrawal from the party was a tragedy for me. I had been in it for about 30 years and had entered it out of conviction, at a time when with Stalin's death a certain thaw had begun. The mood was romantically high: I understood that the role of the party and its all-powerful functioning had led the people astray. And this is perhaps what determined my decision. No, it was not a tragedy but rather a liberation from a false "religion."

[Olbik] Excuse me, but are you the only party member, that is, former party member, in your family?

[Yeltsin] Our family is politicized. The first to decide to take this step was my son-in-law, Valeriy. My other son-in-law, Lesha, was recently accepted as a candidate for the CPSU. True, when he was accepted he expressed his disagreement with the existing situation in the party. I do not know whether he will go beyond being a candidate.... My wife is still thinking about it, and she is right to do so because this step must be taken independently.

[Olbik] Quite recently they wanted to send you to the political morgue but they did not succeed.... You are probably convinced that the people can do a great deal today. But what can the people not do yet?

[Yeltsin] So far they do not get enough to eat, or receive what they have earned, and they are not the real masters of the land and the means of production. We are faced with an immense amount of work in the area of radical political and economic reforms. Time does not stand still and this is perhaps why we will not engage in a game of "catching up."

[Olbik] Society is more or less familiar with your pre-election program. But there are still doubts that you are an economist or that you are capable of raising the decrepit Russian national economy.

[Yeltsin] Tell me, was Reagan an economist? And where did they get the concept "Reaganomics"? It is not a matter of my education but rather of how I accumulate everything new and different and how I arm myself with this. To be honest, I have delved fairly deeply into economics. In general there is something to discuss here.

There is a group for developing alternative economic programs. They are very radical, interesting, and in a certain sense we might call them modernistic. The Union government has rejected many of them, preferring known constructs over innovation. We have decided to include one of them in our Russian program. The newspapers have already written about a 500-day transition to economic reform. Stage by stage and without lowering the standard of living. I have met with this group and was convinced of the powerful intellects they have recruited. Basically they are talented young scholars who have studied world experience in economic transformations—in the United States, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and other countries. True, there is one shortcoming or, rather, peculiarity in this program: It must be implemented with a single monetary unit. Therefore we have decided upon a certain adjustment with respect to Russia. We appointed one of the members of this group, Grigoriy Alekseyevich Yavlinskiy, as a first deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers and made him responsible for this reform. He has the cards in his hand.

For the time being we do not intend to introduce our own monetary unit on the territory of Russia. And therefore a couple of days ago (from Jurmala) I sent a written request to M.S. Gorbachev to begin the program with Russia—according to its program. And on the basis of the concept of the Russian program we could prepare the Union program, for which we would have to select a group of innovative economists with high intelligence.

The president and I have approved these instructions. Preparations begin on 1 September of this year.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, do you believe in the Russian miracle? Not the past, Brezhnevian understanding of it but the modern one.

[Yeltsin] Very much! And I believe in it because I can feel that the people are starting to believe. ... But I have not reached an agreement about the structures in our Supreme Soviet that will handle the development of radical solutions to economic problems. I have in mind the higher economic council that has been created. But there is another social structure which does prognostication between the spheres of the higher economic council, the Supreme Soviet of Russia, and its chairman. This is a very promising organization with a wide range of intellectual research. And hence its name—the coordination-consultation council, which traces the consequences of any decision that is adopted. We would not like to repeat the mistakes made when the economic policy was placed in the hands of just one person or one group of people. For instance, Abalkin. He is a very intelligent and knowledgeable person but he alone sets the tone. And one of his mistakes is multiplied by all of the country's population, so there are 280 million mistakes.

The coordination-consultative council should have a total of only 25 specialists in various areas and several compatriots who live abroad who have already offered Russia their services.

[Olbik] Including Leontyev?

[Yeltsin] Leontyev and Bunich, Yuriy Alekseyevich Ryzhov, Yelyanov, Zaslavskaya, Shatalin, Soros, Shmelev, Nit, Medvedev, and a number of industrial economists.

[Olbik] So it will take Russia 500 days to roll painlessly into a market economy in 1991. But is there at this time any concrete solution directed toward improving the economy of Rus?

[Yeltsin] Here in Jurmala I just signed an address to the citizens of Russia entitled Harvest-90 and approved a document of the RSFSR Council of Ministers directed toward increasing the material incentives for everyone involved in the storage and processing of Harvest-90. The essence of this decision is simple: Workers who have overfulfilled the plan (not including products they know will not reach the consumer) will receive special checks which give them the right to acquire goods that are in high demand.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, let us return to the discussion of the work of the Supreme Soviet of Russia which, although it is somewhat conservative, has nonetheless adopted a number of decisions of a democratic stripe. How do you manage to find a consensus with both the "right" and "left" wings?

[Yeltsin] At the congress we registered literally all the deputy groups and they are equal before the parliament. Incidentally, the USSR Supreme Soviet has still not registered an interregional deputy group.... Almost every evening after the meeting I had to register with some group. The discussion, as a rule, was candid, without pointless arguing, which obviously made things easier. Within two or three hours such discussions led to a situation where 80 percent of the deputies who previously did not agree with me begin to think the same. And they all see that I am not sitting with my hands folded but work 20 hours a day, that is, I can work even though I am not in the opposition.

[Olbik] Do you not feel a certain let-down now that your traditional opponent, Yegor Ligachev, has left the political arena?

[Yeltsin] In my opinion, the times have judged us. This "true Leninist" has departed from the realities of life even more than his party has. The party simply did not need him and sent him into retirement. Incidentally, there is no need to judge him harshly—time itself has put everything in its place....

[Olbik] Will Russia have its own KGB and will the disgraced Kalugin not aim to be its leader? Did you have a discussion with him?

[Yeltsin] I did not discuss this with him. Several candidates have already been discussed and so far only one has been made public. Major Lopatin, a USSR people's deputy who is now unknown in the country, will most likely be appointed deputy chairman of the new committee for public security. The committee will have quite different functions from those the KGB had. And the main one is the protection of the interests of the individual and his civil rights. Excuse me, but this will not be a "fiscal" organ but a protective one. KGB subdivisions on the territory of Russia will be subordinate only to the Supreme Soviet of Russia through the Russian committee for public safety.

The bank has been taken out from under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers in exactly the same way. This is an unusual thing for our country. It too will be out of the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers so that the latter will not be tempted to print money that is not backed by goods. Bank functions will include monitoring the monetary flows. We also have our own Finance Ministry now and its minister will be 32 years old. And in general the average age of the members of the Russian Council of Ministers is 47 years.

[Olbik] In any revolutionary situation the last word is always with the working class. At the first congress of miners it was announced that as of that time the CPSU was doing more to impede transformations than to contribute to them. What kinds of relations do you have with the miners and the working class in general?

[Yeltsin] I have already had meetings with miners of Vorkuta, the Kuzbass, and Donetsk. And we have found a common language. On 11 July they were preparing to conduct a political strike and someone from the Union government thought that I would talk them out of it. I decided not to do this. For the miners a strike is an important act in the fight for their rights. This was the way they expressed their lack of confidence in the Union government because of the fact that it had ignored the demands of the miners. The USSR Council of Ministers Decree No. 608 was actually thrown out—none of its points were fulfilled. The only thing I could ask them was not to prolong the strike and thus avoid destabilization in the country. Then I addressed the miners on television. And they did what they had promised: They held rallies and parades which took only a couple of hours. The Russian government, expecting nothing from the center, is doing everything it can to ease the lot of the miners.

In their resolution the miners expressed confidence to the Russian government, which shows a mutual understanding which is so necessary for both sides.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, under what circumstances would you retire?

[Yeltsin] If the people do not give me their trust and if we have not fulfilled our program in three years. For me this is the last landmark in life. But I am an optimist.

[Olbik] Boris Nikolayevich, the collective of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH conveys to you its friendly greetings and hopes that we will have further contact in spite of how busy you are....

[Yeltsin] I think and talk about this newspaper with a great deal of sympathy. For actually I am in constant contact with MOLODEZHKA. This is one of the newspapers which along with JURMALA supported me during my most difficult times. And this includes you personally, for which I am sincerely grateful. And, of course, when traveling through Latvia I wanted the republic leadership to hear what I think of SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH. And then I actually did have a conversation about it with Anatolijs Gorbunovs. His opinion was clear: The newspaper SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH is one of the most objective in the republic. Therefore it is not surprising that when my acquaintances in Moscow learned I had gone to Latvia they asked me to help them to subscribe to SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH.

I wish to take advantage of this occasion to have you pass along to the courageous collective of the editorial staff that they must continue to fight for real glasnost, for independence of the press, for justice, and in general for freedom and human rights. And my best wishes to the newspaper's editor, Aleksandr Blinov, as well.

And I should also like to say a word of thanks to the Latvian children's fund which published my book.

[Olbik] Thank you for the dialogue and accept my most sincere wishes for the success of your future work in the post of president of Russia.

RSFSR Poll on Leaders, Republic Ties, Market

90UN2718A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 34, 25-31 Aug 90 p 3

[Results of sociological study conducted in RSFSR by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion]

[Text] At the initiative of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Committee on the Mass Media, Ties With Social Organizations, and the Study of Public Opinion, a sociological study was conducted in July of this year by the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion in which 1,489 individuals participated residing in 21 population centers of ten regions of the RSFSR.

Do you support the highest-level RSFSR leaders whom the RSFSR people's deputies have placed at the head of the republic?

	B.N. Yeltsin	I.S. Silayev
Yes	85%	43%
No	10%	16%
Hard to say	5%	41%

To what extent is the elected RSFSR Supreme Soviet prepared to conduct professional parliamentary activity?

To an adequate degree	20%
Not to an adequate degree	38%
Hard to say	42%

Do you approve of the prohibition, adopted by the First RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, on joint holding of a position of head of a state organ of power and a leading position in a political party or social organization?

Yes	60%
No	20%
Hard to say	20%

In what form should relations between the RSFSR and autonomies joining it be structured?

They should stay the same	19%
Economic and political rights should be broadened	47%
Autonomies should receive economic and political independence (up to the right of secession from the RSFSR)	27%
Hard to say	7%

How do you relate to the fact that in the next year or two our country will have shifted from a planned to a market economy?

Very positively	21%
Somewhat positively	29%
Somewhat negatively	20%
Completely negatively	20%
Hard to say	10%

How do you relate to the possibility of the sale of parcels of land in the RSFSR for private ownership?

Positively	61%
Negatively	25%
Hard to say	14%

Russian Constitution To Be Ready by Mid-October

PM0509154590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Plenary Sitting of the RSFSR Constitutional Commission"]

[Text] The second plenary sitting of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Constitutional Commission was held on 31 August. The following people took part in its work: 67 members of the Constitutional Commission, RSFSR and USSR people's deputies, and experts.

The plenary sitting was devoted to discussing the structure and principles of the new Russian Federation Constitution and also the mechanisms of its adoption.

The sitting was chaired by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the Constitutional Commission and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The first part of the sitting heard a report by the commission's working group set up on the instructions of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman and consisting of 31 deputies and eight invited experts.

A report on the work done in the last two months and on the special features of the new constitution was delivered by O.G. Rumyantsev, secretary of the Constitutional Commission and RSFSR people's deputy.

Reports on the work of subcommissions and their proposals for the main sections of the new constitution were delivered by the following coordinators:

—RSFSR People's Deputy Ye.A. Ambartsumov, on behalf of the subcommission "General Principles of the Constitutional Structure of the Russian Federation";

—RSFSR People's Deputy S.A. Kovalev, on behalf of the subcomission "Human and Civil Rights";

—RSFSR People's Deputy F.V. Shelov-Kovedyayev, on behalf of the subcommission "National-State and Territorial Structure and the New Union Treaty";

—RSFSR People's Deputy L.B. Volkov and RSFSR People's Deputy V.L. Sheynis, on behalf of the subcommission "The Electoral System, Supreme Bodies of State Authority, and Local Self-Government";

—RSFSR People's Deputy B.A. Zolotukhin, on behalf of

—RSFSR People's Deputy P.A. Medvedev, on behalf of the subcommission "The Economic System and Social Guarantees."

A broad discussion developed, in which the following took part: RSFSR People's Deputies R.I. Pimenov, Yu.A. Ryzhov, Yu.M. Slobodkin, V.M. Kuznetsov, A.Ye. Shabad, and P.S. Filippov; USSR People's Deputy A.M. Obolenskiy; and experts V.D. Zorkin and V.A. Kikot.

The material presented by the working group was very highly appraised on the whole, although alternative opinions were expressed both on general principles of the constitution and on individual draft sections.

The second part of the sitting provided a meaningful debate on the problem of the mechanism for adopting the constitution, including the organization of a referendum on its basic principles. The following spoke on this question: RSFSR People's Deputies S.M. Shakhray, V.P. Lukin, O.G. Rumyantsev, V.B. Isakov, S.N. Baburin, M.M. Kiselev, V.L. Sheynis, L.B. Volkov, V.I. Tuykov, Yu.Ya. Dmitriyev, V.N. Podoprigora, A.I. Ryabov, V.N. Lyubimov, S.N. Andropov, and P.A. Medvedev; and experts B.A. Strashun and B.P. Kurashvili.

B.N. Yeltsin summed up the results of the discussion. He stressed that the enormous amount of work done by the RSFSR Constitutional Commission subcommissions, working group, and group of experts deserves recognition and support. Despite the different opinions on the proposed principles, an interesting basis for the future constitution is taking shape.

The work must be continued on the basis of the observations made. It is proposed to complete the basic draft of the new Russian Federation Constitution by the middle of October. At the same time, an in-depth version of the new constitution's principles must be prepared for discussion at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

We must be ready, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman said, to hold a referendum and, for this purpose, continue to study the procedure for a referendum on constitutional matters.

The commission approved the proposal of the secretariat and working group on announcing a public competition for the best draft of the new RSFSR Constitution and on publishing the organ of the Constitutional Commission—the periodical bulletin KONSTITUTSIONNYY VESTNIK.

A pilot sociological poll of the commission's members on questions concerning the constitutional process was held during the sitting.

The next plenary sitting of the Constitutional Commission is planned for the end of September.

RSFSR Constitution Principles Examined

PM0409132990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 2 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by RSFSR People's Deputy Oleg Rumyantsev: "Fifth and Last?"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] The RSFSR has tried out four Fundamental Laws over 73 years. New Russia needs a fundamentally new constitution. Oleg Rumyantsev, RSFSR people's deputy and secretary of the Constitutional Commission, describes its basic principles.

People often say: "Flames are raging all around us, and there you are, fussing over your constitution...." But history testifies: Befitting and stable documents have at times emerged from heated and political acute situations. For example—a very long time ago, in 1789 in the United States; or quite recently—in 1978 in Spain.

One absolute condition for the adoption of a new constitution is that the country's return to the open world and the international community should be accompanied by the restoration of civic peace within the country itself.

A good constitution can and must become a means for attaining national and social accord leading to the consolidation of civic peace. The constitution can be described as ready and **mature** [sozrevshyaya] when consensus emerges around its future text.

It is assumed that the new constitution will be aimed at achieving five fundamental goals: civic peace (in other words national and social accord); freedom of the individual; political stability and freedom of choice; prosperity and economic growth; performance by the state of its duties to individuals and society.

The constitution will certainly differ substantially from its predecessors. Let me mention just a few of its most important specific features:

The constitution must become a legal document in the strictly juridical sense, a base for the state's entire legislation. It should provide a basis for drawing judicial conclusions on the constitutionality or otherwise of various deeds, in other words the constitution's norms will have a direct effect and will become mandatory guidelines for courts and state organs.

The new constitution's text will be de-ideologized and will not contain any ideological directives or alluring and emotional promises. The constitution will cease to be a document establishing a given ideology as official state ideology. In the process of creating the new constitution, we are abandoning the adherence to a given teaching's dogmas. A legal document should not express ideas substantiating the desires of certain political forces.

The constitution of a democratic rule-of-law state should not give directives regarding the nature of the system, the "social formation," and so on. The definition of a system's nature is not the constitution's task, it is a political question to be decided in the course of natural political and parliamentary life. It is unlawful to use word collocations like "socialist democracy," "democratic socialism," "socialist legality," and other attributive constructions, in view of the fact that they totally lack legal definition.

Our system should be neither "socialist" nor "capitalist"; it should be **constitutional**.

A constitution consolidates the principle of the social state by defining the social commitments of the state which **is bound** to try and provide citizens with conditions for relative and universal prosperity.

A constitution becomes social not by simply making frequent use of the word "socialism", but by successfully guaranteeing the values of freedom, justice and solidarity, equal opportunities and equality before the law, by the extent to which the bulk of society perceives and accepts these values as constitutional—in other words as correct and meriting respect and observance.

Finally, a constitution must be stable. Soviet Russia has had experience of four Constitutions over 73 years. This is better than the Dominican Republic which has had 31 Constitutions in the period between 1844 and 1966; but it is obviously worse than the United States, whose national Constitution was first adopted in 1787 and is still in force today. In order to achieve this, a constitution must protect itself by offering a complex mechanism for the passing of amendments.

The path to a new constitution could cover several stages: preparation of the constitution's basic principles; holding the first republic-wide referendum on these principles; holding special elections for members of a Constitutional Convention (Constitutional Assembly). If elections were to be organized on the basis of large electoral districts—one Assembly member per 1 million voters—then the Russian Federation's people will elect 100-120 of their most respected plenipotentiary representatives. It is perfectly possible that a subsequent ratification of the adopted document by the Federation's subjects might become necessary—with a view to obtaining yet another opportunity to ponder the question of voluntary participation in the life of a **single** state.

Signs in favor of the election of a Constitutional Convention or a Constitutional Assembly can be seen in the people's reviving self-awareness and the awakening of interest in Russia's past and its statehood; this is also a signpost along the parliamentary and legal path for the revolution's development.

Isakov's Views on Union Treaty Countered

90UN2671C Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Aug 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Professor E. Volodin, doctor of philosophical sciences: "And What Comes After Sovereignty?—Why We Cannot Agree With Certain Arguments of the Author of the Article 'What Kind of Union Treaty Should We Have?'"]

[Text] Sovereignty. In German: souveranitat; in French: souverainete. The complete independence of a state from other states in its internal affairs and external relations. National sovereignty—the aggregate of rights of a nation (people) to freedom of choice of social and political system, to territorial integrity, economic independence, etc. (Foreign Words Dictionary).

Consultations have begun in the USSR Supreme Soviet on the question of sovereignty and the future structure of the USSR. The question is such an important and essential one that its resolution will determine the future of the country and the destiny of each one of us. I therefore believe it is necessary to express my point of view on this most pressing issue.

First of all it is necessary to define what sovereignty it is we are talking about. If we are referring to the sovereignty of the USSR as a unified state, then it possesses this to date with respect to states contiguous to it and the remainder of world states (although it is quite apparent that not entirely contiguous countries of Europe, and countries across the ocean in particular, already influence the external policy and internal processes of the country using political, economic, and propagandistic means).

If we are referring to the Union republics, then the issue on sovereignty may be phrased as follows: complete independence of Union republics in external and internal matters means cessation of the existence of the USSR, and this today is a two-sided process. On the one hand the Baltic republics, for example, realizing the economic weakness of Russia as a donor over many years, are themselves terminating their presence in the Union. On the other hand the central leadership is itself, through a number of measures including the consultations that have begun, accelerating the disintegration of the country in the name of a new Union treaty. What happens then?

Judging from the statements of V.B. Isakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Republic of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, an interview with whom was published in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 11 August of this year, each republic will enter into the new Union in conformance with its own particular conditions. Such a consolidation has existed historically in the form of a confederation or quarrelsome empire of the Austro-Hungarian type, or the association of German principalities, graphically illustrating their instability and inability to function. In point of fact, everything is presently taking shape in such a way that the Baltic region does not wish to turn down any rights whatsoever, Moldova is decaying in the same direction, and chaos in the Transcaucasus is putting into doubt the very existence of law in this region of the Union state. Under these conditions, the transfer of certain rights to the center directly constitutes an indulgence to nationalists in the Union republics to continue to bring the country down under the pretext of their struggle with "Soviet imperialism," and limitation of sovereignty in fact serves as a basis for providing radical democrats freedom of action in the as yet Union republics through continuation of encroachment on the rights of Russia. B.N. Yeltsin develops this principle entirely consistently, if you judge from his interview published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA TATARIYA. Without dwelling on bilateral relations with the Union republics in the treatise of the current chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, I will point out the proposal for the autonomies in Russia to choose forms and levels of independence. In this manner, the destiny of the confederation is already set for Russia, and one can only marvel at how simply problems are resolved whose history spans centuries, which have a national complexion, and are replete with economic significance.

But let us return to the consultative meeting of working groups of the USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet, which was one of the steps along the path to realization of sovereignty, as the modern creators of the future confederation interpret it. Here they did not reckon with the history of Russia. They took an accounting of time from May 1990, using as a baseline the 1918-1920 treaties foisted on a Russia that was bleeding profusely. They brushed aside the thousand-year experience of Russian statehood, thereby turning the idea of sovereignty into a principle of all-permissiveness with respect to history, law, national traditions, etc. And, it must be stated, they proceeded not entirely correctly, to put it mildly. It is easier to brush aside history in words than in state structuring. If sovereignty is extended to autonomous formations, then they must review not the administrative-territorial divisions of Russia **after** the revolution, but the treaty relations of **prerevolutionary** Russia with state or ethnic formations which entered into its composition over the course of many centuries. This is a fair viewpoint for all the peoples of Russia, but it immediately puts into doubt treaty relations of the Union republics of the—again I stress—**postrevolutionary** period. There cannot be two sets of books kept with respect to state law—otherwise someone will receive privileges and someone else will be encroached upon. And this is the objective basis for interethnic and interstate conflicts. V.B. Isakov is mistaken therefore in thinking that delicacy will somehow be of assistance here. And if we want to get to the point, then in the name of protecting the interests of the Russian people, or showing delicacy in this regard, if not now then in the next five-year plan, the question must be resolved of the legal succession of today's interstate and interethnic relations based on the administrative-territorial division of prerevolutionary Russia, in order to defuse the time bomb which was set by the arbitrary legislation of 1918-20, 1922, and 1940.

For us, however, the problem of Russia's sovereignty is important. What this comprises is evident from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolution "On the Establishment of Free Enterprise Zones" dated 14 July 1990, in which Leningrad, Vyborg, Maritime Kray, and Kaliningrad, Sakhalinsk, and Chita Oblasts are declared as such. Not half a word is said about sovereignty—yet justification for the resolution is found in the specifics of regional development and the transition to a market economy. There will be further occasion to return to the market economy, but let us now talk about the aspect of specifics.... But every region, every city has its own peculiarity. How could it be otherwise? It is quite simple. Citing the resolution: "The RSFSR Council of Ministers will generalize the proposals of local soviets of people's deputies **of other regions** (my boldfacing—E.V) for the establishment of free enterprise zones **in their territory** (my boldfacing—E.V.) and submit them to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for examination." End quote. And, truly, there is no need to go further. Russia is being sold at retail and wholesale. Territorial integrity, a unified economic market, communality of national life, economic independence—everything is for sale. Everything is permissible—sovereignty is at hand. If we address the substance of the matter, the resolution on free enterprise zones comprises a direct, long-term act eliminating the economic—and therefore the political—sovereignty of Russia; it is the foundation of its dismemberment—and not even in national-territorial fashion, but in an economic way. And the experience of poorly developed countries shows that in territories of so-called "free enterprise," governmental jurisdiction is either cut down to a minimum or neglected, or laws come into force that are advantageous and convenient for market managers. I ask: Haven't we heard enough speeches "in the name of all the people" for such a dismemberment of Russia and its conversion into a conglomerate of "free zones"?

But let us continue the economic problem. Not long ago the "500 days" plan for stabilizing the economy became known. The plan itself is a separate issue, but the round figure is very mindful of five-year plans, building communism by the year 1980, accomplishment of the Food Program by 1990, and a program for providing housing for the population by the year 2000. What interests me in the 500 days is the following: In the interval between 100 and 250 it is promised to legalize private property, repeal state subsidies, and sell unfinished construction to potential buyers, including foreigners. I am seriously disturbed at the prospect of who will buy the giant vehicle complex in Yelabuga, who will become manager of the "Volga-Chogray" project, and how these proprietors will react to the moves of environmental protection advocates. According to my conjecture, there are two buyers—the home-grown shadow economy and foreign capital. There is no need to think about any other possible buyers from among the workers and peasants. These two forces will determine the economic development of the country. Then the question again arises with respect to economic sovereignty of Russia and its people—let someone prove that the introduction of transnational corporations into the country's economic life will not influence political decisions and, consequently, will not encroach upon the independence of the country and its people. On the other hand, we may note clearly and unambiguously where we are headed with such sovereignty. If we draw logical conclusions from the argument of V.B. Isakov on the right of each kray, oblast, and autonomy to manage property, taxes, and foreign economic activity, then we are headed straight—not to capitalism, of course—but to that form of feudalism which used to be called appanage ownership in Russia, and in the West expressed itself in the famous formula "the vassal of my vassal is not my vassal." Also a form of sovereignty, after all; and what a form!

We must not fail to address the problem of sovereignty regarding the Union republics—or what are for the time being Union republics. Economics takes priority here too. The 70 billion rubles [R] which comes out of Russia's budget and goes to the Union republics will not be put so easily into the pocket, and will not be taken so readily from the others. Having obtained the right to handle this money, the Russian Federation, it would seem, should immediately resolve its internal economic and social problems. Nothing of the sort. After maligning the Russian people for several years, Baltic and Transcaucasian nationalists suddenly started sending welcome telegrams and speaking at the Russian Congress of Deputies, calling for direct cooperation and direct political dialogue with the RSFSR. Adopting laws encroaching upon the rights of Russians and "the Russian-speaking population" in their regions, the nationalists suddenly started talking about friendly ties of long ago with Russia. Where does such dissembling and hypocrisy come from? The answer is simple—previously the center appropriated 70 billion in subsidies to the Union republics, and now the nationalists and Russophobes want Russia herself to provide this subsidy. Enjoying proclaimed sovereignty, so to speak. Judging from the history of gasoline trade between the city on the Neva and the Baltic, of the direct economic ties between this legendary city and the nationalistic leadership of the Baltic region, subsidies will continue and nationalism will be triumphantly confirmed on the shores of the Baltic Sea and beyond the walls of the Caucasus. Otherwise it will again be necessary to chop off pieces of territory from Russia. They have waved off the tragedy of Russians and "the Russian-speaking population;" they have responded with pronouncements and declarations to the condition of the Russian countryside. On the other hand, enjoying sovereignty, they have now begun, without intermediaries, to use the R70 billion for prior aims and new political games. And again I ask—can scorn for the fate of our brother Russians in the Union republics, can new forms of plundering Russia be justified merely by the fact that such activity is supported by a shaky balance of forces within the Russian Congress of People's Deputies?

I have devoted attention to the economic aspects of sovereignty. Now is the time to address the military-political problems. The truth of the matter today is that the sovereignty of the country and political stability of the world are being preserved thanks to the presence of nuclear missile parity. Alteration of this would immediately lead to an undermining of political equilibrium in the world, a fact understood by all realistic political experts. What is in store for us in this sphere through the acquisition of sovereignty? The problem is so crucial that I am compelled to cite a lengthy quotation: "Potentially far-reaching changes in the national security policy of the Russian Republic were enumerated by one of Yeltsin's chief assistants. Oleg Rumyantsev, secretary of the commission headed by Yeltsin which is drawing up the new Russian constitution, declared in Washington that a new national security ministry will be instituted in the republic this month, which 'will exercise control over Army and KGB activity in the territory of Russia.' He informed editors of THE WASHINGTON POST that one of the important topics in negotiations with Soviet authorities will be **questions concerning the production and deployment of nuclear weapons, stating that Russia will strive to declare itself a nonnuclear zone,** to which end it will exert political pressure, where necessary." (my boldfacing—E.V.) (ZA RUBEZHOM, No. 31, p. 3). If everything stated in the quotation corresponds to actuality, then I must draw the only possible conclusion—sovereignty and Russia overall will be done with from the moment establishment on its territory of a "nonnuclear zone" begins. No Strategic Defense Initiative program whatsoever will be necessary. It will be possible to dictate to Russia—or, forgive me, the aggregate of "free economic zones"—any political, economic, or ideological demands. Again I raise the question—can there be such a balance of forces at the Congress of People's Deputies to finish with Russia as a great power, as a country with a centuries-old history, an original culture, a majestic spiritual record?

But the military aspect of the problem is not limited to this. Judging from the interview with V.B. Isakov, there is also discussion of the question of distribution of nuclear potential in the republic. I am not even referring to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Our legislators are presently treating any treaty the same way. Prior to May 1990 there was nothing—after May there will be everything. We have to rack our brains over other things. For example, what if a portion of nuclear potential is transferred to the Transcaucasus or Central Asia? This would be only just and democratic in accordance with the new concepts of sovereignty and the Union treaty. But it would be better still to present this problem for universal popular discussion. Or to a United Nations session.

Only now, it seems to me, can the question of sovereignty be presented in another plane. Being freed from the dictate of the center, to what territorial, political, and economic independence are Russia's current leaders and legislators taking her? Can it be that the freedom achieved through the suffering of the peoples of Russia will become the basis for destruction of Russian statehood and further plundering of the country by Mafioso capital of our own and foreign origin? I do not think everything will go as smoothly as theoreticians, politicians, and practical experts believe. And indeed, they themselves are not very certain of the tacit consent of the people regarding the actions and projects here described. It is precisely for this reason, in my view, that neither the USSR Supreme Soviet nor the RSFSR Supreme Soviet are contemplating the Law on Referendum, the only means through which consent will be obtained for the destruction of Russian statehood, the sale of its property, and the right to determine the destiny of tens of millions of people.

But as long as the people still refrain from asking, and their fate is decided by the balance of forces at the

RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, it is natural to suppose also that the reaction of the people will be incommensurate with the plans of political-economic development proposed for them. Today, under conditions of the temporarily maintained balance of political forces within the country, the consciousness of people and public conscience can still be successfully manipulated. With the legalization of private property, or more appropriately—of a criminal "shadow economy," and the appearance of the first millions of unemployed in Russia, a polarization of political forces will begin on a scale that no adherents of the marathon run to developed feudalism will have gauged or calculated.

We might assume though that there is some kind of plan on hand in the event of political-economic destabilization. I remember that some people at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies confused the concepts of "sovereignty" [suverenitet] and "sovereign-ness" [suverennost]. Well, suffice it to consult that same dictionary of foreign words and see: "sovereign [suverennyy] (Fr: souverain)—exercising supreme power (cf. sovereign [suveren]); sovereign [suveren]—the bearer of supreme power."

In one set of circumstances—an emperor, in another—a leader, in a third—a dictator.

Incidentally, such a sovereign can be in the form of a Russian committee for public security, with the rights of the Committee of Public Safety of the times of the French Revolution. But this is material for another article.

Stolyarov Interviewed on RSFSR Party Post

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[Interview with N. Stolyarov, chairman of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Control Commission, by Yu. Nikolayev; place and date not given: "Both Exactingness and Sensitivity"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] As already report in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, Nikolay Sergeyevich Stolyarov, senior lecturer at the Yu.A. Gagarin Air Force Academy, has been elected chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Control Commission. Our correspondent met with him and asked him to answer a number of questions.

[Nikolayev] First of all, Nikolay Sergeyevich, I would like to know your opinion of the Founding RSFSR Communist Party Congress, which has just ended, and particularly of its second and final stage....

[Stolyarov] It is well known that right from the start reactions to our congress were extremely mixed. Clearly, there will also be critics of its concluding part. But I would like to draw attention to the substantial difference between the first and second stages of the congress. Remember: At our first sessions representatives of the Democratic Platform and of other currents were greeted almost at daggers drawn. At any rate, there was no dialogue. There was confrontation according to the either-or principle... Then the 28th CPSU Congress brought some conciliation into relations and a more amicable attitude emerged. This process was further developed during the second stage of our Founding Congress. I do not think I will be wrong if I say that we delegates learned to hear and listen to each other. And the congress platform was given to representatives of all platforms and currents existing within the RSFSR Communist Party. Incidentally, we learned to reach consensus even during the preparations for the second stage of the congress, we brought a common document to the congress...

[Nikolayev] But the action program for Russian Communists proposed by the preparatory committee aroused a real barrage of criticism...

[Stolyarov] It is certainly a long way from perfect, it contains many bottlenecks and rhetorical assurances. So there are plenty of grounds for criticism. It is something else that I am sorry about—many people unfortunately failed to notice its positive aspects.

[Nikolayev] What do you mean?

[Stolyarov] Well, first, basically and essentially the document concretizes the 28th CPSU Congress Program Statement. Although, why conceal the fact, there are also certain divergences from it, especially with regard to socioeconomic aspects.

The second point: The program submitted to the congress contains alternative versions of a number of fundamental positions. For some reason the critics make no mention of these. But it would certainly be of more practical use to compare all the proposed versions and to determine what tallies and to what extent with the guidelines of the 28th CPSU Congress, and in what respects we now need to go further, necessarily taking into account the Russian Communist Party's specific operating conditions.

Of course, the most attentive attitude must be shown toward each remark. For instance, the Russian Communists' action program cannot be allowed to be antimarket in nature. The market must be approached with understanding. It is the course that our government, legislative organs, and organs of people's power are elaborating. I think that they must be supported in this regard.

Russia's future—and this is the main thing in the Russian Communist Party's actions—will be largely determined by how united both the Communists and the organs of people's power are in their actions. This must be taken into account without fail when finalizing the program document.

[Nikolayev] But let us agree that at the congress the talk was not only of finalizing the action program, but of totally rejecting it. For instance, so far as quite a large group of Moscow delegates was concerned.

[Stolyarov] I had to hear various comments on the Moscow delegates' behavior, up to and including charges that some of them harbor political ambitions, lay claim to exclusivity, and so forth. I would not be so stern in assessing the activity of party comrades. After all, we are speaking of pluralism and freedom of opinions and assessments. The Moscow Communists have their own opinion—they are entitled to express it, and no one should accuse them of grave sins over this. We must abandon this harmful habit rooted in our consciousness.

I will repeat: I recognize the Moscow Communists' right to their own opinion, although I do not share it. And here is why. Yes, I would like to have a better program, more specific, more optimal in its effectiveness, more consonant with the guidelines of the 28th CPSU Congress. But we have got what we have got. And, as is well known, the best is the enemy of the good. So are we not making a mistake in our desire to do better for the party as a whole. The essence of that mistake is as follows. The situation in the country is alarming. I recently returned from the Kuzbass, I talked with miners and representatives of the intelligentsia and tried to find out why an unhealthy tendency toward departure from the CPSU and toward the withdrawal of party committees from enterprises has begun to emerge there. Surely it is clear that certain forces are thereby trying to exclude the CPSU from the political system and political life in the country. This is what we should think about today above all. The Moscow Communists believe that the program is half-baked—that is correct. Let us try to get it through to people more rapidly, rather than drown in verbiage. Let us think for a moment: If we rejected and jettisoned the draft action program, would this help to stabilize the situation in the party? That is the question.

All the other critics of the program presumably acted from the best of motives. But good intentions alone are not enough in politics. You also need good will, a sense of reality, and the ability to foresee and forecast. Forecasting is a bottleneck in our country—the situation in the immediate future and the long term. And we must all eliminate this bottleneck together.

[Nikolayev] So far as I could see, your speech at the congress was greeted with great interest. But how did you greet the proposal to fill the post of chairman of the Central Control Commission?

[Stolyarov] It came as a total surprise to me. When my name was read out, my first reaction was: What should I do? As I walked through the audience I thought about this. And from all sides there were requests "not to withdraw your candidacy." This determined what happened next. When I reached the platform I had come to a decision to try my fortune...

[Nikolayev] But, so far as I am aware, you have never before dealt with control questions. What about party work?

[Stolyarov] In my department I was in the party bureau for 10 years, two of them as secretary. But that is probably the full extent of my experience. But now is the time for bold decisions. I view experience with respect, but there is also a need for new approaches. I hope that my life stance, my moral, philosophical, and political stance, which emerged not in the silence of the study but in the course of active political life (last year, for instance, I ran for USSR people's deputy), will enable me to cope with the new duties.

[Nikolayev] How do you see those duties? How do you envision the work of the commission you head?

[Stolyarov] I have had scarcely any time to consider political strategy and tactics in the work of such a responsible organ as the RSFSR Communist Party Central Control Commission. There is still much that I have to think, and think, and think about. But I have begun by studying the history of the party's control organs. This provided plenty of food for thought. For instance, I saw with horror how their functions were gradually narrowed and simplified. And, most importantly, they were reduced mainly to investigating, punishing, monitoring, and so forth. But control is not an end in itself but merely a means, one of the most important management functions, but not the only one.

In the light of my historical analysis—as yet preliminary and by no means complete—and my present situation and world outlook and looking to the future, I would say this: The 28th party congress adopted a statute on the CPSU Central Control Commission which recreates many lost Leninist norms of party life. There is now a real opportunity to return to the Leninist understanding of party control.

I also see something else. Even the documents adopted by recent congresses are not repositories of ultimate truth. Both statutes demand that the Central Control Commission monitor the fulfillment of program documents and the CPSU Statutes. But how is it possible to monitor the fulfillment of a program, say? On the basis of what criteria and parameters can monitoring be carried out here, and who should do it? And is it possible to confine oneself merely to monitoring? I would make one very important and essential addition to the statute approved by the 28th CPSU Congress: "The Central Control Commission carries out monitoring and provides assistance—I stress, provides assistance—in fulfilling program demands and the CPSU Statutes." There are a great many control workers in our country. Everyone wants to control. But before you can control, it is necessary to do something. Therefore we must help primary party organizations and party committees as much as possible...

I will return to the thought I expressed from the congress platform when I thanked delegates for the trust they had shown in me. The Central Control Commission, it is my firm conviction, can and must become a faculty of party ethics and party comradeship and principledness. I think that this must be so. Will we be strong enough? That is the question.

[Nikolayev] Nikolay Sergeyevich! Please tell us a bit about yourself...

[Stolyarov] I was born in Belorussia and grew up in a large working family. My father was a worker, my mother a peasant, and there were five children, of whom I am the eldest. At the age of 16 I went to work alongside my father as a concrete worker on the railroad. At the same time I studied at evening classes in the city of Rechitsa in Gomel Oblast, and after I graduated I entered a military school. Then came Army service, the academy, postgraduate study... I have two children. My daughter is a mathematics student at Moscow State University. My son is in 11th grade...

[Nikolayev] How do your children view your political activity stemming from your direct participation in the Russian Communist Party?

[Stolyarov] My daughter, naturally, like all young people of her age, is rather skeptical about the party. She watches and considers what is what. My son gravitates more toward his father's deeds and in general, I think, may follow in my footsteps in the long term. But my wife is more concerned than anyone for me, of course. She trained as a mathematician, but is pragmatic in character. So my home has its own control commission, a very keen and strict one. It will not miss even the slightest hypocrisy in behavior. I think this too will help me in my work.

Democratic Party's Kasparov on 'Anticommunism'

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[Interview with Garri Kasparov, a leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, by Yuriy Mityunov; place and date not given: "Interview on the Subject of Anticommunism"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] What was most interesting about and most characteristic of the Constituent Conference of the Democratic Party of Russia was, it seems to me, the elaboration of a Russian idea of anticommunism. Not the elaboration as yet, rather, but an approach toward it: a first fitting; the first attempts at antitotalitarian thinking and the self-perception of the free personality. Thus the exaggerated emphasis on "anti," and the rejection of communism by Bolshevik methods or those very close to them. Nonetheless, an event of immense importance took place: the formation of the first anticommunist party in Russia. It was on this subject that I conducted an interview on the final day of the conference with a leader of the Democratic Party of Russia.

[Mityunov] I shall begin with a question which is surely of interest to many people: Why has Garri Kasparov, number one among professional chess players, suddenly become involved in politics? Become involved, as far as may be judged from the course of the Constituent Conference of the Democratic Party of Russia, not unsuccessfully, nonetheless, the question remains: Why?

[Kasparov] The answer is difficult. From the professional standpoint it is madness: in the year of the world championships, when chess players restrict their activity to the utmost, becoming involved in what takes up a heap of effort and time seems simply foolish.

But those who have observed the events of the last two years in the country closely, particularly in the south, and those who were in Baku this January are making many decisions guided not by common sense but a certain animal instinct. And this instinct suggests that the time is not far off when the whole country will become one big Baku.

Conflicts are reaching a boiling point at which no compromises could be possible. The election of the chairman in the Russian Parliament is indicative in this connection: A stalemate has emerged no longer between an apparatchik and Yeltsin, the representative of the people, but between a bloc of apparatchiks and reactionaries, to whom the representative of the people has counterposed himself.

Let us take the soviets. The executive structures are paralyzed and are slipping from the control of the old authorities, and a tendency toward the use in place of them of the Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the KGB is being observed. Clearly, given the growth of public disturbances, the deterioration of life in the country and the bitterness that exists among the population and the lack of prospects, a confrontation is inevitable. And there is no need to say what this confrontation could develop into in Russia.

The Transcaucasus republics are on the verge of secession from the USSR and are being kept in merely by troops, a real civil war is underway in the south of the country, and the same war is going on in one way or another in cold form in the Baltic area. The Ukraine is in a very uneasy state. This same process is starting in the Russian republics. If we let slip the moment when it is still possible to rectify some things, beat back the tension and the wave of hatred, direct the movement into a parliamentary channel, and attempt to rescue it, a clash is inevitable.

I harbor no illusions about our future. We need to save what can still be saved and choose the lesser evil. For this we need a strong party, which will provide some kind of beacon. Only let it not provide clear-cut prescriptions and assurances (who now, when we are incapable of guessing what will happen tomorrow even, let alone in six months time, can provide assurances or prescriptions?). Nonetheless, such a party is needed. And it must base itself on a broad alliance of all democratic forces.

Spending a large part of my time overseas, from where this is all somehow clearer and more comprehensible, I came to recognize the need for the creation of such a party. I am a professional chess player, I am not about to tie my life to politics alone. But today my name, my popularity, and my knowledge are needed by those who are fighting for the democratization of society. After all, an active role in politics has often been performed in Russia by people not directly associated with it.

[Mityunov] If I have understood correctly, the key, in your opinion, to making the social atmosphere more constructive lies in the structuring of an anticommunist spontaneous movement into a political party. How do you view the idea of anticommunism; this was until recently a heretical word, a profanity employed with a variety of black epithets. What is meant by constructive anticommunism from your standpoint?

[Kasparov] Truly, even at our conference this word had a double and even triple meaning. Many of those who called themselves anticommunists in fact confess a Bolshevik philosophy. This communism-anticommunism contrast is in a sense an offspring of totalitarian Bolshevik thinking denying the right to existence of the opposite viewpoint and laying claim to the truth in the last instance. Constructive anticommunism from my standpoint is precisely the rejection of communist ideology itself. It is anti-Bolshevism and the rejection of an ideology which first wishes to destroy everything and then build everything anew. It is a rejection of the ideology of destruction, a rejection of the denial of the other viewpoint. It is this spirit of totalitarian approach which must disappear from our society.

There is a danger that this Bolshevik ideology could spill over onto the streets. In 1917 this was called communism and could now be called anticommunism, whatever the difference, the result would be the same. Changing a plus for a minus does nothing. And if such a thing happens, new pogroms, new killings are inevitable. A people with a poisoned consciousness would have nothing to lose, and it would be difficult for authorities with the same poisoned consciousness to refrain from using force. And then a gigantic explosion would be inevitable. The purpose of educational work is to avoid this.

[Mityunov] A result of the debate at the Constituent Conference was the separation of your faction. What goals would you like to achieve as a result of the organizational development of the party and your faction?

[Kasparov] The debate at the conference concerned the question of the deep-seated essence of the party and the democratic counterweights which could prevent it becoming a totalitarian party. It is essential to speak of this because we are living in a country which has all the prerequisites for the creation of totalitarian parties. But granted all the imperfection of the organization that has emerged, the documents of the party are democratic. And combating Bolshevism is easier within it. Our faction consists of people who are afraid of chiefism and who believe that the prerequisites for totalitarianism in the party have not yet disappeared. It is for this reason that it is called the Free Democrats Faction. We intend to champion civil and political liberties and liberties in the economic sphere. We intend to draw up an alternative program, which will go further and dot all the "i's" in the preliminary outlines provided in the provisional documents. We will make the character of the party inimitable to prevent it being confused with other parties.

[Mityunov] In the course of the two-week conference and throughout our interview we, to give a general definition, have spoken about the hope of Russia. What do you see as the hope of Russia today?

[Kasparov] Russia has frequently been a wonder of the world, and I would like to believe that we will now succeed in doing something akin to a miracle.

The times have now come—some call them revolutionary, others, epoch-making—when everything depends literally on each of us. We are capable of changing both our life and the life of many of the people around us, that of the present and the future. If a consciousness of the uniqueness of the present times penetrates people's minds, if they understand that we must not now lose time which cannot subsequently be returned and get rid of the burden of the past, we will have an opportunity. It is in the name of the use of this opportunity that we need to work.

Mayors Appeal To Limit 7 Nov Celebrations

LD1009142590 Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 10 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow September 10 TASS—Heads of the Moscow and Leningrad city councils Gavriil Popov and Anatoliy Sobchak called on city councils of Russia not to hold any political actions to mark the anniversary of the October revolution between November 7 and 8.

They also called on President Mikhail Gorbachev to reduce celebrations to holding a military parade in Moscow on November 7.

Addressing a news conference here today, Popov and Sobchak explained their proposals by a deep crisis in the country.

"Celebrations of state holidays are not timely today," Sobchak said. "The country is deep in crisis and faces, maybe, the most important decisions after the October revolution. Under these conditions, it is very important to switch to a concrete positive work. One of the most important tasks is to prepare our cities for winter."

Popov said holiday celebrations in the current conditions might destabilise the situation. He said the situation, including the economic crisis, difficulties with harvesting, shortages and queues, "is not suitable for festivities."

Kuzbass Workers Urged To Avert Strike

PM1109133390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Viktor Kostyukovskiy under the rubric "Direct Line": "Appeal by Kuzbass Workers Committees' Council"]

[Text] The Kuzbass workers committees' council has made an appeal in connection with the recent increase in the frequency of withdrawal of labor by teams and entire shifts over the lack of tobacco products.

"By making demands for tobacco and bread we will achieve nothing," the appeal says, "and only help those who dream of having an 'iron hand' wielding power. These are the forces that are helping the system to cause the situation to explode."

So far it has been possible to restrain the miners who are refusing to descend to the coal face by saying that tobacco is being rushed in. But for how much longer...? Since last year's strike Kuzbass workers have eschewed material demands. Now they are demanding radical changes in the economy and are making political demands. However, the tobacco shortage has made them revert to the old ultimatums. This is what disturbed the elective aktiv of the workers movement which believes that they must demand not so much cigarettes an the elimination of the causes of all shortages, that is, the administrative-command system. "In placing our trust in the supreme power in Russia we must not allow ourselves to be provoked."

Funeral of Slain Russian Priest Held in Moscow

LD1109212290 Moscow TASS in English 2054 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 12 TASS—A funeral service in memory of a slain Russian Orthoox priest was held at the Sretensky Church in Novaya Derevnya, near Zagorsk in Moscow region, on Tuesday [11 September], the VECHERNAYA MOSKVA evening newspaper said.

Aleksandr Menn, superior of the Stetensky Church, was killed early in the morning last Sunday [9 September].

The liturgy and the mass were conducted by metropolitan Yuvenaliy of Krutitsiy and Kolomna, the head of the Moscow diocese.

On Monday, a rally was held in Novaya Derevnya, at which people expressed their indignation over the crime.

Father Gleb Yaknin, a human rights campaigner and Russian parliamentary deputy, told Soviet television on Tuesday that this was a political assassination. Yakunin plans to make a deputy's interpellation on the investigation of the crime.

Western Republics

Belorussian Military District Continues Exercise

LD1209092190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1440 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Report by correspondent Leonid Tratsevskiy]

[Text] Minsk, 11 Sep (TASS)—The Belorussian Military District troop exercise of units and formations, the aim of which is to work on the control and interaction of troops, is continuing in Belorussia.

The "northern" and "southern" units are ending their concentration in exercise regions without disrupting the republic's normal rhythm. Groups are actively conducting the preparations for forthcoming training battles, aviation and ground reconnaissance of approaching simulated enemies, and maneuvering for favorable initial positions.

"We are conducting the exercise strictly in keeping with the new defense doctrine adopted in the USSR in May 1987," said Lieutenant General Mikhail Kendyukhov, leader of the exercise. "As is known, this doctrine is dedicated to resolving the task, common to all men in terms of significance and content, of not permitting war and of defending the USSR. There are three initial tenets in the doctrine. The first is aimed at maintaining the balance of military forces at the lowest possible level. The second affirms the expediency of reducing military potential to the limit necessary for defense. Third, it establishes the impermissibility of taking military measures to resolve any contentious internatinoal issue under the current circumstances. The scale of troop and weapons reductions being effected in the Soviet Armed Forces, the elimination of medium- and short-range missiles, and the real prospects for reducing other forms of weapons serve as proof of the fact that our defense doctrine really works. If we reduce the forces, those which remain should be fully trained, organized, and ready under any conditions for combat to defend USSR state interest. This is the aim of the exercise in Belorussia.

The exercise is scheduled to last until 15 September.

Moldavia Issues Appeals on Dnestr, Gagauz

Blames 'Soviet Neo-Imperialism'

AU1109153290 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Sep 90 p 4

["Appeal of the Council of the People's Front of Moldova Executive Committee to International Public Opinion, to the Governments and Parliaments of All Countries of the World, and to All International Bodies"]

[Text] The People's Front of Moldova informs you that the Republic of Moldova is threatened with a new dismemberment—after the one that took place in 1940, when, in accordance with the Ribbentrop-Molotov Treaty, Bessarabia and North Bukovina, ancient Romanian lands, were annexed to the USSR—as a result of the attempts of the Gagauz population in the southern part of the country and of the Russian-speaking population on the left bank of the Dnestr River to create a so-called independent republic.

These attempts, initiated and supported by the Soviet neo-imperialism, aim at annihilating the democratic reforms of the republic's parliament and government. These attempts culminated with the proclamation of the Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] on 19 August and of the Transdniester SSR on 2 September 1990, whose territories thus would no longer come under the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova.

In this difficult situation, when attempts to divide the ancient Romanian land are made in order to hamper the democratic processes and the steps toward the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Moldavia, the People's Front of Moldova call on you with the request to take all the possible measures and condemn the flagrant violation of our territorial integrity and of the norms of international law.

We express our belief and our hope that we will be heard and supported in all possible ways.

3 September 1990

Seeks Help from Romania

AU1109113090 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Sep 90 p 4

["Appeal of the Council of the People's Front of Moldova Executive Committee to All the Romanians in the Country"]

[Text] Romanian Brothers: A few days ago we lived through the pain of commemorating the difficult events that took place 50 years ago; the consequences of those events are felt even today. Greedy hands tore away bleeding pieces from Romania's body, as a result of a transaction between the Soviet Russia and the fascist Germany.

The old wounds have not healed and now, one of the lands torn away then is threatened by new divisive acts: The sovereign state of Moldova, missing its southern and northern parts, is exposed to the danger of being divided by attempts to form so-called independent republics of the Gagauz people and Transdnestrians.

The heavy moments that your brothers from east of the Prut River go through cannot leave you indifferent, just as we, the Bessarabians were not indifferent during the tragic moments of the Romanian revolution in December 1989, when thousands of young people were ready to help you. Romanian Brothers, the People's Front of Moldavia call on you to take a firm position against the separatist actions of Soviet imperialism and grant us all your assistance in our struggle for national liberation.

We hope that our call will find an echo in your souls. The power lies in Unity. Unity is our success.

Now or never.

God bless us!

3 September 1990

Calls for Demonstrations

AU1109170790 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 6 Sep 90 p 4

["Appeal of the Council of the People's Front of Moldova Executive Committee to Romanians Everywhere"]

[Text] Romanian Brothers: Foul play being planned against our nation.

Soviet imperialism is plotting a new dismemberment of the already torn body of the Moldova country in order to have a pretext for a brutal intervention and to halt through violence the democratic reforms initiated by the parliament and the government of the Republic of Moldova.

The Gagauz republic was proclaimed on 19 August 1990 and the Dnestr republic made its appearance on 2 September 1990, both of them on the ancient lands of Romanians on the eastern side of the Prut River and declared that they freed themselves from the jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova.

We are going through difficult moments which might annihilate the efforts made by the parliament and government of the Republic of Moldova and of our whole nation to obtain real sovereignty.

Within this context, the People's Front in Moldova calls on all Romanians everywhere to take a stand through concrete actions (public demonstrations, radio and television programs, press campaign, and official protests at international bodies) with a view to condemn the separatist attempts of those political adventurers who serve as instruments of the Soviet empire.

Your actions are meant to draw the attention of the international public and the governments of all states to a possible repeat of the tragic events in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). The situation of our young democracy is fragile due to the fact that our state is a colony of the Soviet empire and is not a satellite state of the USSR, as the other above mentioned countries used to be.

We hope that in the coming difficult days for the destiny of our people, we will enjoy the entire support of the

Romanians throughout the world and of all citizens who believe in the ideals of democracy.

We, the people of the Republic of Moldova, are justified in believing that our appeal will not go unnoticed and the flagrant violation of human rights and of the international legal rules will not be tolerated anymore!

3 September 1990.

Moldavia Stands Opposed to Dnestr Independence

Rallies Protest Decision

PM1109135490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 First Edition p 5

[Report filed from Tiraspol "yesterday" by correspondent Captain Third Rank V. Yermolin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Resistance"]

[Text] Rallies, called on the initiative of parliamentary groups of the Moldova Supreme Soviet, were held in Bendery, Grigoriopol, and Slobodzeya—population centers forming part of the recently proclaimed Dnestr Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]—on Thursday 6 September. By decision of the extraordinary session of the Moldova parliament these groups are carrying out work in the Dnestr region to explain the session's decision, the crux of which is the categorical nonrecognition of the very fact of the Dnestr republic's creation.

The attempt to propagandize the Moldavian parliament's tough stance has been resolutety rebuffed everywhere. Unfortunately, it has not passed without provocation. In Bendery, for example, a group of young people waving tricolors tried to disrupt a 10,000-strong rally. Thanks to the efforts of the workers' voluntary militia and the local militia bloodshed was avoided.

Meanwhile the Dnestr Moldavian SSR Provisional Supreme Soviet is continuing its work. Its working bodies are being formed. The composition of the parliamentary group—15 people—to represent the Dnestr Moldavian SSR in the process of concluding a Union treaty has been confirmed. The Provisional Supreme Soviet has made an official statement on the Moldova Supreme Soviet decision sending "agitators" to the territory of the Dnestr Moldavian SSR, regarding it as "interference in the affairs of a sovereign state" and issuing a firm protest. At the same time readiness "to hold talks at the level of a Moldova SSR Supreme Soviet official delegation" was confirmed.

It should be noted that nervousness has been caused in Bendery and Grigoriopol by the presence of special-purpose militia subunits sent there by order of the Moldova SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. A particularly tense atmosphere prevails in Grigoriopol. A few days ago Colonel V. Bychenko, chief of the local rayon internal affairs department, was removed from his work by order from Kishinev. This prompted mass unrest and the holding of rallies at the buildings of the rayon soviet and militia.

Unfortunately, there is every sign that the Moldova leadership does not rule out the use of strong-arm tactics against "disturbers of the peace." And the concentration of Moldova special-purpose militia subunits in a number of Dnestr rayons confirms this.

Polls Support Independence

PM1209093190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Captain Third Class V. Yermolin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Results of Referendums: Votes for the Dnestr Moldova SSR"]

[Text] Tiraspol—Last Sunday referendums were held in Slobodzeya and Grigoriopol, major population centers on the left bank of the Dnestr in Moldova, in which local inhabitants were essentially answering a single question: Should they or should they not be part of the Dnestr Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]? The results of the poll were as follows: In Slobodzeya 87.2 percent of the population voted for the Dnestr Moldavian SSR, while in Grigoriopol 99 percent voted that way.

Thus two more places have been added to the several cities and rayon centers where referendums have already been held on this question.

In the evening a rally involving many thousands of people was held on Constitution Square in Tiraspol in support of creating the Dnestr Moldavian SSR.

A resolution adopted at the rally says in particular: "We assure the fraternal Moldavian people and representatives of all the nationalities of the SSR of Moldova that no nationalist intrigues will ever bring us into conflict. We will make every effort to preserve the closest political, economic, and cultural ties with our brothers on the right bank of the Dnestr." The participants in the rally demanded that the Union leadership make a proper assessment of the Moldovan Supreme Soviet's unconstitutional decision to set up a national army and a carabinieri corps.

"The Moldovan mass media," Vsevolod Yampolskiy, a city soviet deputy and member of the provisional Dnestr Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet, told me after the rally, "are accusing us leaders of the young republic of careerism, of seeking to hold on to leadership posts at any price, and of being detached from the people. Today's rally, I think, is evidence enough that we are simply expressing the will of many thousands of people. The creation of the republic for us, as for all people in the Dnestr region, is not an end in itself but an enforced step. It is due to the inflexible position of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet."

Saturday's latest session of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet offers some hope that the Moldavian [as published] parliamentarians are prepared to moderate their language in dealing with the "rebel regions" of the Gagauz republic and the Dnestr Moldavian SSR.

Snegur Issues Military Conscription Decree

LD1209103290 Moscow TASS in English 1024 GMT 12 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Anatoliy Golya and Aleksandr Tanas]

[Text] Kishinev September 12 TASS—Moldavian President Mircha Ion Snegur has issued a decree governing conscription into the Soviet Army valid until the end of talks between the governments of Moldova and the USSR.

The decree notes that Moldavian conscription centres and district conscription centres may call up Moldavian citizens for military service with the Soviet Armed Forces only with their written consent and the written consent of a conscript's parents.

The presidential decree instructs the Moldavian Government to exercise permanent and efficient control over the execution of the decree's provisions over the entire territory of the republic.

In compliance with the decree, the Moldavian Government is to immediately begin talks with the Soviet Government.

Lvov Oblast Suspends Military Conscription

LD1209103190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 12 Sep 90

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Lvov (Ukraine), 12 Sep—The Presidium of the Lvov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has adopted a decision "On the Autumn Call-up of Conscripts in Lvov Oblast for Active Military Service." It notes, in particular, that the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs are ignoring the decision adopted on 30 July 1990 by the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] "On Routine National Service By Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and the Use of Employees of the Republic's Law Enforcement Bodies Beyond the Bounds of the Republic," thus blatantly violating the declaration of state sovereignty of the Ukraine. With this document the republic's parliament obliged the Ukrainian Council of Ministers; "...by 15 September 1990, to draw up the procedure for the performing of national service by citizens of the Ukrainian SSR and, from autumn 1990, to call up for routine military service, as a rule, in military units stationed on the territory of the Ukraine."

In connection with this, the presidium of the oblast soviet people's deputies has decided to halt the activity of conscription commissions on the oblast's territory and not to set up new ones, and also not to begin the recruitment of conscripts until such time as the appropriate normative documents that would guarantee the fulfillment of the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR have been drawn up and received.

The presidium of the oblast soviet of people's deputies has warned the Lvov Oblast Military Registration and Enlistment Office that the conscription of scientific, technical, pedagogical, juridical and other cadres for periodical training and active military service beyond the bounds of the republic is impermissible.

At the present time about 200 of the oblast's conscripts have handed in notes refusing to service outside the Ukraine.

Youth Papers Drop Motto 'Proletarians, Unite'

PM1209083390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 3

[INTERFAX report: "Ukrainian Communist Youth League Central Committee Bureau Decision"]

[Text] A session of the Ukrainian Leninist Communist Youth League (Youth for Democratic Socialism) [Komsomol (YDS)] has decided to change the name of the pioneer paper YUNYY LENINETS to PEREMNEU and to back the idea of creating an independent Association of Youth and Children's Publications and also a Youth and Children's Press Foundation. The Bureau members were in favor of its not being compulsory to use the motto "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" in the republic papers MOLODEZH UKRAINY and KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA. As a spokesman for the Ukrainian Komsomol Central Committee told an INTERFAX correspondent, "The motto does not reflect today's realities and does not conform to the social composition and tasks of the Ukrainian Komsomol."

Caucasus

Armenia's Ter-Petrosyan Receives Norwegians

NC1109131590 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 9 Sep 90

[Text] Today Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, received Jo Benkow, president of the Norwegian parliament, and members of his delegation who are visiting Armenia.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan highly praised the assistance provided by various countries, including Norway and its people, and specifically by the Norwegian Red Cross for the elimination of the grave consequences of the December earthquake. He pointed out that that assistance was above all moral and psychological; for the first time in 70 years, the Armenian people felt that they were not isolated. Despite that, our people are well aware that they must rely on their own powers. That awareness will be helpful in the disaster zone, in restoring the collapsed economy of the republic, and in surmounting the political crisis.

Jo Benkow noted that the assistance given to Armenia after the disaster was provided by all Norwegians. We are pleased that here in Armenia they like Nansen [not further identified] and his people. On our part, we are well aware of the history of numerous (?trials) of the Armenian people, and the 1915 genocide of the Armenians has not been forgotten in Norway.

During the conversation, views were exchanged on the political and economic reforms taking place in the USSR and Armenia and on the prospects of bilateral relations between Norway and the Armenian Republic.

Levon Ter-Petrosyan expressed thanks once again in the name of the Armenian people [words indistinct] and handed (Jo Benkow) a citation and a memorial medal of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. They also exchanged presents.

Present at the meeting were: Khodzhamiryan, deputy chairman of the Republic's Council of Ministers; Saakyan, secretary of the Supreme Soviet; Mkrtchyan, foreign affairs minister; Aznavuryan, minister of health; (?Bartalanyan), chairman of the Armenian Red Cross; [name indistinct], Norway's ambassador in the USSR; and (Komissarov), temporary USSR charge d'affaires in Norway. Levon Ter-Petrosyan gave a luncheon for Jo Benkow.

In the afternoon, the Norwegian guests visited the depository of ancient manuscripts and familiarized themselves with ancient Armenian manuscripts.

On the same day, Jo Benkow and his entourage left Yerevan. They were seen off by Babken Ararktsyan [first deputy chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet], Yuriy Khodzhamiryan, Anatoliy Mkrtchyan, Ardashes Aznavuryan, and Rita (?Khalbazanyan).

Supreme Soviet Forms Special NKAO Commission

NC1109205990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Gagik Arutyunyan [deputy chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet], who was presiding over the morning session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, announced that thanks to various measures, the gas pipeline entering the Armenian Republic has been reopened.

A special commission dealing with Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—NKAO] was formed during the morning session. At the request of the deputies from NKAO the election of a chairman to this commission was postponed. [passage omitted]

During the recess our correspondent Khrayr Chamchyan interviewed two people's deputies. Here is the recording of the interview:

[Begin recording] [Chamchyan] I am now with Razmik Petrosyan, people's deputy and a member of the special commission dealing with the affairs of Artsakh. Mr. Petrosyan, today you were elected a member of that commission. How do you view the activities of that commission?

[Petrosyan] [sentence indistinct] At present the internal affairs department in NKAO does not function beacuse it is headed by a Russian who is subordinate to Azerbaijan but none of those who work for him submit to him. We must now work out an agreement with the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers to establish special subunits in NKAO attached to the Internal Affairs Ministry. We need to organize special subunits attached to the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry. In addition to our commission, we would also have an Artsakh committee at the Council of Ministers (?headed) by a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers [words indistinct] which would direct all affairs in NKAO. [words indistinct] The committee will see to it that real economic ties are established with Artsakh. As you know, some enterprises have already merged themselves with other Armenian enterprises in line with the legislation on enterprises. Now, the main issue for this committee should be to bring about the legal integration of all enterprises in NKAO with the Armenian enterprises and provide them with raw materials and planning.

[Chamchyan] The situation in NKAO is now very grave. I want to know what measures your special commission plans to take to stabilize the situation in NKAO?

[Petrosyan] One cannot say everything on the radio. However, I can state that our commision must first deal with the issue of defense. [words indistinct] All the region is necessary for us. We need Nagorno-Karabakh, Getashen and Shaumyanovskiy so as to create an autonomous republic. It should include Shaumyanovskiy and Getashen and establish all sorts of economic ties with Armenia. If we create an autonomous republic, then we could legally unite with the Armenian organizations and enterprises. That is, we will trade with Azerbaijan but most of it will be done with Armenia. Armenia's economy is now in difficulty and the NAKO economy, if well-organized, could support twice the population of Armenia. [passage omitted] [end recording]

In the evening, the sesion debated the important draft resolution on the state ownership of the Armenian Republic presented to the Supreme Soviet by the Commission for the Establishment of Independent Statehood and National Policy and the Commission for Economic Independence and Economic Development. We present the draft text of that document:

Proceeding from the principles found in the Decalaration of Independence of the Armenian Republic,

Considering the trend of the economic reforms in the USSR and the Armenian Republic, Cognizant of the necessity to create equal starting conditions for the economic independence in all the republics,

Proceeding from the fact that the economic potential of each republic is the guaranty for its independence

The Armenian Supreme Soviet decides:

1. The Armenian Republic is the owner of all the property of the state enterprises, associations and organizations found on the territory of the Armenian Republic.

2. The acquisition of the ownership of the Armenian Republic's property, its use and disposal is enforced by the Council of Ministers of the Armenian Republic. The latter is also empowered with the right to confiscate or alter the forms of ownership of the property of the Armenian Republic.

3. It is hereby stipulated that as regarding the nationalization of the property on the territory of the republic the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers in its relations with the USSR state organs should basically proceed from the republic's interests in the establishment of economic independence.

During the debate on the draft a number of serious proposals were put forward. The draft resolution was endorsed after some editorial corrections. [passage omitted]

Starting tomorrow, the people's deputies will start working in the standing commissions of the Supreme Soviet. The session will resume its deliberations next Monday, 17 September.

Armenian Parliament Adopts State Property Law

LD1109171390 Moscow TASS in English 1652 GMT 11 Sep 90

[By ARMENPRES-TASS correspondent GAgik Melnkumyan]

[Text] Yerevan September 11 TASS—The Armenian parliament adopted a law on state property, declaring all state enterprises, amalgamations, institutions and organisations on Armenian territory the property of the republic.

According to the law, ownership, usage and command of the property is in the exclusive competence of the republican government, which will proceed in its relations with state Union bodies from safeguarding the republic's economic independence.

On Tuesday [11 September], the newspaper VOICE OF ARMENIA, an organ of the republican Communist Party, published a draft programme of a new party, which is being founded on the basis of the Communist Party. It will be called the "Independent Communist Party of Armenia."

Armenia, Russia Sign Bilateral Agreement

NC1109173290 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] Vazgen Manukyan, chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers, and Ivan Silayev, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation, have signed an intergovernmental agreement in Moscow on economic and cultural cooperation between the two sovereign republics.

In signing the agreement, the sides proceeded from the principles of economic independence and traditional good neighborly relations and were (?moved) by the intention to further develop the economic ties on equal and mutually advantageous basis. [words indistinct] They agreed that the level of mutual supply of products for 1991 should not be lower than the level of 1990. The sides agreed to conduct their mutual relations on the basis of relevant agreements, contracts or protocols to be signed between the enterprises, organizations and other economic entities.

The contracting sides assume full liability for their responsibilities. In 1991, the final settlements for the mutual supplies should be done in current rates in Soviet rubles and in line with international prices acceptable to both sides. The sides will refrain from such actions which might economically damage each other.

State of Emergency 'Has Done a Lot of Good'

LD1109213490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Report by correspondent N. Nazaryan from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today is exactly two weeks since a state of emergency was introduced in Armenia, and one must mention that it has done a lot of good. According to the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs, only 35 crimes have been committed over the last 48 hours, mainly thefts, car thefts, and domestic incidents. An operation to disarm yet another armed grouping was carried out successfully. So the situation is returning to normal. It has been possible to reduce the curfew, which now starts at midnight. Theater and concert halls announced the opening of a new season.

But full peace is yet far away, especially as external events contribute to tension in Armenia. News from Karabakh and Armenian settlements adjacent to the oblast are invariably bleak. It was announced at yesterday's session of the republican Supreme Soviet that, thanks to talks, supplies of gas from Azerbaijan had resumed after a 20-day break. Unfortunately, the joy was short-lived. Today the main gas pipeline was again cut off in the neighboring republic.

Another Armed Group Disbands

NC1209072090 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Statement by the Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry; place and date not given—read by announcer]

[Excerpts] Of 35 crimes that took place in Armenia from 8 to 9 September, 17 occurred in Yerevan. [passage omitted] Thanks to continuing explanatory work, members of the armed groups have voluntarily returned 12 hunting guns, three pistols, an antihail gun, and ammunition. Twenty-one cars have been recovered.

The Armenian Internal Affairs Ministry workers have accomplished a successful operation during which yet another armed group was disbanded and disarmed. Arms, ammunition, and vehicles were recovered after that operation. The building and property forcibly held by the group have been returned to their legal owners.

Tension Continues on Armenia-Azerbaijan Border

Railway Workers Issue Appeal

NC1009081990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 6 Sep 90

[Text] The meeting of the representatives of the Azerbaijan railroad collectives has adopted an appeal to the railway workers in the Soviet Union. The appeal said: Twenty people were wounded recently in the section of the Azerbaijan railroad network that crosses through Armenia, particularly through Megrinskiy Rayon, as a result of the continuing provocations and sabotage. Locomotives and passenger cars have been fired on in 18 separate incidents, the tracks have been destroyed four times, and 18 houses belonging to the railway workers have been ransacked and destroyed by fire. This is part of the continuing psychological campaign against Azerbaijan and conceals the (?activities of the nationalists in Armenia). However, our railroad workers have continued to drive freight cars to Armenia even under such complex conditions. Nevertheless, all this is only part of the truth about the incidents in the region and in our railroad network. The Azerbaijan railroad workers have lost nearly 50 million rubles as a result of these incidents.

The appeal continued: Our decision to appeal to you is based on the [word indistinct] intention to tell you the whole truth about the dispute. Azerbaijan has been dragged into this dispute by the neighboring republic's claims for land.

The appeal concluded: We urge you to raise your voice to defend common sense and justice, hear our [word indistinct] and emotions, and do everything you can to contribute toward the efforts halt the aggressors. [passage indistinct]

Azeris Attack NKAO Village

NC1009210690 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0900 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Excerpts] The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet resumed its deliberations today. The deputies formed a parliamentary commission to handle the affairs of Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—NKAO]. At the recess after the first sitting, Mavr Danielyan met the people's deputies from Artsakh and asked them to detail the incidents which took place in Askeranskiy and Martuninskiy Rayons.

[Begin recording] [Danielyan] The junta, which is known as Azerbaijani Organizational Committee, is like a huge octopus, spreading its tentacles all over Nagorno-Karabakh. At first, as a rule it chose the weakest points. They have already occupied Gadrutskiy and have the Organizational Committee there. They have also occupied Shaumyanovskiy Rayon. As you already know, they made a similar attempt on Askeranskiy and Martuninskiy Rayons. Here is Armenian People's Deputy Davit Aleksanyan who has just returned from Askeranskiy. Mr. Aleksanyan what has happened there?

[Aleksanyan] What is happening there is virtually a continuation of what happened in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon as well as the continuation of incidents which took place in Gadrutskiy and Getashen. The government of Azerbaijan has set itself a goal of depopulating Artsakh of Armenians. It is consistently implementing its plans. To begin with, it is attempting to eliminate the leadership of the people. They have eliminated the oblast administration and now they are trying to eliminate the rayon administrations. Their aim is to deprive the people of Artsakh from organizing. [words indistinct] The major objective behind this policy is to ensure that Mutalibov and the group around him [words indistinct] do not lose the power in the coming elections as the center did in the Armenia elections. [passage omitted] Tonight we contacted the internal affairs department of the Martuninskiy Rayon. They informed us that at 0240 they received a report that a bus-load [words indistinct] of Azerbaijanis, armed with automatic weapons, have attacked the Mashtavashen village and have taken five militia as well as some villagers hostage. So far it is not known how many, if any, are injured. We are waiting for more news from Martuninskiy Rayon. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Ter-Petrosyan Speaks on Force

LD1109142490 Hamburg DPA in German 1326 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Yerevan (DPA)—Armenia's strong man, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, president of the Armenian Supreme Soviet, does not rule out force to implement his political objectives. In a conversation with German journalists in the Armenian capital, Yerevan, he made clear, however, that he is thinking in terms of force regarding the problem of Nagorno-Karabakh rather than the aimed-at secession of Armenia from the USSR.

The liberation of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, who are living as if on an island right inside the territory of neighboring Azerbaijan, according to Ter-Petrosyan, is a question of life and death. This question is "rooted so firmly in the people that we will, if necessary, solve it by force." Concerning Armenia's relations with Moscow the politician said: "We want a totally independent Armenia. But we agree that it must be a process and not a single act." Ter-Petrosyan added: "The Soviet Union is the last colonial system of the world and will inevitably fall apart."

The Armenian parliamentary president added he knew "that Europe has no positive attitude toward the liberation movements in the Soviet Union." Support was given to President Mikhail Gorbachev since there is interest in a stable USSR. However, Europe did not correctly assess the processes in the Soviet Union. The liberation forces can no longer be stopped, Ter-Petrosyan said.

Ter-Petrosyan Comments on Policy

AU1109153190 Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Sep 90 pp 1,2

[Report by Ulrich Schulze: "The Soviet Union Is Not Unshakable"]

[Text] Yerevan, 10 September—Four weeks after his election Armenian Parliamentary President Ter-Petrosyan has presented the bases of his policy. "We are ready and able to solve the problems in Armenia either politically or by force," Ter-Petrosyan said in an interview with this newspaper in Armenia's capital of Yerevan, referring to the conflict surrounding the region of Nagorno- Karabakh, which is located in Azerbaijan but is inhabited by Armenians. He left little doubt about his determination to put Armenia's independence from the Soviet Union, which was declared on 23 August, also in this category. Armenia is ready for compromises, he said. In return, Moscow and Baku also have to be ready for compromises. First of all, Moscow has to explain its attitude concerning the conflict involving Nagorno-Karabakh. Then it has to stop to tie down the Union republics that are striving for freedom, including the Baltic republics, Ter-Petrosyan said.

In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania Moscow can keep the situation stable only with military presence and pressure. This is being overlooked in Western Europe. Ter-Petrosyan called Armenia the "most radical" of the Soviet republics that are striving for independence. He is for a "peaceful path" in freedom and independence. An example of the fact that this is possible is the fall of the Berlin Wall. "Berlin and Nagorno-Karabakh are places that show that the Soviet Union is not unshakable." Like the entire East Bloc, the Soviet Union is gradually crumbling. Ter-Petrosyan added that the Soviet Union is "the last colonial system of the world." Its crumbling leads "at the same time to the end of the central Soviet power."

"Moscow cannot dominate the processes anymore, they are too fast." He has the impression, Ter-Petrosyan said, that this is gradually being recognized. His latest talks with President Gorbachev confirmed his view that Moscow sees Yerevan as a partner. Negotiations are conducted "on the basis of being equal partners in the negotiations." Moscow can settle its problems with Armenia and Azerbaijan only if the conflict involving Nagorno-Karabakh is settled. "This is the lever which is the only instrument to stabilize the situation," the Armenian parliamentary president said. Pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh leads to unrest in Armenia. The events in January and May 1990, which were overshadowed by civil-war-like incidents, showed how explosive the mood in the country is. The state of emergency, which was imposed on Armenia at the end of August, was not imposed by Moscow but by Yerevan. It is supposed to reestablish internal peace, which was disturbed by paramilitary units. Ter-Petrosyan added that the units, which were obviously supported by outside forces, have been defeated. The situation has calmed down. The state of emergency will be maintained until danger has finally subsided.

Ter-Petrosyan's armed units are patrolling Yerevan between midnight and 0600 in the morning. They are members of the "Armenian National Movement." Its leader, Sargisjan, obviously commands 40,000 to 60,000 men. Many of them fought in Afghanistan. They are armed with guns and knives. In Yerevan it is said that they stay away from their jobs to fight. They do not receive any financial support. Until the end of August these "unpaid guerrillas" had bloody fights with the members of the "Armenian National Army."

Ter-Petrosyan is sure that he will be able to bring about lasting peace. Gorbachev's ultimatum of 25 July that all armed units have to lay down their arms within 15 days has not had any effect. Now, however, the situation is calm. Ter-Petrosian does not mention the obvious lack of energy and foodstuffs. Contrary to one year ago, when the Azerbaijani blockade of Armenia was mentioned again and again, now it is only pointed out that train links with the eastern neighbor are again interrupted, that flights to and from Azerbaijan are rare, and that Azerbaijan no longer delivers natural gas. For this reason, cautious contacts have been established with Iran to get oil and gas from there. Stockpiles will be sufficient for two more weeks. As a result of the shortage, there is no hot water and gasoline is distributed in small amounts and in return for vouchers. Bread is running out. At the moment, food supplies consist almost exclusively of tomatoes, cucumbers, cabbage, and chives.

Armenians, Azerbaijanis Meet

NC1109175290 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Report by HYASTAN correspondent Ruben Simonyan: "A Meeting at the Idzhevanskiy Rayon's Border Zone. A Report by Our Correspondent Gevorg Nazaryan"—recorded]

[Text] [Nazaryan] The border zone is the focus of everyone's attention. The first clashes take place here and disrupt the peaceful lives of the local population. What awaits the people of the border zone now? To clarify this point, the members of the council of elders of Idzhevanskiy Rayon decided to meet their former neighbors. Ruben Simonyan, the correspondent of HAYASTAN newspaper and a member of the council of elders of Idzhevanskiy, was in the delegation. Let's listen to him:

[Simonyan] This was not a meeting between the delegation of the two neighboring rayons of Idzhevanskiy and Kazakhskiy despite the fact that representatives of the two rayons formed the bulk of the delegations. The two delegations acted as the delegations of the two republics. People of the same level participated in the delegations. The theme of the discussions between the sides was the improvement of the situation and the reduction of tension in the border zone and regions. It transpired that the Azerbaijani side was mostly concerned about those neighboring villages which recently were the focus of incidents. These are villages belonging to the Askipara subrayon of the Kazakhskiy Rayon which, as they say, have sustained damages. We, on our part, are interested in the improvement of our relations in view of the fact that people here are neighbors and are in constant contact and do their agricultural work in fields close to each other, and the roads cross each others' fields.

Apparently the fact that we, the Armenians, took the first positive step contributed to the improvement of the situation. The destroyed power line at Voskebar village in Noyemberyanskiy Rayon was repaired, thus enabling the supply of power to the Azerbaijani village of Upper Askipara. In return, the Azerbaijani side immediately reconnected the severed natural gas pipeline. Normal life was restored through mutual actions and agreements.

[Nazaryan] We have to state happily that the restoration of the gas pipeline was mentioned today at the Armenian parliament.

[Simonyan] Let me state that the actions which our delegation is taking naturally emanate from the instructions of our parliament and its chairman. The gas pipeline and railway will start operating. We saw ourselves that hundreds of cars loaded with freight destined for Armenia were waiting over there. Without advancing any condition the Azerbaijani side agreed to reconnect the gas pipeline starting 9 September. They kept their word on this matter. And according to the promise they made, the trains will certainly start moving to Armenia today or tomorrow. This is pleasing as it means life is being revived. There is only one condition which the radio listeners, in particular those in the border zones, must note: Any imprudent action and move which might lead to clashes or disaster is prohibited at the border villages and border zones. This is the fundamental condition.

[Nazaryan] Were there any exchange of views on Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomus Oblast]; how they intended to solve the Artsakh problem?

[Simonyan] Naturally it was not within the mandate of these two government delegations to discuss that larger issue. The Azerbaijani side was constantly reminding that we should leave the solution of the larger questions to our leaders. These neighborly problems which bother us and might further exacerbate the situation should be solved between us.

Blockades Result in Shortages

NC1109180990 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] The ebullient statements of the commandant of the state of emergency [in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—NKAO] no more refer to the unimpeded operations at the Stepanakert railway station. There is nothing strange in that. For the last six days or so no freight car has arrived here. There is also no possibility of dispatching the city's manufactured goods to various customers in the country. It is also impossible to send around 150 empty freight cars which have accumulated in the station. These cars are much needed in various Union republics.

Yet, what is strange is that there is no mention of the forced idleness of the local railwaymen in the statements of the commandant. It is not difficult to grasp the reason for that silence: The Armenian exremists are not responsible for the stranding of more than 300 freight cars destined for the oblast along the Azerbaijani railways.

The halt in supplies needed for the national economy will undoubtedly cause the complete disintegration of the already feeble economy of the NKAO which too must make the transition to a market economy.

There is a dangereous shortage of foodstuffs. It is not known at which station the school books have been detained.

The power supply is sytematically reduced to eight hours a day, mostly at nights. That is harming technological processes and disrupting the work of the enterprises. What's more, they have also started taking citizens hostages at nights.

In view of the fact that the old scenario is being implemented with the assistance of the Internal Troops, it is possible to assume with certainty that very soon the local administration organs will disintegrate also in Mardakertskiy Rayon and Stepanakert.

Yet there are Russian nationals in Azerbaijan who are ready to assume the leadership of the so-called organizational bureaus which at the close of the 20th century have become the salient breakthroughs of the conservative political mind.

The alterations in the administrative divisions of the NKAO and the complete blockade of information can only be described as white genocide.

We might one day suddenly see the establishment of a demographic balance. Then Azerbaijan would probably organize a plebiscite the results of which would undoubtedly end in the dissolution of the Armenian autonomous formation. If we are mistaken in our conjectures let the leadership of that republic prove otherwise.

As never before, the Armenians of NKAO need sympathy. Where has the voice of the progressive intellectuals gone? After all, the violation of human rights, in this case, the violation of the rights of an entire people, cannot be confined to state borders. You should feel the pain of being a citizen in Artsakh.

Ministry Corrects TASS Report

LD1109210190 Moscow TASS in English 2027 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 11 TASS—The following is a report from the Soviet Interior Ministry's press centre:

On Monday [10 September], TASS distributed an AZERINFORM report about the aggravation of the situation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region. The report contained two serious mistakes.

The AZERINFORM report said: "During the past two days, Armenian militants and young hoodlums occupied the buildings of the district communist party committees in the district centres of Askeran, Gadrut and Martuni."

According to the Interior Ministry's latest reports, the situation in Askeran, Gadrut and Martuni districts of Nagorno-Karabakh became aggravated due to the arrival of members of a republican organising committee for Nagorno-Karabakh to "temporarily replace" the first secretaries and apparatus of the district party committees.

On September 7, the building of the Askeran party committee was sieged by 1,000 protesting local residents, rather than militants.

On the same day, about 3,000 people in the Martuni district gathered outside the local party committee, protesting against the removal of the first secretary from his post.

Protesters overturned a UAS-469 car belonging to the Azerbaijani Interior Ministry, in which the organising committee members had arrived.

The local party committees in the above-mentioned districts are now being guarded by militia and Interior Ministry Troops.

Deputy Continues Hunger Strike

NC1209122490 Yerevan Domestic in Armenian 1630 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] For three days now Zori Balayan, USSR people's deputy from the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], author, and orator, has been on a hunger strike to protest the illegal acts the Baku leadership and the military are perpetrating in the NKAO.

As is known, in his letter to the Soviet president, Balayan pointed out that the constitutionally valid Armenian formation is threatened.

There was extensive reaction in Armenia and in the NKAO to the news of the extremely regrettable decision by the people's deputy. The phones at agencies and newspapers are ringing constantly. The public is expressing its concern over Zori Balayan's health. It has become known that the Soviet president has also received cables from renowned American doctor (Robert Hale) and from public worker Armand Hammer, who both expressed their great sympathy for the tragedy inflicted on the Armenian people in December 1988 and then immediately headed for Armenia to help.

The doctors at the U.S. clinic where Zori Balayan was being treated more than a year ago have also expressed their concern to the Soviet president. In their appeals to Mikhail Gorbachev, they made no demands but expressed their sincere concern over Balayan's health, asking that all the necessary steps be taken to avoid possible grave consequences. The American doctors recalled that their patient had already been clinically dead but survived, and that a hunger strike can inflict irreparable damage.

At noon on 11 September, we tried to contact Zori Balayan, said ARMENPRES correspondents. We do not know why his phone at the Moscow Hotel where the people's deputies are staying was not answered. And it is not clear why the floor guard, who could have said something about the deputy, refused to talk to us, and why each time—knowing that the phone call was from Yerevan—he hung up the phone. The same applied to the hotel's infirmary. They did not know anything about the hunger strike by the USSR people's deputy, although news on the hunger strike had been published in the Soviet and international mass media.

It was only late in the day, with the help of the Yerevan intercity telephone center operators and because of our persistence, that telephone contact was established. Naturally the first question was on how Zori Balayan, who had not had anything to eat for three days, was feeling. How do your Supreme Soviet colleagues feel?

Naturally they are extremely concerned, he replied. Most of them agree that under the circumstances, when no one listens to us, such a step is necessary.

We asked, was your letter handed to Gorbachev?

He received it yesterday evening, 10 September, upon his return from Finland. He is expected to participate in the USSR Supreme Soviet session, Balayan replied.

Do you not find that, under the existing conditions when something is happening in the country every day and the center is at a loss on where to begin, your hunger strike—a hunger strike by a member of the USSR Supreme Soviet—could be considered inopportune?

No, I do not think so, he replied. There should be no doubts under the current conditions when the fate of the NKAO as an ethnic Armenian formation is at stake, especially when the Soviet mass media is trying to keep the country's public at a distance from the true situation in the region.

Mr. Balayan, we wish you health on behalf of your compatriots. Thank you.

Georgian Democratic Election Campaign Appeal

LD1109224690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] We have just received a report from Tbilisi. An appeal by the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee to political parties and public political movements which are taking part in the election of deputies to the republic's future parliament has been published here today. It has been dictated by the need to create optimal conditions for a free expression of the popular will. For the first time, elections are taking place in Georgia on a multiparty basis and with a combined majority proportional system. Thirty-five parties and public political organizations have entered the struggle for the deputies' mandates. The election is scheduled for the end of October. On the threshold of this event the Communist Party of Georgia Central Committee has appealed to all taking part in it to hold a meeting of representatives of the parties and movements without delay and on an equal footing. It is proposed that a joint statement be drawn up and made to the effect that, irrespective of their views, the participants in the election take upon themselves a responsibility to contribute in every way possible to it being held democratically.

29 Parties Registered for Elections in Georgia

PM1009151890 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by Colonel V. Kaushankskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "On a Multiparty Basis"]

[Text] Tbilisi—Twenty-nine political parties will enter the electoral battle for deputies' seats in the next Georgian parliament. This figure was finally determined after the Central Electoral Commission for the election of deputies to the republic Supreme Soviet summed up the results of the registration of political parties which had submitted requests to participate in the elections. A situation—let us say directly—that is unique both for the republic and for the country as a whole. The selection of parties was rather tough; suffice to say that 11 parties were refused registration, including the Georgian political organization "Stalin."

It is stipulated that parties whose statutes, program, or activity do not correspond to the requirements of the recently ratified law are excluded from the electoral campaign. However, those who are rejected have a right to appeal against the commission's decision in the republic's Supreme Court within three days. One more substantive detail of the current campaign: Officially registered parties have the right to unite into electoral blocs at their own discretion. The final version of "bloc formation," as well as the specific distribution of forces, will be known in the very near future.

Georgian Supreme Court Registers 'Stalin' Party

PM1009151090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[INTERFAX report under tje "One Paragraph" rubric: "'Stalin' Runs for Election"]

[Text] Georgia's Supreme Court has adopted a decision to allow the Georgian political organization "Stalin" to run in the forthcoming parliamentary elections. The organization is an association of Stalinists and neo-Stalinists. The grounds on which the electoral commission tried to prevent this group from participating in the elections are interesting. The organization was initially refused registration because it "directs its activity in accordance with the program and statutes of another party—the CPSU—and recognizes all the demands of the present constitutions of the USSR and Georgia." Apart from "Stalin," five other parties have obtained the right to participate in the elections via the court. The number of parties in the political election arena is thereby brought to 35.

Six More Georgian Parties Registered on Appeal

PM1209085390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by Colonel V. Kaushanskiy under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Six More"]

[Text] Tbilisi—The dynamics of political life in Georgia now are such that even the most daring assumptions and official reports can be out of date in 48 hours. Sometimes even sooner than that. We have already told readers how the Central Electoral Commission for the election of deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet registered 29 parties. And how eight of those refused registration on the basis of one article or another of the Law on Elections exercised their right of appeal against the commission's decision to the republic's Supreme Court. Six of these achieved their aim and, according to a report from I. Zhordaniya, chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, have now joined the election marathon. Among those seeking seats in parliament is the All-Georgian Party of Peace and Freedom. It was founded on 24 August by the All-Georgian Union of Afghan Veterans and numbers around 5,000 people. The party's paramount goal is to fight for the consolidation of the nation and the representatives of all the peoples living in Georgia. Incidentally, at the beginning of September the first issue of ULUMBO, a newspaper issued by the Afghan veterans, reached the "Soyuzpechat" kiosks.

Central Asia

Tajik Instigator of Interethnic Strife Sentenced

LD1209035290 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 1300 GMT 7 Sep 90

[Text] From the court hall: The Supreme court of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic has sentenced to four years of deprivation of freedom Bedimogov, resident of (Gizhdalabad) in Leninskiy Rayon.

In the Collegium of the Supreme Court it has been established that on 12 February at 1400 Bedimogov, worshipper in the village mosque, came to the rayon to the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, where at that time an unofficial meeting [nesanktsirovaniy] was being held. Bedimogov spread rumors that the few thousand Armenians who had come to town had been given living accommodations. He then, using a microphone and a megaphone, spoke to those present at the meeting, saying: Don't believe the words of Latifi, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Makhamov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Republic. They are not telling the truth. The Armenians have not been removed from the territory of Tajikistan. He demanded the resignation of the leaders of the Republic. Not satisfied with this, he said: In defense of the interests of Muslims, it is necessary to establish an Islamic republic, and called on the crowd for more decisive actions. During this time he acted as an organizer and active participant in disturbances, and he aroused national hatred.

In light of this, the case was looked into by the court. The accused completely and frankly confessed to all the crimes committed by him. In line with the totality of the crime and taking into consideration his frank confession of guilt and repentance before the law, Bedimogov was sentenced to four years of deprivation of freedom, to be kept in a labor colony with an intensifed regime.

Declaration of Turkmen Sovereignty Published

90US1303A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 23 Aug 90 p 1

["Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR"]

[Text] Expressing the wishes of the people of Turkmenistan, recognizing its responsibility for the fate of the Turkmen nation, realizing the nation's right to self-determination, displaying concern for the full-fledged political, economic, social, spiritual, and cultural development of the people and the all-around assurance of the rights and liberties of the citizens, and considering the republic an equal and independent member of the world community, the Turkmen SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet proclaims the state independence of the Turkmen SSR as the republic's supremacy, independence, and fullness and indivisibility of power throughout its territory and independence and equality in foreign relations.

1. The Turkmen SSR is a sovereign national state exercising the fullness of power throughout its territory.

The Turkmen SSR assures the defense and protection of the national statehood of the Turkmen people.

2. The Turkmen SSR declares its aspiration to create a humane democratic society in which the law is supreme.

The vector of sovereignty and the source of state power in the Turkmen SSR is its people. The people exercise state power directly and through representative bodies on the basis of the Turkmen SSR Constitution. Only the highest organs of state power of the Turkmen SSR may speak on behalf of the whole people.

3. The state sovereignty of the Turkmen SSR is realized in the name of the highest goals—assurance for each person of the rights and liberties proclaimed by the General Declaration of Human Rights, the Turkmen SSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, and the rules of international law.

4. The Turkmen SSR unites voluntarily with other republics in the Union on the basis of a treaty. The republic reserves the right of free secession from the USSR and the competence to itself determine the political and economic system. The Turkmen SSR confirms its right to exercise authority which it has voluntarily transferred to the jurisdiction of the USSR.

5. The supremacy of the Constitution and the laws of the Turkmen SSR is established throughout the territory of the Turkmen SSR. Enactments of the USSR contrary to the sovereign laws of the Turkmen SSR are suspended by the highest organs of state power and administration of the republic on its territory.

State power in the Turkmen SSR is exercised according to the principle of its separation into legislative, executive, and judicial authority.

The highest surveillance of the precise and uniform execution of the laws of the Turkmen SSR is exercised by the Turkmen SSR prosecutor, who is appointed by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet, is answerable to it, and is accountable to it alone.

6. The territory of the Turkmen SSR within its current borders is inviolable and may not be altered or used in this form or the other without the say of the Turkmen people.

7. Republic citizenship with preservation of citizenship of the USSR is established on the territory of the Turkmen SSR. The Turkmen SSR ensures the equality before the law of all citizens of the republic, regardless of origins, social and property position, racial and national affiliation, sex, education, language, political views, religious beliefs, type and nature of occupation, place of residence, and other circumstances.

Citizens of the Turkmen SSR outside of the republic are under the protection and patronage of the Turkmen SSR, and the organs of power of the republic create the conditions for satisfaction of their cultural and linguistic requirements.

Citizens of other Union republics and foreign states and stateless persons on the territory of the Turkmen SSR are guaranteed the rights and liberties stipulated in the Turkmen SSR Constitution, the USSR Constitution, and the rules of international law.

8. The Turkmen SSR independently decides all questions of the republic's internal and external security. The republic determines the procedure of military service by citizens of the Turkmen SSR and monitors the assurance of their rights and conditions of service and use for military purposes.

The Turkmen SSR realizes direct relations with other states, concludes treaties with them, exchanges diplomatic, consular, and commercial representations, participates in the activity of international organizations, and contributes actively to the strengthening of general peace and international security.

10. The land and its interior, air space, water, and other natural resources within the confines of the territory of the Turkmen SSR and the offshore economic zone are national property and the possession of the Turkmen people, and serve as the material basis of the republic's sovereignty. The people of Turkmenistan have an exclusive right to the possession, enjoyment, and disposal of this wealth and also the economic and scientific-technological potential created on the territory of the republic.

11. The creation, location, and procedure of functioning on republic territory of facilities of the ownership of the USSR, other Union republics, and foreign states and their citizens are regulated by laws of the Turkmen SSR. The republic ensures the protection of all forms of ownership. The Turkmen SSR independently establishes the extent of the recovery and the terms of the supply (export) of minerals and raw materials, regulates (licenses, sets quotas) foreign economic activity, and administers the customs service on republic territory. The Turkmen SSR has a right to its share of all-Union property and the diamond and currency funds and gold reserves of the USSR.

12. The Turkmen SSR independently determines the procedure of the organization on republic territory of environmental protection and the use of natural resources, assures environmental safety for the people of the republic, and prohibits ecologically harmful processes and the realization of products harmful for man's health.

13. The Turkmen SSR forms a national bank subordinate to the republic Supreme Soviet, creates its own financial and credit system, and confirms the rights of title to specialized banks. The Turkmen SSR creates a foreign economic bank of the republic.

14. The Turkmen SSR is independent in the solution of questions of the cultural and spiritual development of the people of Turkmenistan and in the creation of its own system of schooling, education, science, and information.

15. The Turkmen SSR provides for the national and cultural revival of the Turkmen people, national self-awareness, folk traditions and singularities, and the functioning of Turkmen as the official language.

16. National, cultural, and historical values on the territory of the Turkmen SSR are the exclusive property of the republic and its people. The Turkmen SSR has the right to restore to the ownership of the people of Turkmenistan national, cultural, and historical values outside of the republic.

17. The Turkmen SSR guarantees all nationalities residing on the territory of the republic the right to their free national and cultural development.

The declaration is the basis for the elaboration of a new constitution of the Turkmen SSR, the conclusion of a Union treaty, and the perfecting of republic legislation.

Adopted by the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet on 22 August 1990.